Re: zombie wives
George Levy writes: >Russell Standish is as infinite as the continuum, and in > fact there is a path along the Russell Standish continuum that eventually > becomes George Levy. Russell Standish Responds >No - I don't believe this is true in the MWI of Quantum Mechanics. It >may be true of the complete everything universe - as really wierd >stuff can happen there. I am sorry that Russell did not appreciate the idea of being morphed into me. I think he would have liked the experience. George Levy writes: >So we are all in a sense related through all the > conscious points (locus of consciousness?) in the MW that separate us. :-) Russel Standish replies: >Or perhaps reread the elementary QM textbooks. There does appear to be >a lot of confusion over precisely what the multiverse is (Not the same >as the Everything universe of Tegmark), of measure, of time etc. I >applaud Jacques' attempts at clarifying these ideas and keeping us >honest. There will of course be several different measures applicable >to different sets. For example Wei Dai's universal measure (which >applies minimally over bitstrings representing different possibility) >is completely unrelated to measure induced by the "wavefunction of the >universe" in MWI, that Jacques refers to. The measure referred to in >RSSA is most likely the same as the MWI measure, rather than some >concept of number of differentiated classical states (eg concsious >states), particularly as the latter has the property of growing >exponentially with time. Why should we restrict our scope of the universe to anything less than what is necessary to maintain us alive? In fact in the presence of QS, the effective size of the Universe will increase to whatever it takes to keep us alive! If the size of the universe as defined by the MWI is not sufficiently large than by all means we are jutified by the WAP to increase its size. The problem is not how we could justify QS but how we can avoid the weird stuff that happens when our scope is too big. But here again we can use WAP to define the limits and eliminate the weird stuff. I think that we must take the bull by the horns and in the absence of **sufficient reason**, face the possibility of living in the Plenitude or the Everything Universe. The challenge is to bridge the gap between this infinity and our observable world and to show the power of the WAP to do so. George
Re: zombie wives
"Jacques M. Mallah" wrote: > > > relative SSA predicts that the observer will see at the next instant > > of time an observer moment with the greatest measure, subject to its > > lying in the future of the current observer moment. That measure may > > be fantastically small (eg just prior to a fatal crash) - it just has > > to be the largest from that set. > > No. If every observer sees all future moments, then the amount of > consciousness does not decrease with time, and thus the measure stays > constant over time. This has the consequence that, for a given observer, > over most of his lifetime he will find himself to be very old. It may > seem that I am mixing in the ASSA when I say that, therefore, the fact > that we do not find ourselves old is evidence against the RSSA. The truth > is I can not avoid this way of thinking any more than I could believe that > 1+1=3. > But this doesn't make any sense! Define "old"! No matter what age you are, you could always ask why you don't find yourself to be "younger" or "older". When I'm 10,000 years old, I think I'll still consider myself young, so I'd still be able to reason on the basis that I don't find myself to be very old. -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com "Donuts are so sweet and tasty." -- Homer Simpson
Re: zombie wives
On Fri, 27 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote: > > I use the terms SSA, ASSA, RSSA only because others on the list > > insist on using them. In my opinion the 'ASSA' is a tautology and not > > an assumption, while the 'RSSA' is an error. > > ASSA SSA. ASSA makes explicit the sample set over which SSA is > applied. So does RSSA (the sample set being different to the ASSA > case). A third possibility is SSA of birth rank, as used in Leslie > Carter's arguments. Ok. Nothing in your paragraph contradicts what I said. > > > Under relative SSA, there is time. Each observer moment is connected > > > to a range (presumably infinite) of future observer moments. The > > > > Here's where the position of the QS camp appears to diverge from > > other positions of QSers, notably Higgo James, who of course endorses both > > seemingly contradictory positions. > > Sorry - what are the seemingly contradictory position? Whether one > assumes ASSA or RSSA? (these are contradictory positions, and > give rise to different predictions about QTI) No, the role of time. Higgo James has often stated his belief that moments in time are really not connected. > > No. If every observer sees all future moments, then the amount of > > Whoa there! Noone said anything about every observer seeing all future > moments. Where did this piece of nonsense come from? It's the QTI claim together with the claim that an observer is extended over all times at which he exists. Nonsense, yes. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Thank you Jacques for your detailed reply to my post asking about your >concept of measure. >It seems to me that you have made the assumption that the MWI only deals >with "splitting" of the observer and not the "merging". This leads to the >conclusion that under the Relative SSA the measure keeps increasing and we >find ourselves to be very old in the most probable worlds. >However, if we include merging of the observer, then we could end up with a >Relative SSA in which measure is conserved. Nope. The measure is conserved in the RSSA leading to the infinite expected value for the age. >This said, I find it difficult to talk about increase and decrease and making >comparisons of the measure when the quantity in question is infinite. Then take a calculus course. I consider the question a non-issue, and I just spelled it out explicitly to try to get past it. Some limiting proceedure is required. Same as always when dealing with infinities in physics. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Re: zombie wives
<<
George Levy writes
>
> This said, I find it difficult to talk about increase and decrease and
making
> comparisons of the measure when the quantity in question is infinite.
