On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 2:24:20 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>
> Hi Craig Weinberg
>
> Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of
> Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public,
> objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the
> interpreter,
> instead using the word interprant.
>
> This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we
> disagree on
> the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III
>
> 1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public.
> Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is
> the
> mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I)
> from a set of objects stored in memory.
>
> You might say that III is the meaning of the thing,
> the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status
> sign, object, interpretant).
>
> For example,
>
> I = object (apple)
> II = sign ("apple")
> III = meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the
> observer,
> not just the dictionary meaning.
>
You are directly contradicting the information on that page, which says:
Firstness. Quality of feeling. Ideas, chance, possibility.
Vagueness, "some".
i.e. nothing at all like an apple or object: private subjective experience
Secondness. Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation. Brute facts,
actuality. Singularity, discreteness, “this”.
... "This" is like an apple: public objective realism
Thirdness. Representation, mediation. Habits, laws, necessity.
Generality, continuity, "all".
i.e. the semiotic medium through which private is made universal -
language, gesture, etc.
Craig
> This triad is described on
>
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs
>
>
> A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of
> "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about
> something.
> It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial.
>
> An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an
> interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event,
> relationship, quality, law,
> argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13]
>
> All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is
> the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.
> For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto
> but ultimately not only about Pluto.
>
> An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less
> clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference
> which
> the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory
> concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not
> just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The
> interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's
> "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object.
> The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an
> interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation
> culminates, though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of
> agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that
>
> " the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. "
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Craig Weinberg
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09
> Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list
>
> Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8]
> Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As
> quantity:Technical definition:Valence, "adicity":
> Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness,
> "some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a
> quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11]
> which has the quality).
> Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts,
> actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its
> relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate).
> Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws,
> necessity.Generality, continuity, "all".Reference to an
> interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant*).
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> These categories are the stages of epistemology.
>
> Firstness is the pure quale or what I would call "inner raw experience".
> Subjective. Private. Personal.
>
> Agree.
>
>
>
> Secondness is dyadic relation, typical of thinking,which is an activity of
> intelligence.
>
> Disagree. Thinking is first person inner raw experience too. It's a
> different channel of qualia (not smells, flavors, or colors, but thoughts,
> ideas, memeories, etc) which is meta to subordinate qualia, but there is no
> other significant difference. Thoughts are higher up on the monochord than
> other kinds of sensorimotive activity (according to thoughts, anyways...it
> may be relativistic).
>
>
> The dyad seems to be to me between Firstness and Thirdness.
>
> Thirdness is the objective form of the quale, a description for the
> experience of Firstness. Objective. Public.
>
> Public objects are multisensory facts, so they have to be Secondness.
>
> Thirdness is the unfolding relations between Firstness and Secondness -
> the capacity for perception to develop an inertial direction. This gets
> into numerology really, as three is about expression and character - the
> beginning of irreversibility and disambiguation. In four, inertial
> direction finds its limit - range or frame. Worlds, games, systems.
>
> Craig
>
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