Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
On Thu, Jan 29, 2004 at 11:33:15AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote: > What about arguments that attempt to estimate the fraction of observers > who are in simulations versus in base realities, such as Nick Bostrom's > Simulation Argument, www.simulation-argument.com? > > Are you saying that such arguments are pointless, and that no matter > how convincing they became, both choices would be equally rational? These arguments are not pointless, but they only make sense if you assume a particular measure or class of measures to be used. An argument that counts the number of copies of observers only make sense if you assume that you should care about each copy equally regardless of whether it exists in a simulation or in base reality. > Or would you say that it is rational to reject observations? After all, > among the infinity of universal distributions there are enough to justify > rejecting any specific observation as a "flying rabbit", a special case > exception which is built into the UTM that defines the distribution. > There exist universal distributions which can accommodate any such > exceptions. I'm not sure what you mean by 'justify rejecting any specific observation as a "flying rabbit"'. > Doesn't this philosophy ultimately reject all evidence, and further, > make it impossible to make predictions? No, it just means that you have assume a measure when making predictions, and that arguments about implications of evidence can only usefully occur between people who use similar measures. > There is a universal measure > which is consistent with my past observations and yet lets me conclude > that the sun won't rise tomorrow. Is it just a matter of taste and not > rationality that determines my beliefs on this matter? Yes, theoretically there exists a universe where the sun won't rise tomorrow, and you could assign it a larger measure than the universe where the sun does rise. You could also prefer the taste of dirt to the taste of ice cream. If we don't call the latter irrational, why should we call the former that? > If my understanding of these questions is correct, we have to find > a stronger set of rules and constraints on rationality, for the term > to have a useful meaning. Maybe we don't have them yet, but it isn't > acceptable to call such a wide range of behaviors rational. I'm not sure how to respond to that. Can you explain why it isn't acceptable to call these behaviors rational?
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Wei Dai writes: > Maybe a different example will make my point clearer. We could be living > in base reality or a simulation. You can choose a measure in which the > observer-moments like us living in base reality have a greater measure, or > one in which the observer-moments living in simulations have a greater > measure. These two measures have different implications on rational > behavior. The former implies we should plan for the far future, whereas > the latter says we should live for today because the simulation might end > at any moment, and we should try to behave in ways that wouldn't bore the > people who might be running and observing the simulation. (See Robin > Hanson's "How To Live In A Simulation", > http://hanson.gmu.edu/lifeinsim.html). > > Can you offer any arguments that one of these choices is > irrational? What about arguments that attempt to estimate the fraction of observers who are in simulations versus in base realities, such as Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument, www.simulation-argument.com? Are you saying that such arguments are pointless, and that no matter how convincing they became, both choices would be equally rational? What is the difference between these kinds of arguments, and those based on observation? Or would you say that it is rational to reject observations? After all, among the infinity of universal distributions there are enough to justify rejecting any specific observation as a "flying rabbit", a special case exception which is built into the UTM that defines the distribution. There exist universal distributions which can accommodate any such exceptions. Doesn't this philosophy ultimately reject all evidence, and further, make it impossible to make predictions? There is a universal measure which is consistent with my past observations and yet lets me conclude that the sun won't rise tomorrow. Is it just a matter of taste and not rationality that determines my beliefs on this matter? If my understanding of these questions is correct, we have to find a stronger set of rules and constraints on rationality, for the term to have a useful meaning. Maybe we don't have them yet, but it isn't acceptable to call such a wide range of behaviors rational. Hal