>
> Measure is not finite. This would violate the principle of plenitude and
it
> would require a reason for measure to be any particular size.
Russell Standish responds
Remember we are restricting our attention to a self-aware subsystem
(eg one called Russell Standish) of the Quantum Mechanics subsystem of
the everything universe. The principle of plenitude can only apply to
the whole everything universe, not to well defined subsystems like the
MWI.
Now the measure of Russell Standish is a finite quantity, and is
calculated by the formula m_{RS}(t) = <\Psi(t)|P_{RS}|\Psi(t)>, where
\Psi(t) is the wavefunction of the multiverse, and P_{RS} is the
projection operator corresponding to Russell Standish. It doesn't
matter that we don't exactly know what \Psi(t) or P_{RS} are - however
they do exist as part of the MWI mathematical structure.
>>
Russell, you have made an interesting point. You have separated the concept
of plenitude from the MWI. According to you, the MWI is only a subset of the
Plenitude. I am not sure if I agree with this but the point is well taken. I
certainly think that the MWI is a manifestation of the plenitude. Why should
the MWI be of lesser size than the Plenitude? I don't have an answer for this.
You also maintain that "you" are "finite." Let us discuss the meaning of
"you" and "finite." What do you mean when you talk about the entity Russell
Standish. How much variations from the nominal point "Russell Standish as
described on August 27th at exactly 4PM Australian time, along the continuum
of the wave function are you willing to accept? Is Russell Standish on the
28th at 4 PM still Russell Standish? How about a variation of Russell that
never materialized in "our world" but is well and kicking on another branch
that separated at 6 PM on August 27th?
In fact I believe that Russell Standish exists in an infinite number of
variations just as there are an infinite number of points on a line between
two points A and B. Russell Standish is as infinite as the continuum, and in
fact there is a path along the Russell Standish continuum that eventually
becomes George Levy. So we are all in a sense related through all the
conscious points (locus of consciousness?) in the MW that separate us. :-)
George Levy
Re: zombie wives
I use the terms SSA, ASSA, RSSA only because others on the list insist on using them. In my opinion the 'ASSA' is a tautology and not an assumption, while the 'RSSA' is an error. On Mon, 23 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote: > Now this implies that an individual's measure decreases the older that > individual gets. This is the basis of Jacques' argument against > QTI. In absolute SSA, an individual concious being is a sample from > the set of all observer moments. There is no time, one just is. Under > this picture, one could never expect to be all that old. Ok so far. > Under relative SSA, there is time. Each observer moment is connected > to a range (presumably infinite) of future observer moments. The Here's where the position of the QS camp appears to diverge from other positions of QSers, notably Higgo James, who of course endorses both seemingly contradictory positions. > relative SSA predicts that the observer will see at the next instant > of time an observer moment with the greatest measure, subject to its > lying in the future of the current observer moment. That measure may > be fantastically small (eg just prior to a fatal crash) - it just has > to be the largest from that set. No. If every observer sees all future moments, then the amount of consciousness does not decrease with time, and thus the measure stays constant over time. This has the consequence that, for a given observer, over most of his lifetime he will find himself to be very old. It may seem that I am mixing in the ASSA when I say that, therefore, the fact that we do not find ourselves old is evidence against the RSSA. The truth is I can not avoid this way of thinking any more than I could believe that 1+1=3. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Re: zombie wives
On Mon, 23 Aug 1999, Jacques M. Mallah wrote: > Life will continue but with decreasing measure. Still it seems > that you can make a refutable prediction: namely, that the universe we are > in is not optimised for us to be here, but is optimised to give you a long > lifetime. Basically you are saying that what the measure ratio (say, > between two universes) will be in the future affects the measure ratio in > the present. For example a universe in which lives decay polynomially > would be favored over one in which they decay exponentially. This may be confusing since I mixed apples with oranges. I should have said "the universes in which the (absolute) SSA would predict a slower decrease in measure", since, with the relative SSA, those universes would *increase* in measure. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Re: zombie wives
