Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?
Dear All, >From the philosophical/epistemological and particularly theory of science point of view, Mark¹s remark is essential. What conceptual primitives do we use and how do we undersand them? Mark reminds us that even basic concepts of a basic science of physic such as space, time and matter/energy are complex cognitive constructions. Words which we agree upon (I hope there are such) are conventional by origin, like physical units. That might be an insight from the perspective of cognitive science - if something is not strictly agreed upon by construction, there are different interpretations of it. And that which we have agreement about are procedures defining how we behave in order to observe something or construct something. Is there anything else that is self-evident in such a way that everybody immediately can agree about it? Best wishes, Gordana On 2017-10-23, 22:04, "Fis on behalf of Mark Johnson" wrote: >Dear all, > >There are some terms from physics which we use continually and assume >we all know what they mean. I'm taking my cue from Peter Rowland's >physics - see http://anpa.onl/pdf/S36/rowlands.pdf - in asking some >fundamental questions not only about information, but about physics >itself. > >1. "Dimension" - what is a dimension? We are told in school that >height, width and depth are three "dimensions", or that time is a >fourth. At the same time, we understand that a value in one dimension >is called a "scalar", and that in two dimensions we have "vectors" >(and also in more dimensions). > >2. "Vector" - this gets used in all sorts of contexts from cartography >to text analysis. But we have bivectors, trivectors, psuedovectors and >then the weird rotational asymmetry of quaternions, octonions, nonions >(see Peirce's work on these in the collected papers: his emphasis on >triadic forms seems to derive from his interest in quaternions). It's >important to be clear about what we mean by "vector". > >4. "Matter" and "Mass" - do we mean "mass" when we say "matter"? It's >worth noting that mass is a scalar value. > >5. "Energy" - isn't this a combination of mass, space and time? (e.g. >1/2mv^2) So... a scalar, a vector and time? > >6. "Time" - Is time "real" in the same way as we might consider mass >to be real?... It is perhaps surprising that mass and energy are >connected: Nuclear reactors turn scalars into vectors! Is time >imaginary? is time i? That would make it a pseudoscalar. > >7. "Conservation" - some things are conserved and other things aren't. >Time isn't conserved. Mass is. Energy is conserved. Space isn't >conserved, is it? Something weird happens with conservation...maybe >this is agency? Is information conserved? > >8. "Information" - Shannon information involves counting things. On >the face of it, it's a scalar value - but in the counting process, >there is work done - both by the thing observed and by the body that >observes it. Work, like energy, is (at least) a combination of mass, >time and space. This applies to *any* counting: there is an imaginary >component, the dimensions of space and scalar mass. It probably >involves charge too. > >9. "Agency" - Turning to Terry's definition of "agency", it involves >"work", "conservation" and "organisation". The definition hides some >complexities relating to the nature of work, and the ways in which >mass and charge might be conserved, but time and space isn't. Implicit >in the relation between extrinsic and intrinsic tendencies (what are >they?) is symmetry. Is agency a principle of conservation which >unfolds the symmetry between conserved and non-conserved dimensions? >That means we are in a symmetry: "a pattern that connects" - to quote >Bateson. > >Personally, I find the value of these questions is that they render >less certain the dogmatically asserted principles of modern physics. >Maybe we need this uncertainty in order to get closer to >"information". > >Best wishes, > >Mark > > >On 23 October 2017 at 17:39, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Dear Gordana, >> >> >> >> >> On 20 Oct 2017, at 11:02, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote: >> >> >> Dear Terry, Bob, Loet >> >> Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices >>for >> the definition of agency. >> >> I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro¹s article >> which makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and >>informational >> aspects of the same physical reality. I believe that on the fundamental >> level of information physics we have a good ND simplest example how >>those >> two entangled aspects can be formally framed. >> As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological >> agency. >> Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full >>cognitive and >> social agency which are very much dominated by informational aspects >> (symbols and language)? >> Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, >> >> >> >> Hmm... I am not sure. Elementary arithmetic determines
Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?