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Wei Dai wrote: On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 03:41:55AM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: Do you think that by choosing a different measure, you could change the actual first-person probabilities of different experiences? Or do you reject the idea of continuity of consciousness and "first-person probabilities" in the first place? The latter. I came to that conclusion by trying to develop a theory of first-person probabilities, failing, and then realizing that it's not necessary for decision making. If someone does manage to develop a theory that makes sense, maybe I'll change my mind. No one has tried to answer my other objection to an objective measure, which is that since there are so many candidates to choose from, how can everyone agree on a single one? I think that a notion of measure which is so flexible that there are infinite numbers of possible measures to choose from, is a wrong, or non-useful, definition of measure. I think people have to try harder to find a stronger and even more objective notion of measure. I would argue that all of the observers who co-exist should agree that 1. their universe has a very high measure, and 2. their universe generates complex order They should say "it's overwhelmingly most likely that we're observing a high-measure universe which generates complex order." I think the form of any high-measure universe which can generate complex order is exceedingly constrained, because the two constraints (high measure) and (generates complex order) can only be obtained with onerous constraints on form of universe (physical law etc). Eric
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 03:41:55AM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: > Do you think that by choosing a > different measure, you could change the actual first-person probabilities of > different experiences? Or do you reject the idea of continuity of > consciousness and "first-person probabilities" in the first place? The latter. I came to that conclusion by trying to develop a theory of first-person probabilities, failing, and then realizing that it's not necessary for decision making. If someone does manage to develop a theory that makes sense, maybe I'll change my mind. No one has tried to answer my other objection to an objective measure, which is that since there are so many candidates to choose from, how can everyone agree on a single one?
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 09:51:47AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote: > But we can solve this conundrum while retaining symmetry. Rationality > should demand allegience to the observed measure. It is irrational to > cling to a measure which has been rejected repeatedly by observations. > If classical definitions of rationality don't have this property, we > should fix them. Bob is irrational to hold to M' in a universe whose > observations reveal M. There is no need to change measures. When Bob repeatedly observes balls falling down, he'll conclude that he happens to be stuck in a low-measure universe and will just have to deal with it. The issue is, what does he do before making the first observation? At that point he thinks he should bet on the ball falling up, and wouldn't be irrational to do so. And Alice thinks she should bet on the ball falling down, and wouldn't be irrational to do so either. Maybe a different example will make my point clearer. We could be living in base reality or a simulation. You can choose a measure in which the observer-moments like us living in base reality have a greater measure, or one in which the observer-moments living in simulations have a greater measure. These two measures have different implications on rational behavior. The former implies we should plan for the far future, whereas the latter says we should live for today because the simulation might end at any moment, and we should try to behave in ways that wouldn't bore the people who might be running and observing the simulation. (See Robin Hanson's "How To Live In A Simulation", http://hanson.gmu.edu/lifeinsim.html). Can you offer any arguments that one of these choices is irrational? > Now, this will demand that in White Rabbit universes, ones where the > quantum or thermodynamic laws just happen to fail due to bad luck, a > rational person would have to abandon his (correct!) belief in a lawful > universe and come to believe (incorrectly!) in miracles. However this > is actually a reasonable requirement, since we are stipulating that such > miracles have been observed. You can come to believe in miracles without changing measures. You just conclude that you're probably in a low-measure universe with miracles, instead of an even-lower-measure universe where the White Rabbit appeared through pure chance. The beauty of the universal distributions is that if you adopt one of them as the measure, you'll never(1) "go crazy" (i.e. start behaving absurdly) after making any observation, because no matter what you observe, you'll still prefer the algorithmically simplest explanation for your observations. But the infinite class of universal distributions leaves you plenty of room to choose which universes or observer-moments are most important to you. (1) Well that's not completely true. You would still go crazy if you observe something that has a logical explanation but not an algorithmic one, for example if you observe something that can only be explained by an uncomputable law of physics, which is why I advocate adopting more dominant measures based on logic or set theory.