Jacques Mallah wrote: > No, I'm just a sane MWIer. I have explained my views on this on >previous occasions. > According to the standard MWI, the measure of a human is >proprtional to the squared amplitude of the term in the wavefunction which >that human is in. As long as there is no killing, etc. total the measure >is therefore conserved as a function of time. > If the measure was not conserved, but grew exponentially, then >later times would be very heavily favored, which is inconsistent with our >observations. This is correct with the ABSOLUTE SSA. Not with the RELATIVE one. > My attempt to explain the situation is to take the measure to be >proportional to the number of implementations of conscious computations. >This first requires a definition of implementation, and that has been the >roadblock. The final step is to show that the number of implementations >is proportional to the squared amplitude. > Quantum events, then, just cause the implementations to >differentiate rather than creating new ones. This is reasonable since >each implementation should have slightly different boundaries to mark off >where the formal states of the computation are in the space of >wavefunction configurations. > Since the number of implementations is infinite and they are >parameterized by continuous parameters, only infinite groups of them have >any significance. This is analagous to coloring a surface. It does not >matter if one point on a surface is colored, what matters is the *area* >that is colored. Measure is analagous to such an area. It is >quantifiable because just as two people have twice as much consciousness >as one person, doubling the number of implementations would double the >measure. I agree, basically. So I guess it is the absolute/relative point which distinguish between us. The immortality distinction results. Nevertheless I don't understand you when you say: > Quantum events, then, just cause the implementations to >differentiate rather than creating new ones. I guess you disagree with Q19 of Michael Clive Price's FAQ at http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#detect. Q19 = "Do worlds differentiate or split?" Bruno
Re: Fwd: zombie wives - The relativistic point of view
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > You all seem to assign to "measure" a soul-like quality as if measure had any > value, as if it is "good" to maximize measure, as if measure has an > objective, and absolute existence.. like the Ether. > > I believe that in fact, the probability of observing an event LINKED TO YOUR > OWN EXISTENCE is a relative quantity. Depending in which frame of reference > you decide to follow you will end up with different results. After reading > 142 E-mails, I am too tired now to work out the math, but is is clear that > from the "bird eye" view of an outside observer, you'll come up with one > probability value, and from the frame of reference attached to the person > being copied (or fused) you'll end up with a different probability value. > > George But, George, all any of us has is a subjective perspective. From the point of view of each of us, we attempt to discern the laws of physics, and make predictions. I'm just making the assumption that it is possible for us to know those laws (probabilistically) and then looking at Wei Dai's thought experiment. What do you propose as an alternative? -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com "Donuts are so sweet and tasty." -- Homer Simpson
Re: zombie wives
> > On 18 xxx -1, Marchal wrote: > > Jacques M. Mallah wrote: > > >> Russell Standish wrote: > > >> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness! > > > That is the problem. > > I don't see that either. > > The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the > > relative probability of living such and such experiences. > > It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience. > > No one ever suggested it might, so I don't know what you're > talking about. Measure is the amount of consciousness, and effective > probability is proportional to measure. > There is no reason to be confused about amount vs. intensity. If > you want an analogy you can think of paint. Intensity, quality, or > whatever you want to call it describes the *color* of the paint, but the > *amount* of paint is another issue. If you have two colors, red and blue, > the "effective probability" of red is analagous to the amount of red > paint divided by the total amount of paint. This is all a bogus argument. One cannot quantify conciousness - either an entity is concious, or it is not. People like Marchal are just using words like intensity, or amount or degree (my term) just to refer to this quantification for the purposes of showing how silly it is. Now you come along an introduce an arbitrary distinction between different people's terms for an unbelievable and non-existent concept. Again, I repeat my statement - I don't see what measure has to do with conciousness. ... Rest of stuff deleted as it is even more absurd, and depends on the above issue for it support ... > > - - - - - - - > Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) >Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/ > > Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
Re: zombie wives