On 20 Oct 2017 at 4:47 AM, Stanley N. Salthe wrote: Here is an interesting recent treatment of autonomy. Autonomy is an authentic notion, albeit a bit intriguing. While no authority to talk down to the rest is allowed in there, an organized whole is in place. Every member element of an autonomy is then going to participate in forming the collective decisions made by the supporting autonomous unit. One prototypic example demonstrating the coordinated decision-making is a quantum measurement. The consequence of the measurement is simply an outcome of the decision-making transaction between an object to be measured and its measurement apparatus. Neither of the two dominates the other. Both of them are malleable to each other. This malleability may meet a requirement for approaching a robust autonomy with use of a lot of measurement apparatuses of natural origin whose armory is extremely rich. Measurement in quantum physics could be open to experiencing if the sequence of measurement of a measurement happens to constitute a loop without ending up with a mere accumulation of random events. Any autonomous unit like an embodied loop in spacetime may become durable if it can succeed in furnishing itself with the affinity towards detecting and implementing the conditions for its further durability through, for instance, the exchange of material components. Apropos, figuring out the affinity towards the conditions for duration, rather than those for conservation, is already sufficiently informational in referring to what the autonomy is all about on the physical basis. Koichiro Matsuno From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 4:47 AM To: Terrence W. DEACON ; fis Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”? Here is an interesting recent treatment of autonomy. Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences 12); Springer, Dordrecht, 2015, xxxiv + 221 pp., $129 hbk, ISBN 978-94-017-9836-5 STAN ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?
Dear all, There are some terms from physics which we use continually and assume we all know what they mean. I'm taking my cue from Peter Rowland's physics - see http://anpa.onl/pdf/S36/rowlands.pdf - in asking some fundamental questions not only about information, but about physics itself. 1. "Dimension" - what is a dimension? We are told in school that height, width and depth are three "dimensions", or that time is a fourth. At the same time, we understand that a value in one dimension is called a "scalar", and that in two dimensions we have "vectors" (and also in more dimensions). 2. "Vector" - this gets used in all sorts of contexts from cartography to text analysis. But we have bivectors, trivectors, psuedovectors and then the weird rotational asymmetry of quaternions, octonions, nonions (see Peirce's work on these in the collected papers: his emphasis on triadic forms seems to derive from his interest in quaternions). It's important to be clear about what we mean by "vector". 4. "Matter" and "Mass" - do we mean "mass" when we say "matter"? It's worth noting that mass is a scalar value. 5. "Energy" - isn't this a combination of mass, space and time? (e.g. 1/2mv^2) So... a scalar, a vector and time? 6. "Time" - Is time "real" in the same way as we might consider mass to be real?... It is perhaps surprising that mass and energy are connected: Nuclear reactors turn scalars into vectors! Is time imaginary? is time i? That would make it a pseudoscalar. 7. "Conservation" - some things are conserved and other things aren't. Time isn't conserved. Mass is. Energy is conserved. Space isn't conserved, is it? Something weird happens with conservation...maybe this is agency? Is information conserved? 8. "Information" - Shannon information involves counting things. On the face of it, it's a scalar value - but in the counting process, there is work done - both by the thing observed and by the body that observes it. Work, like energy, is (at least) a combination of mass, time and space. This applies to *any* counting: there is an imaginary component, the dimensions of space and scalar mass. It probably involves charge too. 9. "Agency" - Turning to Terry's definition of "agency", it involves "work", "conservation" and "organisation". The definition hides some complexities relating to the nature of work, and the ways in which mass and charge might be conserved, but time and space isn't. Implicit in the relation between extrinsic and intrinsic tendencies (what are they?) is symmetry. Is agency a principle of conservation which unfolds the symmetry between conserved and non-conserved dimensions? That means we are in a symmetry: "a pattern that connects" - to quote Bateson. Personally, I find the value of these questions is that they render less certain the dogmatically asserted principles of modern physics. Maybe we need this uncertainty in order to get closer to "information". Best wishes, Mark On 23 October 2017 at 17:39, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Dear Gordana, > > > > > On 20 Oct 2017, at 11:02, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote: > > > Dear Terry, Bob, Loet > > Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices for > the definition of agency. > > I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro’s article > which makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and informational > aspects of the same physical reality. I believe that on the fundamental > level of information physics we have a good ND simplest example how those > two entangled aspects can be formally framed. > As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological > agency. > Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full cognitive and > social agency which are very much dominated by informational aspects > (symbols and language)? > Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, > > > > Hmm... I am not sure. Elementary arithmetic determines all semi-computable > relative information state (with Oracles). So, with the numbers, once you > accept the addition laws and the multiplication laws, information "grows" > from inside, and consciousness differentiates. > When the information get deeper and deeper, in Bennett sense of debth, > dreams can stabilize and physical reality are "correctly" inferred, and > eventually derived from arithmetic. > > That might not make your point below invalid. > > It is yet an important metaphysical point. The incompleteness theorem > entails the existence of a sort of canonical information flux, or > consciousness differentiation internal to elementary arithmetic, or > elementary combinators, or to any universal machinery (universal in the > mathematical Church-Turing-Post-Kleene sense). > > We can decide to consider the arithmetical beings being zombies, but this > would entails a very special definition of matter to make it differ from the > testable "arithmetical distribution". > > We can't have weak mechanism and weak materi
Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?
