Re: reductionism: please explain
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:47, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented >>> fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required >>> to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way >>> of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist >>> approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading it for >>> him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. >> >> >> Personally I disagree with any reductionist approach. But, given that >> I >> agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have a "vocabulary" >> problem. >> I do even believe that a thoroughly "scientific attitude" is >> automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories are used. Science, >> being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). >> Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely reductible to any >> "unifying theory". >> Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the week-end) can be >> reductionist. > > I'm afraid I don't understand the version of reductionism to which you > so > strongly object. I guess I react strongly because the comp theory is sometimes confused with reductionist interpretation of it. > Are you perhaps referring to the mistake of trying to > explain too much with too little? Not necessarily. Perhaps. It is more the error of explaining *away*, at the level of the interpretation of some theory. > Or are you referring to what Daniel > Dennett has called "greedy reductionism": where something is not so > much > explained in terms of what it reduces to as dismissed or explained > away, > like saying there is no such thing as mental states because it's all > just > neurophysiology? Ah, you say it! That is certainly a form of reductionism. > Well, it is "all just neurophysiology", in that the > neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states. Honestly, I find the expression "neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states" rather ambiguous. It can be reductionist (example are given in the writing of Patricia Churchland). John Searle would say the same sentence in a much less reductionist spirit, except that he has some reductionist notion of matter in the background. > The > mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to the underlying > brain > states. OK, but saying is not explaining. According to the explanation given, we could decide if we are lead to a reductionist conception of the mind/brain relation. > But this is not the same as saying that the mental states therefore > do not exist, or are not important. Saying that mental state does not exist is not just a reductionist position, I think it is just wrong. Saying that mental states exist and are "just" brain states is a form of reductionism. It is hard to define "reductionism", but I would say it consists in explaining away problems by imposing some univocal interpretation of a theory. In "consciousness explained" Dennett explains *away* not only consciousness but mainly matter. But his general view on consciousness is not necessarily reductionist per se. Its notion of matter is very reductionist, and from this follows a sort of reductionism in his approach of the whole the mind-body question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: reductionism: please explain
--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Bruno Marchal writes: > > > >Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to > John): > > > > > > > > > > Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I > presented > > > fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is > required > > > to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to > the way > > > of thinking I presented). If one rejects the > reductionist > > > approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading > it for > > > him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. > > > > > >Personally I disagree with any reductionist > approach. But, given that I > >agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have > a "vocabulary" problem. > >I do even believe that a thoroughly "scientific > attitude" is > >automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories > are used. Science, > >being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). > >Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely > reductible to any "unifying theory". > >Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the > week-end) can be reductionist. > > I'm afraid I don't understand the version of > reductionism to which you so > strongly object. Are you perhaps referring to the > mistake of trying to > explain too much with too little? Or are you > referring to what Daniel > Dennett has called "greedy reductionism": where > something is not so much > explained in terms of what it reduces to as > dismissed or explained away, > like saying there is no such thing as mental states > because it's all just > neurophysiology? Well, it is "all just > neurophysiology", in that the > neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the > mental states. The > mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to > the underlying brain > states. But this is not the same as saying that the > mental states therefore > do not exist, or are not important. > > Stathis Papaioannou > I feel compelled to address this point since I use the 'reductionist' denomination a lot lately and got lots of different aspects to it. The sense I USE the term stems from my wholistic view, to consider the totality interconnected and in unison. Our present mind-level cannot compose all of that into its activity (performed by the tool of a limited brain) so as a modus vivendi we consider parts as unit models. Such limited models can be topical, ideational, or functional, they are REDUCED from the totality for our comfort. This is the way humans can think and this is the way conventional sciences apply their cut domains. For that reason I disagree with Bruno when he wrote:"...that a thoroughly "scientific attitude" is automatically anti- reductionnist". It would be vague if not restricted to its domain. However: reductionist science (model-wise observation) gave us our knowledge of the world (no judgement on its quality) and our technology we enjoy. I find it objectionable when those model-restricted observations serve for beyond-model conclusions, when the explanations turn universal from select percepts. There are many (and different) identifications for the term, mine is the practical restriction for my own use. I don't want to sell it, just explain how I use it. Your 'mental states' are figments of the model you use as neural physiology. You reduce the 'mental' into a physiological cut in brainfunction-model and visualize conclusions 'without' based on observations 'within'. I leave it open, because our epistemy is incomplete as far as thinking is concerned. The neurological model in reductionism is important in its practical uses. When Georges calls the universe and the numbers-based concept 'isomorh' he speaks about a match in two models both in the 'number-type' restriction. Infinite totality cannot be 'isomorph'. Not even with "another" infinite totality. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
reductionism: please explain
Bruno Marchal writes: >Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): > > > > > > > > Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented > > fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required > > to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way > > of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist > > approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading it for > > him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. > > >Personally I disagree with any reductionist approach. But, given that I >agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have a "vocabulary" >problem. >I do even believe that a thoroughly "scientific attitude" is >automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories are used. Science, >being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). >Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely reductible to any >"unifying theory". >Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the week-end) can be >reductionist. I'm afraid I don't understand the version of reductionism to which you so strongly object. Are you perhaps referring to the mistake of trying to explain too much with too little? Or are you referring to what Daniel Dennett has called "greedy reductionism": where something is not so much explained in terms of what it reduces to as dismissed or explained away, like saying there is no such thing as mental states because it's all just neurophysiology? Well, it is "all just neurophysiology", in that the neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states. The mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to the underlying brain states. But this is not the same as saying that the mental states therefore do not exist, or are not important. Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