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Wei Dai wrote: On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 11:49:09PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: But measures aren't just about making decisions about what to *do*, the main argument for a single objective measure is that such a measure could make predictions about what we *see*, like why we see regular laws of physics and never see any "white rabbits". Although Bob can decide that only universes where gravity is repulsive matter to him in terms of his decision-making (so that he'd be happy to bet his life's savings that a dropped ball would fall up), he'll have to agree with Alice on what is actually observed to happen when a particular ball is dropped. Well, when the ball is dropped, in one universe it falls down, and Bob has to agree with Alice, and in another universe it up, and Alice has to agree with Bob. Alice thinks the second universe is less important than the first, but Bob thinks it's more important. How do you break this symmetry? Well, each of us only experiences a single universe (and further, all of the other humans that we observe are also observing the same universe we are observing.) Even if one believes a strong version of MWI in which there are untold numbers of other us's experiencing other universes, it's still true that each of those duplicates only gets to experience a single universe. That's something about the nature of observation and observable universes themselves. So if Alice and Bob are IN the same universe, where balls fall down, they'd both be well-advised to "believe in" the facts of their own universe, and not some speculative, or at the very least completely inaccessible, alternate universe. From the perspective of an observer (within a universe), the universe they inhabit is more important. PRINCIPLES: --- 1. A UNIVERSE IS WHERE ONLY ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ANYTHING HAPPENS. 2. EACH OBSERVER ONLY EXPERIENCES ONE UNIVERSE 3. COUNTERPART OBSERVERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT OBSERVERS, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS CROSS-UNIVERSE ACCESSIBILITY OR EXPERIENCE. I simply do not believe that the notion of an observer being able to access or meaningfully experience the life of the observer's other-universe counterparts, even if counterpart is a well-formed notion. I'm familiar with all of the various logic variations of the notion of trans-world identity, and I find them to be model-level concepts (matters of representative opinion) more than object-level concepts. What I've learned about identity is that there is a mixture of objectivity and subjectivity (affected by focus of concern) to it as a concept. What trans-world identity means (or is useful for) if a premise of total inter-world inaccessibility is accepted, is questionable. Eric Without an objective measure, I don't think there's any way to explain why we consistently see outcomes that obey the known laws of physics (like why we always see dropped balls fall towards the earth). What good are the explanations provided by an objective measure, if I choose to use a different subjective measure for making decisions? How do these explanations help me in any way? Choosing a measure from some other universe that you speculate exists (with, necessarily, no evidence) is risky and counterproductive to your survival in your universe. I'd advise you to get out of the path of the falling ball. Even if "counterparts" makes sense (not granted), if all counterparts made decisions based on their speculations about other-world likely happenings, then all counterparts of that particular observer would quickly die off for sure. Observers like that would not evolve. Only home-body observers (with local-universe concerns) would.
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
One might ask Bob, what is the measure of Universes in which a Bob finds M but heeds M' without being suicidal or at least hazardous to his own health? At any rate, Bob could hardly have reached in sound mind & body the cognitive height of many-worlds ideas without heeding M instead of M'. "Why not stick with them's what brung you, Bob?" (Also, it seems to me that Bob might well have to be at least partially heeding familiar M in order to function well enough to try to heed M'.) Of course, Bob could quip, "Denial is not just a river in Egypt." To some extent, we all stick to one or another interpretation in spite of the interpretation's apparent incoherence, & in spite of apparent contrary evidence. The fact that the incoherence or contrariness may be merely apparent is the temptation (we revise core ideas more reluctantly than others, & rightly so) -- the temptation to go wrong & persist even against a wind of disconfirming information. There is no surefire formula to avoid errors in any of these directions. There's open-mindedness (good) & there's flakiness & wishy-washyness (bad.) There's respect for what has stood the test of time so far (good) & there's dogmatism (bad). (As a practical matter, as regards knowingly to play by a different set of rules than that of the reality which one lives -- it seems to me that psychologically & biologically we are constituted so that we can't do that unless we are insane, & unlikely to be argued back to sanity.! ) - Ben Udell Hal Finney writes: >Wei Dai writes: >> Now suppose that two people, Alice and Bob, somehow agree that a measure M is the >> objectively correct measure, but Bob insists on using measure M' in making >> decisions. He says "So what if universe A has a bigger measure than universe B >> according to M? I just care more about what happens in universe B than universe A, >> so I'll use M' which assigns a bigger measure to universe B." What can Alice say to >> Bob to convince