Dear Gordana, On 20 Oct 2017, at 11:02, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote: Dear Terry, Bob, Loet Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices for the definition of agency. I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro’s article which makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and informational aspects of the same physical reality. I believe that on the fundamental level of information physics we have a good ND simplest example how those two entangled aspects can be formally framed. As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological agency. Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full cognitive and social agency which are very much dominated by informational aspects (symbols and language)? Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, Hmm... I am not sure. Elementary arithmetic determines all semi- computable relative information state (with Oracles). So, with the numbers, once you accept the addition laws and the multiplication laws, information "grows" from inside, and consciousness differentiates. When the information get deeper and deeper, in Bennett sense of debth, dreams can stabilize and physical reality are "correctly" inferred, and eventually derived from arithmetic. That might not make your point below invalid. It is yet an important metaphysical point. The incompleteness theorem entails the existence of a sort of canonical information flux, or consciousness differentiation internal to elementary arithmetic, or elementary combinators, or to any universal machinery (universal in the mathematical Church-Turing-Post-Kleene sense). We can decide to consider the arithmetical beings being zombies, but this would entails a very special definition of matter to make it differ from the testable "arithmetical distribution". We can't have weak mechanism and weak materialism, and the evidences might side on a mathematical (somehow theological or psychological) origin of the physical reality. Incompleteness entails that all (platonist, classical reasoner machine) are confronted with many different, and conflicting, views about itself. Indeed it enforces the Theaetetus' distinctions, between true, provable, knowable, observable, sensible: p, []p, []p&p, []p&~[]f, []p&~[]f&p With p sigma_1 arithmetical (equivalently: partial computable) this gives a proposition account of a theology, testable as it explains how the physical laws emerges from some "dream percolation" in arithmetic. The physical is very important, but like in Plato, it could be, and seemed to be, the border of another non physical, more mathematical, plausibly arithmetical, reality. but when we think about epistemology and the ways we know the world, for us and other biological agents there is no physical interaction without informational aspects. Can we somehow think in terms those two faces of agency? Without matter/energy nothing will happen, nothing can act in the world but that which happens and anyone registers it, has informational side to it. Without matter/energy nothing physical will happen. But if we assume a very weak form of digital mechanism, arithmetic justfies limiting dreams, with rich indexical, relative amount of information, from "inside arithmetic". And what we take as the physical might be what emerges from a first person statistics on those dreams. The logic of which is testable, and up to now, it matches the data (thanks to QM without coilapse of the wave). It is just premature to conclude that information (in the 1p and 3p sense) needs the physical. The physical might be an invariant in a notion of normal sharable number dream. (A dream can be defined by a computation containing the emulation of a Löbian machine (they know they are universal) with respect to different or not universal numbers. In arithmetic, the universal numbers infers that below their substitution level, if it exists, they are confronted to a statistics on infinity of universal numbers, and above, locally, only with a finite (but huge) number of universal machine/number. I am aware I ask a huge spiritual or theological effort, coming back to Plotinus, and Parmenides, and Plato, if not Pythagoras. But in epistemology, computable can be defined in very elementary theories and languages. The deep reason is the closure of the partial computable functions for cantor diagonalization (Gödel's called that a Miracle), and its price: the non computability of most predicate on most machines behaviors (like halting), and the loss of control and the art of letting go the things which go without saying. The universal (Löbian) machine can already defeat all normative or reductionist theory about their first person. They know that their soul is not a machine! For human agency (given that matter/energy side is functi
Re: [Fis] Simple question: What we really see in the mirror?