On 18 xxx -1, Marchal wrote: > Jacques M. Mallah wrote: > >> Russell Standish wrote: > >> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness! > > That is the problem. > I don't see that either. > The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the > relative probability of living such and such experiences. > It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience. No one ever suggested it might, so I don't know what you're talking about. Measure is the amount of consciousness, and effective probability is proportional to measure. There is no reason to be confused about amount vs. intensity. If you want an analogy you can think of paint. Intensity, quality, or whatever you want to call it describes the *color* of the paint, but the *amount* of paint is another issue. If you have two colors, red and blue, the "effective probability" of red is analagous to the amount of red paint divided by the total amount of paint. > It is the same with your physical computationalism, because if > a computation is well-implemented (in your "physical" sense), then > the duplication will be well-implemented too. > Needless to say your zombie argument doesn't work with COMP (Pure COMP), > but I don't see how it works with your > own (hybrid) PHYSical COMPutationalism. I repeat: the zombies are an artefact of the approach that is used to justify QS. I do NOT think there would be zombies. It's an attempt to expose the absurdity of QS. > Nor does it work with Everett MWI. Your argument looks a little > like the argument against MWI from which it follows that Energy is > not conserved in the 'multiplication of worlds'. Not at all. Obviously if there is no copying or killing (or birthing), we all agree that the measure of observers stays the same in the MWI (at least to a good approximation). - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Re: zombie wives
On Mon, 16 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote: [Jack wrote] > > What I am trying to do is to look at the consequences of the > > claims made by the quantum suicide camp. The claim is that consciousness > > 'flows into' possible continuations of oneself and is, in effect, > > conserved as long as such continuations exist. I by no means accept this > > claim. However I see no reason why you say it would deny the existence of > > copying machines. > > Because copying machines increase one's measure, but not effective > probability, which remains normalised. I agree with that statement but don't agree that it's consistent with QS. > In this copying machine incident, we assume that a person experiencing > the event has a 50% chance of experiencing being either copy. However, > each Jane will be fully concsious - there is no diluting of that > conciousness. An outside observer will be unable to distinguish who > was the "real Jane". Neither would an inside observer. I maintain that the distinction is meaningless. [I wrote] > > If the problem is that QSers may deny that measure is conserved, > > that problem is not my fault. By their other words it is clear that they > > believe it is. (You may be included in the group I mean by 'them'.) I am > > the one using the term correctly. [this paragraph still applies] > I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness! That is the problem. From: Higgo James <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >We of the 'quantum suicide camp' deny absolutely that consciousness, or >anything else 'flows'. Flow is a function of time, which is subjective, not >an objective feature of reality. To say consciousness flows, is like saying >a program creates the hardware on which it runs, and the programming >language in which it is written. I'd say there's a split in your camp - and you have been on both sides of it! I don't see how you can say the above but reject the SSA. >Consciousness is not some special property you can bottle, for God's sake. >But if I am conscious in this universe, and the next one is virtually >identical, then I am virtually certain that I will be conscious in that one. The above paragraph is incomprehensible, starting with your use of the letter 'I'. I am not sure what this letter is supposed to signify in that context. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
zombie wives
referring to > t0 | > | > t1 T / \ H >/ \ > t2 / / \ > | | \ > t3 Y R B Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events). Gilles Henri wrote: >With the color cards, each Jane will measure subjectively a probability 1/2 >of yellow, 1/4 of red (1/2 H *1/2 "being chosen as Jane 1") and 1/4 blue, >so again p(H) = p(T)=1/2 with the conditional probability formula. >The probability 2/3 is indeed the chance of finding someone who saw H after >the first experiment from a bird perspective, because duplicating >introduces a bias. I agree that according to the approach taken by the q-su's, namely that one's measure is somehow distributed among the so called computational continuations of one's brain activity, the probabilities would be (1/2,1/4,1/4). It is a history dependent claim: > t0 | > | > t1 W / \ H >/ \ > t2 T/ \H \ > | \ \ > t3 Y R B where W=wait to show the coin to her until the second copying event. Since she doesn't know when copying occurs this looks identical from her perspective, but the measure distribution is (1/4,1/4,1/2) according to the QS claim. Presumably this measure distribution would remain the same years later. I think this is already both ill-defined and anti-intuitive. To extend the example suppose that to counter the unfortunate demographic imbalance in China, someone figures out how to instantly make a million copies of Gong Li. According to the flow of measure claim, each of these copies would have just one millionth of a normal human measure. So these women would practically be zombies. It would not be justified to give them equal rights since they have so much less consciousness. This would remain true even as life experiences give them different perspectives and evolved personalities, some of them come to America, etc. I think this shows how ridiculous the claim is. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