him that he is not being rational? I don't see what the answer >> could be. >How about if she whacks him on the head? Maybe that would knock some sense into him. >Seriously, she could confront him with the reality that in the universe branch they >are in, measure M works, while M' does not. Reality, whether in the form of a knock >on the head or more peaceful interactions, is not subjective. >Now, true, there would be branches in the multiverse where M' worked while M did not. > Believers in objective measure would say that those branches are of low measure and >so "don't matter", but as you point out, Bob can argue symmetrically that this branch >where he is stuck with Alice and M has worked is also, to him, of low measure. >But we can solve this conundrum while retaining symmetry. Rationality should demand >allegience to the observed measure. It is irrational to cling to a measure which >has been rejected repeatedly by observations. If classical definitions of rationality >don't have this property, we should fix them. Bob is irrational to hold to M' in a >universe whose observations reveal M. >Now, this will demand that in White Rabbit universes, ones where the quantum or >thermodynamic laws just happen to fail due to bad luck, a rational person would have >to abandon his (correct!) belief in a lawful universe and come to believe >(incorrectly!) in miracles. However this is actually a reasonable requirement, since >we are stipulating that such miracles have been observed. >Hal Finney
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Wei Dai writes: > Now suppose that two people, Alice and Bob, somehow agree that a measure M > is the objectively correct measure, but Bob insists on using measure M' in > making decisions. He says "So what if universe A has a bigger measure than > universe B according to M? I just care more about what happens in universe > B than universe A, so I'll use M' which assigns a bigger measure to > universe B." What can Alice say to Bob to convince him that he is > not being rational? I don't see what the answer could be. How about if she whacks him on the head? Maybe that would knock some sense into him. Seriously, she could confront him with the reality that in the universe branch they are in, measure M works, while M' does not. Reality, whether in the form of a knock on the head or more peaceful interactions, is not subjective. Now, true, there would be branches in the multiverse where M' worked while M did not. Believers in objective measure would say that those branches are of low measure and so "don't matter", but as you point out, Bob can argue symmetrically that this branch where he is stuck with Alice and M has worked is also, to him, of low measure. But we can solve this conundrum while retaining symmetry. Rationality should demand allegience to the observed measure. It is irrational to cling to a measure which has been rejected repeatedly by observations. If classical definitions of rationality don't have this property, we should fix them. Bob is irrational to hold to M' in a universe whose observations reveal M. Now, this will demand that in White Rabbit universes, ones where the quantum or thermodynamic laws just happen to fail due to bad luck, a rational person would have to abandon his (correct!) belief in a lawful universe and come to believe (incorrectly!) in miracles. However this is actually a reasonable requirement, since we are stipulating that such miracles have been observed. Hal Finney
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Subjective measure? How does that work? Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2004 03:09:08 -0500 On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 11:49:09PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: > But measures aren't just about making decisions about what to *do*, the main > argument for a single objective measure is that such a measure could make > predictions about what we *see*, like why we see regular laws of physics and > never see any "white rabbits". Although Bob can decide that only universes > where gravity is repulsive matter to him in terms of his decision-making (so > that he'd be happy to bet his life's savings that a dropped ball would fall > up), he'll have to agree with Alice on what is actually observed to happen > when a particular ball is dropped. Well, when the ball is dropped, in one universe it falls down, and Bob has to agree with Alice, and in another universe it up, and Alice has to agree with Bob. Alice thinks the second universe is less important than the first, but Bob thinks it's more important. How do you break this symmetry? By looking at my actual experiences, from a first-person point of view. If I drop the ball over and over again and consistently have the experience of seeing it drop, that suggests there's some kind of objective measure, independent of my own preferences, that assigns greater probability to versions of me experiencing the ball drop than to versions seeing it fly upwards. An objective measure would seem to be the only way to capture the notion that there is something about my experiences that is externally given, and not just a matter of my own arbitrary choices. Even if I choose a weird measure for the purposes of making decisions, like one that tells me I should bet my life savings that I will be able to fly, I don't think that would change the probability that my next experience will actually be that of flying, which I assume will stay very low regardless of what decision-theory measure I feel like choosing. Again, there seems to be an external reality guiding the probabilities of different experiences which I have no control over. Do you disagree? Do you think that by choosing a different measure, you could change the actual first-person probabilities of different