Dear Lou, dear Gordanna, On 22 Oct 2017, at 05:56, Louis H Kauffman wrote: Dear Krassimir, Thank you!! Yours is the most creative resolution of the Barber Paradox that I have encountered. Perhaps we can apply it also to the Russell Paradox. I do not know. Let us think about it. Another paradox that is resolved in the human realm is the card that reads “No one holding this card can verify the truth of this statement inscribed upon it.” For a human holding the card can say “Suppose I were not holding the card. Then indeed the statement can be seen to be true since if my friend Max were holding the card, then the statement would lead Max into a contradiction if he were to attempt to verify it. Thus I have verified the statement on the card by imagining that I do not hold the card." I submit that this solution (modal logical as it is) is a close relative of your mirror solution to the Barber. For in your mirror solution the Barber must understand that he does not shave himself, but that he shaves his mirror image. Similarly the card holder must imagine that he does not hold the card but that another holds the card. That is a very nice way to solve the paradox indeed, forcing us to make a little out-of-body experience! I would say that "This statement is false" is a "genuine paradox". And the machine's solution is that "false" is not definable as predicate (tarski solution). "this statement is unbelievable" go out of the paradox, not quite unlikely this Krassimir's solution, but it makes the statement true and definitely not believable except by going out of the body again, which machines can do, by the constructive diagonal involved. Best regards, Bruno Very best regards, Lou Kauffman On Oct 21, 2017, at 12:35 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote: Dear FIS Colleagues, It is time for my second post this week. First of all I am glad to participate in such very interesting discussion! Thank you for the nice posts. More than 25 years ago, working on the new theory, I had to solve the problem with concept of entity which has information activity. There were many candidates for such concept: “robot”, “agent”, “intelligent agent”, “interpreter”, “subject”, “information subject”, “intelligent subject”, etc. Every such concept had its own history and many domains of meanings which caused many misunderstandings. In the same time, if one had a single meaning then it couldn’t be applied to all entities with information activity. For instance, concept “robot” is not good to be used for a human. Because of this, we had proposed a new word: “INFOS”, which had no meaning in advance and may be defined freely without misunderstandings. I shall use it in my further posts. I do not want to define it now. Step by step its meaning will arise from what I shall write. In many discussions till now, I had seen that this approach is the best way to introduce a new concept. *** I want specially to thank Bruno for his post from 18.10.2017 about “Self-reference”! For me, it is very important it to be analyzed. I shall do this on the basis of an example. Not all kinds of self-reference concern information activity and Infos. But, if at least one case exists, then we have to analyze it. Such case, for instance, is the Barber paradox: A barber (who is a man) shaves all and only those men who do not shave themselves. Does he shave himself? This paradox exists only in “3D” mathematical world based on triad (x, y, f) or, in other writings: (x, f, y), y=f(x), etc. (there are several nice publications of Mark Burgin about triads !). I.e. paradox exists only if we ignore the fact that the Barber is a human. The paradox could not exist in the “4D” world of informatics where we have quadruple (x, y, f, I) or, in other words, for Infos “I”, “y” is information about “x” because of evidence “f”. What is happen when the Barber shaves someone? At the first place, it is a direct collecting, by eyes, the data about the place where the razor has to be put to shave. Have you ever seen a Blind barber? NO! OK, this is a fundamental condition. Not only Barber, but every human COULD NOT DIRECTLY COLLECT DATA about his/her face, head, or back. In another case, for instance, we have to have eye on the end of the nose which has to be as long as the elephant trunk! This means: the barber cannot shave himself because he could not see where to put the razor! But every man can shave his beard! How he can do it? Of course, everyone will say, by using a mirror! But this is NOT DIRECT REFLECTION (data collecting). It is TRANSITIVE SELF-REFLECTION via mirror! Who does the barber shave: himself or the man in the mirror? Of course, the second!!! Barber puts the razor on his own beard and this way he shaves the
[Fis] Property of garden peas: mass
1. Il figaro autobarbando The split between the role of the barber and the person of the barber can be massaged into a split between form and substance. Like roles are not additive, neither are forms. (A grandfather who is a neighbour are not 2 persons.) Like a person can be more (important, esteemed, weighty) than a different one, the substance of a thing can be more than that of a different object. 