Re: Strange Anthropic Probabilities
On 12th January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote: ... Let me also say I find it a morally ghastly proposition that each of us is duplicated an infinite number of times in an infinite number of universes. If so, why ever bother to do the right thing?... Whatever else may be said in response to this argument, it is important to keep in mind that our opinion of what is the case, or our wish that a particular thing be the case, has no bearing on what IS IN FACT the case. I find it a morally ghastly proposition that thousands of innocent people have died recently as the result of the invasion of a certain small and weak nation by a certain large and powerful one, but my opinion does not change one iota the reality of what has happened. Stathis Papaioannou Melbourne, Australia _ Get less junk mail with ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Strange Anthropic Probabilities
Doug, What you say rings true! Thanks for a breath of fresh air. Norman - Original Message - From: "Doug Porpora" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2004 1:32 PM Subject: Strange Anthropic Probabilities > Hi all, > > I have a query about Tegmark's argument I hope some of you might be > able to address. > > First, let me say I am not a physicist or computer science person but > a humble sociologist with some lay physics knowledge on this topic. > > Let me also say I find it a morally ghastly proposition that each of > us is duplicated an infinite number of times in an infinite number of > universes. If so, why ever bother to do the right thing? Some > infinite set of me's will be doing the wrong thing, so why not be one > of them? > > So I have been thinking of possible counter considerations. Here is > one: Is it possible that the parametric coincidences required for > the existence of advanced (beyond microbial) life are so improbable > that (i) even in the right kind of universe, advanced life is likely > to occur only once; and (ii) it requires an infinite number of > universes even to get one occurrence of a me-ish person? > > I am wondering whether probabilistically, (ii) is a coherent > theoretical possibility. It seems to suggest a probability that would > be represented as (1 / infinity) or perhaps as the limit as N goes to > infinity of 1 / N. > > Then, according to this scenario (I think), the likelihood of a > me-ish person is equal to the limit as N goes to infinity of N * (1 / > N) = 1. > > As I say, I am just a sociologist, not a mathematician. So I don't > know whether what I am suggesting is plain nonsense. It is certainly > speculative, but no more so than Tegmark's scenario. > > Thanks for any feedback. > > doug > -- > doug porpora > dept of culture and communication > drexel university > phila pa 19104 > USA > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >
Re: Strange Anthropic Probabilities
Doug Porpora writes: > Let me also say I find it a morally ghastly proposition that each of > us is duplicated an infinite number of times in an infinite number of > universes. If so, why ever bother to do the right thing? Some > infinite set of me's will be doing the wrong thing, so why not be one > of them? I'll offer some thoughts on this below. > So I have been thinking of possible counter considerations. Here is > one: Is it possible that the parametric coincidences required for > the existence of advanced (beyond microbial) life are so improbable > that (i) even in the right kind of universe, advanced life is likely > to occur only once; and (ii) it requires an infinite number of > universes even to get one occurrence of a me-ish person? That would require that it is infinitely improbable that you could exist. But I don't think that is the case, because there are only a finite number of possible arrangements of matter of the size of a human being. (Equivalently, humans embody only a finite amount of information.) So it would seem that the probability of a human appearing in some universe must be finite and greater than zero, hence there would be an infinite number of instances across an infinity of universes. As far as the issue of human action and free will, here is how I look at it. There are really two issues. The first is that in some sense the multiverse makes our actions deterministic. That is, there is no longer any true unpredictability in what we do, because we do everything in one universe or another. So how can we have free will if there are no choices? Well, this problem has been considered many times in the philosophical literature going back hundreds of years (where it was asked how free will was compatible with God's omniscience). Recent works by Daniel Dennett, his books Elbow Room and his new book (which I haven't read) Freedom Evolves, discuss how free will can be said to coexist with determinism. The basic idea is that the acting out of deterministic processes and the considerations involved in making a free choice are two equally valid ways of explaining the same phenomenon, at different levels of description. These books could be good sources to explore these concepts further. The second part of the problem is specific to the multiverse model, which is, even assuming that in some sense you have free will, what is the practical point of acting, since your decisions will be in effect cancelled out by being done differently in other universes? Larry Niven's science fiction short story All the Myriad Ways explores the problems which sweep society when a technology is invented to visit parallel universes, leading to a widespread surrender to nihilism and social ennui. However this perspective ignores the concept of measure, where some universes are more prominent than others. Although you may make different choices in different universes, the probabilities are not equal. Your decision making processes influence the measure of the universes in which your different choices occur. By giving matters careful thought and making wise decisions, you can maximize the measure of the universes in which your choices have good outcomes. This justifies the necessity of careful choice and eliminates the descent into nihilistic horror and despair. Hal Finney
Strange Anthropic Probabilities
Hi all, I have a query about Tegmark's argument I hope some of you might be able to address. First, let me say I am not a physicist or computer science person but a humble sociologist with some lay physics knowledge on this topic. Let me also say I find it a morally ghastly proposition that each of us is duplicated an infinite number of times in an infinite number of universes. If so, why ever bother to do the right thing? Some infinite set of me's will be doing the wrong thing, so why not be one of them? So I have been thinking of possible counter considerations. Here is one: Is it possible that the parametric coincidences required for the existence of advanced (beyond microbial) life are so improbable that (i) even in the right kind of universe, advanced life is likely to occur only once; and (ii) it requires an infinite number of universes even to get one occurrence of a me-ish person? I am wondering whether probabilistically, (ii) is a coherent theoretical possibility. It seems to suggest a probability that would be represented as (1 / infinity) or perhaps as the limit as N goes to infinity of 1 / N. Then, according to this scenario (I think), the likelihood of a me-ish person is equal to the limit as N goes to infinity of N * (1 / N) = 1. As I say, I am just a sociologist, not a mathematician. So I don't know whether what I am suggesting is plain nonsense. It is certainly speculative, but no more so than Tegmark's scenario. Thanks for any feedback. doug -- doug porpora dept of culture and communication drexel university phila pa 19104 USA [EMAIL PROTECTED]