experiences? Or do you reject the idea of continuity of consciousness and "first-person probabilities" in the first place? > Without an objective measure, I don't > think there's any way to explain why we consistently see outcomes that obey > the known laws of physics (like why we always see dropped balls fall towards > the earth). What good are the explanations provided by an objective measure, if I choose to use a different subjective measure for making decisions? How do these explanations help me in any way? An objective measure would tell you the probability that you will actually have a particular experience in the future, even if that knowledge would have no influence on your decisions. But for most people, the probability of actually having future various future experiences probably *would* influence their decisions, no? For example, I am more likely to take a gamble that has a very low probability of leading to my experiencing pain in the future than one that has a high probability of leading to a pain-experience. Jesse _ Learn how to choose, serve, and enjoy wine at Wine @ MSN. http://wine.msn.com/
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 11:49:09PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: > But measures aren't just about making decisions about what to *do*, the main > argument for a single objective measure is that such a measure could make > predictions about what we *see*, like why we see regular laws of physics and > never see any "white rabbits". Although Bob can decide that only universes > where gravity is repulsive matter to him in terms of his decision-making (so > that he'd be happy to bet his life's savings that a dropped ball would fall > up), he'll have to agree with Alice on what is actually observed to happen > when a particular ball is dropped. Well, when the ball is dropped, in one universe it falls down, and Bob has to agree with Alice, and in another universe it up, and Alice has to agree with Bob. Alice thinks the second universe is less important than the first, but Bob thinks it's more important. How do you break this symmetry? > Without an objective measure, I don't > think there's any way to explain why we consistently see outcomes that obey > the known laws of physics (like why we always see dropped balls fall towards > the earth). What good are the explanations provided by an objective measure, if I choose to use a different subjective measure for making decisions? How do these explanations help me in any way?
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Wei Dai wrote: Now suppose that two people, Alice and Bob, somehow agree that a measure M is the objectively correct measure, but Bob insists on using measure M' in making decisions. He says "So what if universe A has a bigger measure than universe B according to M? I just care more about what happens in universe B than universe A, so I'll use M' which assigns a bigger measure to universe B." What can Alice say to Bob to convince him that he is not being rational? I don't see what the answer could be. But measures aren't just about making decisions about what to *do*, the main argument for a single objective measure is that such a measure could make predictions about what we *see*, like why we see regular laws of physics and never see any "white rabbits". Although Bob can decide that only universes where gravity is repulsive matter to him in terms of his decision-making (so that he'd be happy to bet his life's savings that a dropped ball would fall up), he'll have to agree with Alice on what is actually observed to happen when a particular ball is dropped. Without an objective measure, I don't think there's any way to explain why we consistently see outcomes that obey the known laws of physics (like why we always see dropped balls fall towards the earth). Jesse Mazer _ Rethink your business approach for the new year with the helpful tips here. http://special.msn.com/bcentral/prep04.armx
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 12:21:40PM -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote: > Can you explain briefly why the choice of measure is subjective? I > haven't read any of the > books you mentioned (will try to get to them) but am familiar with > computability theory > and decision theory. Since you do not mention that you're familiar with the theory of algorithmic complexity, I suggest that you read the first book on that list ASAP. The following response might not make sense until you do. Basically, all of the sensible proposed measures are based on the universal distribution, which assigns a larger probabilities to strings that have lower algorithmic complexities. However there's actually an infinite class of universal distributions, one for each universal Turing machine, and there's no objective criteria for determining which one should be used. Another problem is that using the universal distribution forces you to assume that non-computable universes do not exist. If one does not want to make this assumption, then a more dominant measure need to be used (for example, based on a TM with an oracle for the halting problem or the complexity of a string's logical definition) but then there are even more measures to choose from (how high up the computability hierarchy do you go? how high up the set theoretic hierarchy?). Now suppose that two people, Alice and Bob, somehow agree that a measure M is the objectively correct measure, but Bob insists on using measure M' in making decisions. He says "So what if universe A has a bigger measure than universe B according to M? I just care more about what happens in universe B than universe A, so I'll use M' which assigns a bigger measure to universe B." What can Alice say to Bob to convince him that he is not being rational? I don't see what the answer could be.