2. The individuality of garden peas We have seen that in multitudes conflicts exist a priori, because if the multitude is made up of different objects, the rankings according to the differentiating properties will be different. (If nothing else, one reason for discord would be whether the odd or the even numbered objects should be dealt with first /with humans: female & male/). We have seen that each of the garden peas possesses individuating properties which come from the mechanism of establishing a working compromise regarding the above contradictions of ranking. (This is called "cyclic permutations" and has an established literature.) So the form of garden pea nr i will be given 1. by the garden peas j, k, l, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from alpha into beta; 2. by the garden peas m, n, o, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from gamma into delta; 3. by the garden peas p, q, r, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from epsilon into zeta; 4. and so forth UNTIL THE LAST NONREDUNDANT ENUMERATION 3. How many nonredundant enumerations An observant colleague asked about the optimal size of the information transmission multitude, to which the answer is to study the functions shown in OEIS A242615. Their relative inexactitude grows outside all limits with n>140, and becomes relevant with n>135. Therefore, the set translating linear into planar should not be above n=136, and the efficiency advantage coming from size is somewhat diminished by the inbuilt inexactitude caused by 136>135. (Could be an approach to the subject of genetic variations and mutations.) We see by resolving the quadratic exponent that around 15 independent descriptions are sufficient to completely describe a collection of 68 objects carrying commutative symbols. (We need an equal number of objects to serve as background.) Therefore, the most individual garden pea will not be able to be included in more than 15 nonredundant comparisons. (This means that the property of mass can have about 15 different categories - in an idealised, nonredundant environment. There can APPEAR many more gradations, as the corpora will have a wide variety of number and individuality coming from the other elements of the corpus.) 4. The non-individual property of garden peas The other elements in the corpus of the reorder from greek letter into greek letter and the differences between the greek letters confer the individuality to the garden pea. That what is not individual is the how many part of the observation. We have seen that there appears an enumerable entity without any qualities which is closely linked to a+b=c. Plausibility consideration shows that below a minimal value of 1 the mass appears to be smeared along a wave (cycle), and that there exist upper limits to masses of assemblies. Please note that the garden peas discussed here are heavily idealised, nonredundant ones. They may be considered ideal garden peas, only to be found in specific circumstances. ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Property of garden peas: mass
1. Il figaro autobarbando The split between the role of the barber and the person of the barber can be massaged into a split between form and substance. Like roles are not additive, neither are forms. (A grandfather who is a neighbour are not 2 persons.) Like a person can be more (important, esteemed, weighty) than a different one, the substance of a thing can be more than that of a different object. 2. The individuality of garden peas We have seen that in multitudes conflicts exist a priori, because if the multitude is made up of different objects, the rankings according to the differentiating properties will be different. (If nothing else, one reason for discord would be whether the odd or the even numbered objects should be dealt with first /with humans: female & male/). We have seen that each of the garden peas possesses individuating properties which come from the mechanism of establishing a working compromise regarding the above contradictions of ranking. (This is called "cyclic permutations" and has an established literature.) So the form of garden pea nr i will be given 1. by the garden peas j, k, l, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from alpha into beta; 2. by the garden peas m, n, o, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from gamma into delta; 3. by the garden peas p, q, r, etc. with which it shares a cycle during a reorder from epsilon into zeta; 4. and so forth UNTIL THE LAST NONREDUNDANT ENUMERATION 3. How many nonredundant enumerations An observant colleague asked about the optimal size of the information transmission multitude, to which the answer is to study the functions shown in OEIS A242615. Their relative inexactitude grows outside all limits with n>140, and becomes relevant with n>135. Therefore, the set translating linear into planar should not be above n=136, and the efficiency advantage coming from size is somewhat diminished by the inbuilt inexactitude caused by 136>135. (Could be an approach to the subject of genetic variations and mutations.) We see by resolving the quadratic exponent that around 15 independent descriptions are sufficient to completely describe a collection of 68 objects carrying commutative symbols. (We need an equal number of objects to serve as background.) Therefore, the most individual garden pea will not be able to be included in more than 15 nonredundant comparisons. (This means that the property of mass can have about 15 different categories - in an idealised, nonredundant environment. There can APPEAR many more gradations, as the corporis will have a wide variety of number and individuality coming from the other elements of the corpus.) 4. The non-individual property of garden peas The other elements in the corpus of the reorder from greek letter into greek letter and the differences between the greek letters confer the individuality to the garden pea. That what is not individual is the how many part of the observation. We have seen that there appears an enumerable entity without any qualities which is closely linked to a+b=c. Plausibility consideration shows that below a minimal value of 1 the mass appears to be smeared along a wave (cycle), and that there exist upper limits to masses of assemblies. Please note that the garden peas discussed here are heavily idealised, nonredundant ones. They may be considered ideal garden peas, only to be found in specific circumstances. ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
