Re: The meanings of Peirce's three OBJECTIVE Categories
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 2:24:20 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of > Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public, > objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the > interpreter, > instead using the word interprant. > > This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we > disagree on > the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III > > 1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public. > Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is > the > mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I) > from a set of objects stored in memory. > > You might say that III is the meaning of the thing, > the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status > sign, object, interpretant). > > For example, > > I = object (apple) > II = sign ("apple") > III = meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the > observer, > not just the dictionary meaning. > You are directly contradicting the information on that page, which says: Firstness. Quality of feeling. Ideas, chance, possibility. Vagueness, "some". i.e. nothing at all like an apple or object: private subjective experience Secondness. Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation. Brute facts, actuality. Singularity, discreteness, “this”. ... "This" is like an apple: public objective realism Thirdness. Representation, mediation. Habits, laws, necessity. Generality, continuity, "all". i.e. the semiotic medium through which private is made universal - language, gesture, etc. Craig > This triad is described on > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs > > > A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of > "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about > something. > It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial. > > An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an > interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, > relationship, quality, law, > argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13] > > All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is > the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs. > For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto > but ultimately not only about Pluto. > > An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less > clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference > which > the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory > concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not > just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The > interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's > "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. > The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an > interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation > culminates, though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of > agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that > > " the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. " > > > > > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net > 10/17/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09 > Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories > > > > > On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list > > Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8] > Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As > quantity:Technical definition:Valence, "adicity": > Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness, > "some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a > quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11] > which has the quality). > Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts, > actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its > relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate). > Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws, > necessity.Generality, continuity, "all".Reference to an > interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant*). > > > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net > 10/17/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > These categories are the stages of epistemology. > > Firstn
The meanings of Peirce's three OBJECTIVE Categories
Hi Craig Weinberg Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public, objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the interpreter, instead using the word interprant. This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we disagree on the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III 1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public. Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is the mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I) from a set of objects stored in memory. You might say that III is the meaning of the thing, the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status sign, object, interpretant). For example, I = object (apple) II = sign ("apple") III = meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the observer, not just the dictionary meaning. This triad is described on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial. An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, relationship, quality, law, argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13] All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs. For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but ultimately not only about Pluto. An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation culminates, though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that " the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. " Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09 Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8] Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As quantity:Technical definition:Valence, "adicity": Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness, "some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11] which has the quality). Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts, actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate). Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws, necessity.Generality, continuity, "all".Reference to an interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant*). Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen These categories are the stages of epistemology. Firstness is the pure quale or what I would call "inner raw experience". Subjective. Private. Personal. Agree. Secondness is dyadic relation, typical of thinking,which is an activity of intelligence. Disagree. Thinking is first person inner raw experience too. It's a different channel of qualia (not smells, flavors, or colors, but thoughts, ideas, memeories, etc) which is meta to subordinate qualia, but there is no other significant difference. Thoughts are higher up on the monochord than other kinds of sensorimotive activity (according to thoughts, anyways...it may be relativistic). The dyad seems to be to me between Firstness and Thirdness. Thirdness is the objective form of the quale, a description for the experience of Firstness. Objective. Public. Public objects are multisensory facts, so they have to be Secondness. Thirdness is the unfolding relations between Firstness