Hence, both are extended. QED On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 9:13 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist > > The more brain, the more mind. > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/27/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> > *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > *Time:* 2012-08-27, 09:09:24 > *Subject:* Re: What is the mind-body problem ? How do monads cause change > ? > > Roger, > If the mind were not extended, > then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size. > Richard > > On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ? >> >> http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html >> >> >> "The Mind Body Problem >> >> What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. >> In Descartes' philosophy >> the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially >> an extended thing - something which occupies space. >> Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two >> quite different kinds of substances. >> So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the >> body in action. But how is this possible? >> How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something >> in space effect an unextended thing?" >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> � >> Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin >> in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal >> world. >> � >> In summary, and in addition, >> � >> 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or >> phenomenal. >> � >> 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one. >> � >> 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a >> property, >> monads燾an have爏ome limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the >> universe (including all life). >> This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious. >> Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that >> happens. >> � >> 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men >> as燽lind, completely passive robots. However,爃is monad >> is inside of the supreme monad,爓hich is his puppet-master. >> But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he >> becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense爐hat we feel we are alive. >> but through the supreme monad in which he is爏ubordinately enclosed. >> � >> 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have >> some dim awareness of future happenings. >> � >> � >> � >> � >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> � >> � >> � >> I will just briefly燿iscuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely >> virtual, >> a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions >> (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the >> universe.� >> Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless,� >> with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks)�). >> � >> Every monad� has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed >> set爋f爒irtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him by >> the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed >> to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every >> other >> monad in the universe.� >> � >> All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to >> Leibniz's >> principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can >> perceive, >> feel, and act. >> � >> � >> So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain,燼nd react, >> he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad, >> and then have you virtually feel pain燼s a monad, but actually to feel >> a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really >> jump in both world, one virtually and one physically. >> � >> � >> � >> How does this differ >> � >> � >> � >> ================================================== >> A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS >> � >> BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect, >> first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's >> metaphysics. >> >> What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology: >> >> http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html >> >> The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is >> given at >> >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/ >> >> There seems to be some confusion and differing acounts爋n how things >> happen, >> >> but my own understanding is that: >> >> 1). All simple substances are monads, or which there are 3 types, >> those just containing bodily perceptions (rocks, vegetables), >> those containing affective perceptions as well (animals) and those (man) >> which also have mental perceptions (ie all things mental). >> >> 2. Monads can do nothing or perceive anything on their own, but only >> through God >> (the supreme monad) according to our desires, which are actually God's >> � >> >> 3) All of the actions of lesser monads and the supreme monad God have >> been scripted >> in the Preestablished Harmony. >> � >> 4) Thus causation is virtual, say like in a爏ilent movie. No actual forces >> are involved, >> only virtual forces. >> � >> 5) >> � >> � >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <+rclo...@verizon.net> >> 8/27/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: benjayk >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-08-25, 11:16:59 >> Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of >> computers >> >> >> I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the >> main >> points: >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> But let's say we mean "except for memory and unlimited accuracy". >> >> >> This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY >> >> >> computers. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than >> atoms? >> >> I >> >> > can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of >> >> > interacting particles. >> >> > >> >> > But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is >> >> there >> >> > a reason that computers cannot? >> >> > >> >> Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily >> >> computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense >> >> already. >> >> >> > >> > Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious >> > experiences that we do? >> > >> > Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not >> explain >> > very much (without some meta-theory). >> No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it >> doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because >> reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it >> obviously >> is described and incorporates them). >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> > Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as >> >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea >> that >> >> God >> >> > has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I >> don't >> >> see >> >> > how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since >> >> > computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. >> >> OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can >> emulate >> >> everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's >> >> simply >> >> the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the >> sense >> >> of >> >> transforming input/output. >> >> It is about what something IS (or is like). >> >> >> > >> > Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our >> > reality)? >> There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO. >> >> But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom >> with >> respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with >> respect >> to reality. >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> since this is all that is required for my argument. