Re: Re: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ?
Hi Richard Ruquist No, intelligence is a function of mind and hence is inextended. Brain is extended. Mind is the monad of brain if I may. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-27, 09:16:20 Subject: Re: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ? Hence, both are extended. QED On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist The more brain, the more mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-27, 09:09:24 Subject: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ? Roger, If the mind were not extended, then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size. Richard On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ? http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html "The Mind Body Problem What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. In Descartes' philosophy the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially an extended thing - something which occupies space. Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two quite different kinds of substances. So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the body in action. But how is this possible? How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something in space effect an unextended thing?" - Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal world. In summary, and in addition, 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or phenomenal. 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one. 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a property, monads?an have?ome limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the universe (including all life). This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious. Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that happens. 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men as?lind, completely passive robots. However,?is monad is inside of the supreme monad,?hich is his puppet-master. But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense?hat we feel we are alive. but through the supreme monad in which he is?ubordinately enclosed. 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have some dim awareness of future happenings. I will just briefly?iscuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely virtual, a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the universe. Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless, with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks) ). Every monad has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed set?f?irtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him by the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every other monad in the universe. All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to Leibniz's principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can perceive, feel, and act. So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain,?nd react, he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad, and then have you virtually feel pain?s a monad, but actually to feel a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really jump in both world, one virtually and one physically. How does this differ == A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect, first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's metaphysics. What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology: http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is given at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/ There seems to
Re: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ?
Hence, both are extended. QED On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > The more brain, the more mind. > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/27/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Richard Ruquist > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-27, 09:09:24 > *Subject:* Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change > ? > > Roger, > If the mind were not extended, > then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size. > Richard > > On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > >> It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ? >> >> http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html >> >> >> "The Mind Body Problem >> >> What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. >> In Descartes' philosophy >> the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially >> an extended thing - something which occupies space. >> Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two >> quite different kinds of substances. >> So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the >> body in action. But how is this possible? >> How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something >> in space effect an unextended thing?" >> >> - >> � >> Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin >> in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal >> world. >> � >> In summary, and in addition, >> � >> 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or >> phenomenal. >> � >> 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one. >> � >> 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a >> property, >> monads燾an have爏ome limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the >> universe (including all life). >> This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious. >> Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that >> happens. >> � >> 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men >> as燽lind, completely passive robots. However,爃is monad >> is inside of the supreme monad,爓hich is his puppet-master. >> But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he >> becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense爐hat we feel we are alive. >> but through the supreme monad in which he is爏ubordinately enclosed. >> � >> 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have >> some dim awareness of future happenings. >> � >> � >> � >> � >> >> >> � >> � >> � >> I will just briefly燿iscuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely >> virtual, >> a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions >> (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the >> universe.� >> Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless,� >> with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks)�). >> � >> Every monad� has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed >> set爋f爒irtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him by >> the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed >> to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every >> other >> monad in the universe.� >> � >> All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to >> Leibniz's >> principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can >> perceive, >> feel, and act. >> � >> � >> So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain,燼nd react, >> he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad, >> and then have you virtually feel pain燼s a monad, but actually to feel >> a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really >> jump in both world, one virtually and one physically. >> � >> � >> � >> How does this differ >> � >> � >> � >> == >> A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS >> � >> BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect, >> first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's >> metaphysics. >> >> What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology: >> >> http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html >> >> The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is >> given at >> >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/ >> >> There seems to be some confusion and differing acounts爋n how things >> happen, >> >> but my own understanding is that: >> >> 1). All simple substances are monads, or which there are 3 types, >> those just con
Re: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ?
Hi Richard Ruquist The more brain, the more mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/27/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-27, 09:09:24 Subject: Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change ? Roger, If the mind were not extended, then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size. Richard On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ? http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html "The Mind Body Problem What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. In Descartes' philosophy the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially an extended thing - something which occupies space. Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two quite different kinds of substances. So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the body in action. But how is this possible? How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something in space effect an unextended thing?" - ? Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal world. ? In summary, and in addition, ? 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or phenomenal. ? 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one. ? 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a property, monads?an have?ome limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the universe (including all life). This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious. Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that happens. ? 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men as?lind, completely passive robots. However,?is monad is inside of the supreme monad,?hich is his puppet-master. But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense?hat we feel we are alive. but through the supreme monad in which he is?ubordinately enclosed. ? 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have some dim awareness of future happenings. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I will just briefly?iscuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely virtual, a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the universe.? Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless,? with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks)?). ? Every monad? has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed set?f?irtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him by the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every other monad in the universe.? ? All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to Leibniz's principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can perceive, feel, and act. ? ? So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain,?nd react, he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad, and then have you virtually feel pain?s a monad, but actually to feel a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really jump in both world, one virtually and one physically. ? ? ? How does this differ ? ? ? == A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS ? BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect, first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's metaphysics. What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology: http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is given at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/ There seems to be some confusion and differing acounts?n how things happen, but my own understanding is that: 1). All simple substances are monads, or which there are 3 types, those just containing bodily perceptions (rocks, vegetables), those containing affective perceptions as well (animals) and those (man) which also have mental perceptions (ie all things mental). 2. Monads can do nothing or perceive anything on their own, but only through God (the supreme monad) according to our desires, which are actually God's ? 3) All of the actions of lesser monads and the supreme monad God have been scripted in the Preestabli
