Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
Hi Bruno Marchal "Is" is what we privately think, "ought" is what we think when another guy's around. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/22/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-21, 14:31:50 Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume On 20 Aug 2012, at 15:01, Alberto G. Corona wrote: In evolutionary terms, is and ougth reflect the double nature of a social being which has not lost is individuality, as individual and as a member of a bigger whole. Both are in tension. The social whole is also in our instinctive individual nature,and appear to the conscious trough intuitions and feelings of duty. The "Ought" are our long term rules for survival as individuals as member of a society trough generations, which is accesibe trough intuition. The IS is more inmediate to our intuition (when social things are ok). But both are given, but are adapted to the social circunstances : We would not be here if our ancestors would not have been egoistic. Neither we would be here too if they would not attend their social duties and repress the deleterious part of their selfish behaviours. For this reason,John Maynard Smith, an evolutionist http://meaningoflife.tv/ said that the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy, because the Ough is in an IS no less IS than the IS of our ordinary selfish behaviour, with some matizations. is in concordance with the Christian notion of the human nature of a man in permanent tension between the god (which he have knowledge thanks to his Soul or his Nous) and the evil of his socially and individually deleterous selfish impulses. This tension between deletereous individuality that endangers the common good appears in all the scales of evolution. there are parasite molecules, parasite genes, parasite intracellular organules, parasite tissues and parasite individuals against which the whole has a set of countermeasures. The transitions from a level to the next never is complete. The tension between individuality and sociality is ethernal, but in the human being this conflict is not only is carried out externally, but in its own conscience. Well said. Mathematical modal logic, like model theory and mathematical semantics, illustrates also that the ought can be made as an is by a change of level in the theories, as adding dimensions can sometimes do that in mathematical physics. The tension between the higher self and the "little selfish ego" exists right at the start in all universal machine, even if this is not palpable when the machine is isolated from other machine. I mean that we can already justify a sort of "ought" by the logic of self-reference, (notably the one give by [[]p & <>p)), and this might corroborate some of Leibniz insight. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 2012/8/20 Roger Hi meekerdb All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier. Heaven is what should be, down here is what is. This conflict earns preachers a nice life. The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by resurrecting Him. IMHO. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-18, 15:04:00 Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume Who? Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy? Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
In evolutionary terms, is and ougth reflect the double nature of a social
being which has not lost is individuality, as individual and as a member of
a bigger whole. Both are in tension. The social whole is also in our
instinctive individual nature,and appear to the conscious trough intuitions
and feelings of duty. The "Ought" are our long term rules for survival as
individuals as member of a society trough generations, which is accesibe
trough intuition. The IS is more inmediate to our intuition (when social
things are ok). But both are given, but are adapted to the social
circunstances : We would not be here if our ancestors would not have been
egoistic. Neither we would be here too if they would not attend their
social duties and repress the deleterious part of their selfish behaviours.
For this reason,John Maynard Smith, an evolutionist
http://meaningoflife.tv/ said that the naturalistic fallacy is itself a
fallacy, because the Ough is in an IS no less IS than the IS of our
ordinary selfish behaviour, with some matizations. is in concordance with
the Christian notion of the human nature of a man in permanent tension
between the god (which he have knowledge thanks to his Soul or his Nous)
and the evil of his socially and individually deleterous selfish impulses.
This tension between deletereous individuality that endangers the common
good appears in all the scales of evolution. there are parasite molecules,
parasite genes, parasite intracellular organules, parasite tissues and
parasite individuals against which the whole has a set of countermeasures.
The transitions from a level to the next never is complete. The tension
between individuality and sociality is ethernal, but in the human being
this conflict is not only is carried out externally, but in its own
conscience.
2012/8/20 Roger
> Hi meekerdb
>
> All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier.
> Heaven is what should be, down here is what is.
> This conflict earns preachers a nice life.
>
> The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long
> time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by
> resurrecting Him. IMHO.
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/20/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> *From:* meekerdb
> *Receiver:* everything-list
> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 15:04:00
> *Subject:* Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
>
> Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
> Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural
> and Social Science, London School of
> Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk.
>
> Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural
> human desires, and that
> moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of
> society. Recent
> developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and
> neuroscience explain
> why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean
> approach to moral
> psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been
> willing to pursue this
> naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called
> ‘the naturalistic fallacy’.