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that >> >> >> definition >> >> >> >> >> because a human is not a computer according to the everyday >> >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, >> >> therefore >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> > human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers >> >> are >> >> >> >> > very powerful and flexible in what they can do. >> >> >> >> That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you >> might >> >> >> > realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your >> >> >> imagination. >> >> >> Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have >> programmed >> >> a >> >> >> fair amount. >> >> >> Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our >> >> >> imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing >> it >> >> on >> >> >> a >> >> >> computer? It is very hard. >> >> >> I never said that they can't. >> >> >> >> >> >> I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For >> example >> >> they >> >> >> can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and >> >> which >> >> >> axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no >> >> >> computational way of determining that. >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms >> to >> >> > use. >> >> Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't >> >> determined a program first. >> >> >> >> >> > You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms >> to >> > use. >> > >> > We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human >> > mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability. >> That just would strengthen my point (note the words "we program" meaning >> "we >> choose the program"). >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> > If the computer program had a concept for desiring >> novelty/surprises, >> >> it >> >> > would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than >> others. >> >> Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and >> there >> >> is >> >> no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already >> >> programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem). >> >> >> >> In effect you get an infinite regress: >> >> How determine which program to use? ->use a program to determine it >> >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> >> .... >> >> >> >> >> > Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution. >> But which guessing and checking program to use? ->use a more general >> guessing and checking program to determine it >> But which? ->use an even more more general guessing and checking program >> to >> determine it >> etc.... >> >> You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes >> more >> difficult each time you ask the question, because the program would have >> to >> be more general. >> >> 牋 >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> > You're crossing contexts and levels. Certainly, a heart inside a >> >> computer >> >> > simulation of some reality isn't going to do you any good if you >> exist >> >> on >> >> > a >> >> > different level, in a different reality. >> >> So you are actually agreeing with me? - Since this is exactly the >> point I >> >> am >> >> trying to make. >> >> Digital models exist on a different level than what they represent, >> and >> >> it >> >> doesn't matter how good/accurate they are because that doesn't bridge >> the >> >> gap between model and reality. >> >> >> > >> > But what level something is implemented in does not restrict the >> > intelligence of a process. >> This may be our main disagreement. >> It boils down to the question whether we assume intelligence = (turing) >> computation. >> We could embrace this definition, but I would rather not, since it >> doesn't >> fit with my own conception of intelligence (which also encompasses >> instantiation and interpretation). >> >> But for the sake of discussion I can embrace this definition and in this >> case I agree with you. Then we might say that computers can become more >> intelligent than humans (and maybe already are), because they manifest >> computations more efficiently than humans. >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much >> no >> >> >> other >> >> >> way to explain psi. >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > What do you mean by psi? >> >> Telepathy, for example. >> >> >> >> >> > Are you aware of any conclusive studies of psi? >> That depends on what you interpret as conclusive. For hard-headed >> skepticists no study will count as conclusive. >> >> There are plenty of studies that show results that are *far* beyond >> chance, >> though. >> Also the so called "anecdotal evidence" is extremely strong. >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> I am not saying that nature is infinite in the way we picture >> it. >> >> It >> >> >> may >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> fit into these categories at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, >> so >> >> by >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The UD also contains subjective randomness, which is at the heart >> of >> >> >> > Bruno's argument. >> >> >> No, it doesn't even contain a subject. >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno assumes COMP, which I don't buy at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Okay. What is your theory of mind? >> >> I don't have any. Mind cannot be captured or even by described at the >> >> fundamental level at all. >> >> >> > >> > That doesn't seem like a very useful theory. Does this theory tell >> > you whether or not you should take an artificial brain if it was the >> only >> > way to save your life? >> Of course it is not a useful theory, since it is not a theory in the >> first >> place. >> To answer your question: No. There is no theoretical way of deciding >> that. >> >> benjayk >> >> -- >> View this message in context: >> http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34348098.html >> >> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.com.<+everything-list@googlegroups.com.> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ >> unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. <+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.> >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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