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
John M wrote: I find some inconsistencies in your post: qubitstring containing all of the possible information-states implied in such a long bitstring,...< possible, of course, to OUR knowledge (imagination). Anthropomorph thinking about the MW. I'm really talking about "convertible to binary-representation" information states here. i.e. formal notion of information i.e. a count and structuring of discrete differences. As such, the number of information-states representable in a qubitstring of length n is 2 ^ n. Let Ui be an "internal-time-ordered" set of information-states s1,s2,...,s(now)comprising an observable universe.< How 'bout the Uis where 'time' has not evolved? Excluded? Those Uj's are not observable (unless we change the conventional meaning of that word.) "Observe" as conventionally meant is defined with respect (at least indirectly) to notions of time. Observable by what means? Any means where information can be conveyed from something outside of the observer SAS, at the speed of light or lower, to the representing mechanism inside the observer. BY THE WAY. I'M NOT A PHYSICIST. Can someone who knows please clarify the answer to the rather basic question of whether something like the slit-experiment means anything (or DOES anything to the quantum phenomena of the photons) in the absence of a perceiving observer like ourselves. I'm fairly basically and profoundly ignorant on that score. i.e. can "the measuring experiment machine itself" without the person (or AI etc, or dog, say) to perceive the result, still cause a difference in "what happens" to the photons? We have a pretty narrow range in mind. Would you restrict the MWI to our cognitive inventory of 2004? Does that mean that the MW was "smaller" in 1000 (with the then epistemized contents of cognition)? The observable, classicized portion of the Ui observable universe was smaller in 1000, or at any previous time-within-itself than now, yes. Of course, to be precise, now actually means here-now, as these are inseparable in relativistic physics. ... must be informationally consistent (not law violating) in conjunction ...< what "law"? presumed omniscient? Observed and verified physical laws of the Ui universe. Just malicious remarks. I appreciate to try and to criticize. I have no better ones. No problemo JM Eric
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
I find some inconsistencies in your post: > qubitstring containing all of the possible information-states implied in > such a long bitstring,...< possible, of course, to OUR knowledge (imagination). Anthropomorph thinking about the MW. > Let Ui be an "internal-time-ordered" set of information-states > s1,s2,...,s(now)comprising an observable universe.< How 'bout the Uis where 'time' has not evolved? Excluded? Observable by what means? We have a pretty narrow range in mind. Would you restrict the MWI to our cognitive inventory of 2004? Does that mean that the MW was "smaller" in 1000 (with the then epistemized contents of cognition)? >... must be informationally consistent (not law violating) in conjunction ...< what "law"? presumed omniscient? Just malicious remarks. I appreciate to try and to criticize. I have no better ones. JM - Original Message - From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2004 3:21 PM Subject: Re: Subjective measure? How does that work? > Can you explain briefly why the choice of measure is subjective? I > haven't read any of the > books you mentioned (will try to get to them) but am familiar with > computability theory > and decision theory. > > In my favourite interpretation of the multiverse, as a very long > (possibly lengthening) > qubitstring containing all of the possible information-states implied in > such a long bitstring, > the "absolute" measure of any information-state (instantaneous state of > some universe) > would be the same as any other state of the same bitstring length. > > In that framing of things, I guess there's another definition of > measure, which goes something > like this: > > Let Ui be an "internal-time-ordered" set of information-states > s1,s2,...,s(now)comprising > an observable universe. > > Ui, to be observable, is constrained to be an informationally > self-consistent > (too complex a concept to get into right here) set of information-states. > > There is a constraint on any information-state which qualifies to be > s(now+1) in any observable > universe path s1,s2,...,S(now). Specifically, any information-state that > can be S(now+1) > must be informationally consistent (not