Re: The meanings of Peirce's three OBJECTIVE Categories

2012-10-17 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 2:24:20 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>
> Hi Craig Weinberg 
>
> Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of 
> Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public, 
> objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the 
> interpreter, 
> instead using the word interprant. 
>
> This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we 
> disagree on 
> the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III 
>
> 1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public. 
> Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is 
> the   
> mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I) 
> from a set of objects stored in memory.   
>
> You might say that III is the meaning of the thing, 
> the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status 
> sign, object, interpretant). 
>
> For example, 
>
> I = object (apple) 
> II = sign ("apple") 
> III =  meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the 
> observer, 
> not just the dictionary meaning. 
>

You are directly contradicting the information on that page, which says:
 Firstness. Quality of feeling. Ideas, chance, possibility. 
Vagueness, "some". 
i.e. nothing at all like an apple or object: private subjective experience

Secondness.   Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation. Brute facts, 
actuality. Singularity, discreteness, “this”.
... "This" is like an apple: public objective realism

Thirdness. Representation, mediation. Habits, laws, necessity. 
Generality, continuity, "all".
i.e. the semiotic medium through which private is made universal - 
language, gesture, etc.

Craig




> This triad is described on 
>
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs 
>
>
> A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of 
> "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about 
> something. 
> It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial. 
>
> An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an 
> interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, 
> relationship, quality, law,   
> argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13] 
>
> All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is 
> the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs. 
>  For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto 
> but ultimately not only about Pluto. 
>
> An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less 
> clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference 
> which 
> the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory 
> concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not 
> just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The 
> interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's 
> "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. 
> The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an 
> interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation 
> culminates, though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of 
> agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that 
>
> " the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. " 
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen   
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -   
> From: Craig Weinberg   
> Receiver: everything-list   
> Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09   
> Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories   
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:   
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list   
>
> Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8]   
> Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As 
> quantity:Technical definition:Valence, "adicity":   
> Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness, 
> "some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a 
> quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11] 
> which has the quality).   
> Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts, 
> actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its 
> relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate).   
> Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws, 
> necessity.Generality, continuity, "all".Reference to an 
> interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant*).   
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net   
> 10/17/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen   
>
> These categories are the stages of epistemology.   
>
> Firstn

The meanings of Peirce's three OBJECTIVE Categories

2012-10-17 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Craig Weinberg 

Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of
Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public,
objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the interpreter,
instead using the word interprant. 

This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we 
disagree on 
the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III 

1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public. 
Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is the  
mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I) 
from a set of objects stored in memory.  

You might say that III is the meaning of the thing, 
the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status 
sign, object, interpretant).

For example, 

I = object (apple)
II = sign ("apple")
III =  meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the observer,
not just the dictionary meaning.

This triad is described on 


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs


A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of 
"represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about 
something. 
It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial. 

An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an 
interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, 
relationship, quality, law,  
argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13] 

All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the 
universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.
 For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but 
ultimately not only about Pluto. 

An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified 
meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which 
the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory concerns 
meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not 
just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The 
interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's 
"predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. The 
interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an 
interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation culminates, 
though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of 
agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that

" the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. "




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/17/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09  
Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories  




On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list  

Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8]  
Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As quantity:Technical 
definition:Valence, "adicity":  
Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness, 
"some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a 
quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11] 
which has the quality).  
Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts, 
actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its 
relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate).  
Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws, necessity.Generality, 
continuity, "all".Reference to an interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign, 
object, interpretant*).  


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
10/17/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

These categories are the stages of epistemology.  

Firstness is the pure quale or what I would call "inner raw experience". 
Subjective. Private. Personal.  

Agree.  
   


Secondness is dyadic relation, typical of thinking,which is an activity of 
intelligence.  

Disagree. Thinking is first person inner raw experience too. It's a different 
channel of qualia (not smells, flavors, or colors, but thoughts, ideas, 
memeories, etc) which is meta to subordinate qualia, but there is no other 
significant difference. Thoughts are higher up on the monochord than other 
kinds of sensorimotive activity (according to thoughts, anyways...it may be 
relativistic).  
   

The dyad seems to be to me between Firstness and Thirdness.  

Thirdness is the objective form of the quale, a description for the experience 
of Firstness. Objective. Public.  

Public objects are multisensory facts, so they have to be Secondness.  

Thirdness is the unfolding relations between Firstness