Hi Stephen,
Pleasing reading indeed. A bit old. You should easily find what is
missing.
Answer: the mind-body problem. It is still a form of aristotelian
physicalism, even if it has the correct natural numbers ontology.
There is still an implicit use of the aristotelian identity thesis
between a mind and a body.
Comp is finitist for the ontology, as there is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)),
etc. (or K, S, KK, SK, ... ).
Then comp is infinitist, both for the subject, and for the math needed
to solve the mind body problem in that setting, as we have to take
into account non enumerable set of histories and random oracles, etc.
Now there might be relation between the Conway Moore automaton and the
Z logics, but I have not yet find one, despite some formal
relationship/duality between them (please don't jump on the duality
here, as it is another one than the one by Pratt).
It is nice that Svozil cites people like Descartes, Rossler,
Boscovitch and Finkelstein, and also Galouye, but he was somehow
closer to comp when he referred also on Everett, like in his Singapore
book.
I have often (try to) explained on this list that digital physics is
self-contradictory, as it entails comp, but comp, if you keep the 1-
indeterminacy in mind, entails ~digital physics, and ~digital
theology, a priori.
The conscious person is still under the rug, I would say. It is still
pre-first person indeterminacy, if you want, but it is also pre-the
ASSA approaches, or the general everything approach.
Bruno
On 21 Oct 2012, at 05:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Folks,
For your amusement, delight and (hopefully) comment, I present a
paper:
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0305048
Computational universes
Karl Svozil
(Submitted on 12 May 2003 (v1), last revised 14 Apr 2005 (this
version, v2))
Suspicions that the world might be some sort of a machine or
algorithm existing ``in the mind'' of some symbolic number cruncher
have lingered from antiquity. Although popular at times, the
most radical forms of this idea never reached mainstream. Modern
developments in physics and computer science have lent support to
the thesis, but empirical evidence is needed before it can begin to
replace our contemporary world view.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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