law violating) in conjunction > with s1,s2,...,S(now). > > Furthermore, the history that has evolved as s1,s2,...,s(now) has the > result of determining > the Ui-relative probability of any particular other information-state > being able to become > s(now+1) in that observable path. > > That now-in-an-observable-universe-relative probability of successorhood > in that universe > of any other information-state is then a universe-specific measure > value, or more specifically, > a now-state-of-universe specific measure value. > > That now-in-an-observable-universe measure (for potential successor > information states for that > universe state-set) may correspond to the probabilities of all the > outcomes of all the wave equations > of quantum-states which are observable in the "now" moment in that universe. > > As a comp sci person and not a physicist, I look forward to your read on > where my interpretation > is misguided, and for a better interpretation. > > Eric > PS I stay out of the 'ethix - morality' discussion, which IMO is definitely Earthbound - human - cultural - debatable. Eric mentioned lately the group-evolution, in which respect altruism (moral thinking?) is not out, but go 1 step higher - still within the earthly biosphere - and morality turns into "foodchain". Dine or dined. There is no "goal" only change. Survival is a result. Human groups can identify what is good for them. E.g. to eat animals and plants - fellow living creatures.
Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Can you explain briefly why the choice of measure is subjective? I haven't read any of the books you mentioned (will try to get to them) but am familiar with computability theory and decision theory. In my favourite interpretation of the multiverse, as a very long (possibly lengthening) qubitstring containing all of the possible information-states implied in such a long bitstring, the "absolute" measure of any information-state (instantaneous state of some universe) would be the same as any other state of the same bitstring length. In that framing of things, I guess there's another definition of measure, which goes something like this: Let Ui be an "internal-time-ordered" set of information-states s1,s2,...,s(now)comprising an observable universe. Ui, to be observable, is constrained to be an informationally self-consistent (too complex a concept to get into right here) set of information-states. There is a constraint on any information-state which qualifies to be s(now+1) in any observable universe path s1,s2,...,S(now). Specifically, any information-state that can be S(now+1) must be informationally consistent (not law violating) in conjunction with s1,s2,...,S(now). Furthermore, the history that has evolved as s1,s2,...,s(now) has the result of determining the Ui-relative probability of any particular other information-state being able to become s(now+1) in that observable path. That now-in-an-observable-universe-relative probability of successorhood in that universe of any other information-state is then a universe-specific measure value, or more specifically, a now-state-of-universe specific measure value. That now-in-an-observable-universe measure (for potential successor information states for that universe state-set) may correspond to the probabilities of all the outcomes of all the wave equations of quantum-states which are observable in the "now" moment in that universe. As a comp sci person and not a physicist, I look forward to your read on where my interpretation is misguided, and for a better interpretation. Eric Wei Dai wrote: I have to say that I sympathize with Caesar, but my position is slightly different. I think there is a possibility that that objective morality does exist, but we're simply too stupid to realize what it is. Therefore we should try to improve our intelligence, through intelligence amplication, or artificial intelligence, before saying that objective morality is impossible and therefore we should just pursue other goals like survival, comfort or happiness. Some people have argued that in fact survival is an objective goal, because evolution makes sure that people who don't pursue survival don't exist. But if we assume that everything exists, the above statement has to be modified to an assertion that people who don't pursue survival have low measure. However the choice of measure itself is subjective, so why shouldn't one use a measure in which people who don't pursue survival have high measure (e.g., one which favors universes where those people survive anyway through good luck or benevolent gods)?