> This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that
> none of them present an
> obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical
> naturalism.
>
> http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf
>
> Brent
>
> On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
> This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to
> be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism,
> and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is
> "ought to be" and Aristotle is "is in fact".
> There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the
> Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven
> ("thy Kingdom come.).
> This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between
> "is" and "should be". He said he knew of no way to go from
> "is" to "should be". Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker
> so ihe's worth quoting:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
>
> Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, *A
> Treatise of Human
> Nature
> * (1739):
>
> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
> remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of
> reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
> concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that
> instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I
> meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought
> not*. This change is imperceptible; but i
Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
Hi meekerdb
All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier.
Heaven is what should be, down here is what is.
This conflict earns preachers a nice life.
The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long
time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by
resurrecting Him. IMHO.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/20/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-18, 15:04:00
Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and
Social Science, London School of
Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk.
Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural human
desires, and that
moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of
society. Recent
developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and
neuroscience explain
why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean approach
to moral
psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been willing to
pursue this
naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called ‘the
naturalistic fallacy’.
This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that none
of them present an
obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical naturalism.
http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf
Brent
On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to
be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism,
and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is
"ought to be" and Aristotle is "is in fact".
There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the
Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven
("thy Kingdom come.).
This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between
"is" and "should be". He said he knew of no way to go from
"is" to "should be". Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker
so ihe's worth quoting:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, A
Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning
human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be
given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the
readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
reason.[1]
Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any
explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how
exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by
Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical
theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is
impossible.[2] This complete severing of "is" from "ought" has been given the
graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine.[3]
Implications
The apparent gap between "is" statements and "ought" statements, when combined
with Hume's fork, renders "ought" statements of dubious validity. Hume's fork
is the idea that all items of knowledge are either based on logic and
definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then
"ought" statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it
would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and
non-cognitivism work with such conclusions.
The is–ought problem has been recognised as an important issue for the validity
of secular ethics and their defense from criticism—often religiously
inspired.[4]
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
---
Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
Hi Bruno Marchal
Yes, Hume was complaining about slipping modal logic into an argument.
There are indeed some similarities between Hume and van Quine. Hume
was an empiricist while van Quine sxeems to me at l,east to have been a
pragmatist.
Bother woirk from the particular to the general. Theory schmeery.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/20/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-19, 05:56:54
Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
On 18 Aug 2012, at 17:08, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to
be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism,
and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is
"ought to be" and Aristotle is "is in fact".
You are right. Aristotle is intuitive, and Plato is counter-intuitive.
There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the
Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven
("thy Kingdom come.).
This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between
"is" and "should be". He said he knew of no way to go from
"is" to "should be". Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker
so ihe's worth quoting:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, A
Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning
human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be
given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the
readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
reason.[1]
Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any
explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how
exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by
Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical
theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is
impossible.[2] This complete severing of "is" from "ought" has been given the
graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine.[3]
Implications
The apparent gap between "is" statements and "ought" statements, when combined
with Hume's fork, renders "ought" statements of dubious validity. Hume's fork
is the idea that all items of knowledge are either based on logic and
definitions, or else on observation. If the is杘ught problem holds, then "ought"
statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would
seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and non-cognitivism
work with such conclusions.
The is杘ught problem has been recognised as an important issue for the validity
of secular ethics and their defense from criticism梠ften religiously inspired.[4]
You make me realize that Hume is a bit Quinean. Quine was struggling against
modal logic, or any notion of necessity and possibility. Indeed Modal logic has
been discovered by Aristotle when trying to make clearer its metaphysics, and
modal logic is indeed a technical tool for serious metaphysician.
Quine claimed that modal logic has been conceived in sin.
But, as George Boolos said aptly: G del's incompleteness redeemed Modal logic,
if only by assuring purely arithmetical interpretation of it, made necessary by
arithmetical incompleteness. It is a fact: machines cannot avoid the modalities.
Arithmetical truth does fit well with Quine's idea of "is", and then
incompleteness provides all the internal, modalities as seen by the numbers
(the person associated to them).
This concerns more "is possible" than "ought to". The moral element is more
complex to talk about, but is made possible by the "is possible", and so they
are certainly related.
In the machine's world Hume's Guillotine is bugged. It can't work.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would sa
