Re: [Fis] some notes

[Francesco Rizzo]

Cari colleghi,
l'esistenza implica la conoscenza articolata nelle diverse scienze della
natura, umane e sociali. Quindi la "Science of Logic" , non la logica della
scienza,
di Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1812-1816) vale per qualsiasi tipo di
scienza. Difatti la scienza pura della ragione si divide in tre dottrine:
- dell'essere (quantità, qualità e misura);
- dell'essenza, che studia il pensiero nella sua riflessione o mediazione,
cioè il concetto in quanto è "per sè" e dunque appare;
- del concetto, che studia il concetto "in sè e per sè".
Il primo presentarsi della realtà avviene nelle forme immediate, intuitive,
della qualità, quantità e misura, ma bisogna cogliere ciò che è all'origine
nascosto
nella realtà dell'essere: l'essenza che rappresenta la "verità dell'essere".
La rilettura di Hegel fornisce i fondamenti ontologici al(la teoria del)
valore economica concepita come una combinazione o una relazione
energia/informazione basata sulla
dialettica quantità/qualità e sulla "quantità qualitativa" o misura. Hegel
non contrappone la quantità alla qualità, ma tenta di coglierne la
complementarità facendo derivare la prima dalla seconda. La quantità è la
negazione della qualità. Quantità e qualità variano continuamente, sono
caratterizzate dalla variabilità, ma la variazione quantitativa è
indifferente nei confronti della qualità che non cambia al mutare della
dimensione quantitativa. Se la quantità è un momento di esteriorità
indifferente alla sfera della qualità si giustifica o spiega la scarsa
consi derazione di Hegel per le trattazioni puramente quantitative e dunque
per quelle scienze matematiche quantitative o dure.  Egli ritiene che le
proposizioni della geometria e dell'aritmetica abbiano una natura
esclusivamente analitica e dunque tautologica, negando loro ogni efficacia
euristica.
Questa forte critica al rigore e alla validità scientifica dei modelli
matematici non gli impedisce di svolgere un'analisi che evidenzia
l'insufficienza delle determinazioni,
quantitative per la stessa matematica nella quale, secondo questa
impostazione filosofica che influenza fortemente l'epistemologia
scientifica, irrompono criteri qualitativi facendola divenire  "dolce". Se
la matematica è costretta  incorporare criteri qualitativi o ordinali, deve
far proprio il passaggio alla sfera della misura o "quantità qualitativa".
Beninteso, la scienza della logica mi è servita per elaborare la Nuova
economia (Cfr. in particolare Rizzo F., "La scienza non può non essere
umana, civile, sociale, economi(c)a, enigmatica, nobile, profetica",
Aracne, Roma, 2016, pp. 604-615; oppure Rizzo F.,  "La città dell'uomo.
Sottesa dalla fede", in Human Rights and The City Crisis a cura di Corrado
Beguinot ed altri, Giannini, Napoli, 2012).
Quindi, per farla breve, "quantità qualitativa", "emo-ra-zionalità" e
"significazione, informazione, comunicazione" sono fondamentali per
l'INTERA  conoscenza.
Chiedo scusa per essermi dilungato e vi ringrazio anticipatamente per la
vostra attenzione critica.
Francesco.

2017-11-19 6:34 GMT+01:00 Xueshan Yan :

> Dear Terry and Loet，
>
> I think both of your posts put forward a very important concept to
> information studies, i.e., HIERARCHY.
>
> Terry stated: "Communication needs to be more carefully distinguished from
> mere transfer of physical differences, …… Any transfer of physical,
> physical differences in this respect can be utilized to communicate, and
> all communication requires this physical foundation."
>
> I hope to raise a similar question: what is the mode of the existence of
> information? My answer is: No information can exist in a bare way. That is
> to say, any existence of information is premised on the existence of
> substrate, and the substrate can be hierarchical. In the same way, no
> information can be communicated or processed in a bare way if and only if
> it has been embedded in the substrate. In human information, substrate can
> be divided into sign, paper, etc., or other electronic devices. In genetic
> information, substrate can be divided into base, DNA or RNA, chromosome,
> cell, and organism. The study about the mode of existence of information is
> an important aspect of ontological research of information science.
>
> In Terry’s statement: "Simply collapsing our concept (compression,
> collapse) of 'communication' to its physical substrate ……", or in Loet’s
> words: "One should not confuse communication with the substance of
> communication." Again, this is a hierarchy problem. Because no information
> can be communicated in a bare way, so the communication of information is
> premised on the communication of substrate, the same is true in the
> processing of information. Then, any communication of information is
> twofold: communication of information and communication of substrate. The
> study about the mode of communication and processing of information is the
> important aspect of dynamical research of information science.
>
>
>
> Best 

Re: [Fis] some notes

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear Terry and Loet，

I think both of your posts put forward a very important concept to information 
studies, i.e., HIERARCHY.

Terry stated: "Communication needs to be more carefully distinguished from mere 
transfer of physical differences, …… Any transfer of physical, physical 
differences in this respect can be utilized to communicate, and all 
communication requires this physical foundation."

I hope to raise a similar question: what is the mode of the existence of 
information? My answer is: No information can exist in a bare way. That is to 
say, any existence of information is premised on the existence of substrate, 
and the substrate can be hierarchical. In the same way, no information can be 
communicated or processed in a bare way if and only if it has been embedded in 
the substrate. In human information, substrate can be divided into sign, paper, 
etc., or other electronic devices. In genetic information, substrate can be 
divided into base, DNA or RNA, chromosome, cell, and organism. The study about 
the mode of existence of information is an important aspect of ontological 
research of information science.

In Terry’s statement: "Simply collapsing our concept (compression, collapse) of 
'communication' to its physical substrate ……", or in Loet’s words: "One should 
not confuse communication with the substance of communication." Again, this is 
a hierarchy problem. Because no information can be communicated in a bare way, 
so the communication of information is premised on the communication of 
substrate, the same is true in the processing of information. Then, any 
communication of information is twofold: communication of information and 
communication of substrate. The study about the mode of communication and 
processing of information is the important aspect of dynamical research of 
information science.

 

Best wishes,

Xueshan

 

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2017 4:19 PM
To: Terrence W. DEACON ; fis 
Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes

 

Dear Terry and colleagues, 

 

I agree that one should not confuse communication with the substance of 
communication (e.g., life in bio-semiotics). It seems useful to me to 
distinguish between several concepts of "communication".

 

1. Shannon's (1948) definitions in "The Mathematical Theory of Communication". 
Information is communicated, but is yet meaning free. These notions of 
information and communication are counter-intuitive (Weaver, 1949). However, 
they provide us with means for the measurement, such as bits of information. 
The meaning of the communication is provided by the system of reference (Theil, 
1972); in other words, by the specification of "what is comunicated?" For 
example, if money is communicated (redistributed), the system of reference is a 
transaction system. If molecules are communicated, life can be generated 
(Maturana).

 

2. Information as "a difference which makes a difference" (Bateson, 1973; 
McKay, 1969). A difference can only make a difference for a receiving system 
that provides meaning to the system. In my opinion, one should in this case 
talk about "meaningful information" and "meaningful communication" as different 
from the Shannon-type information (based on probability distributions). In this 
case, we don't have a clear instrument for the measurement. For this reason, I 
have a preference for the definitions under 1.

 

3. Interhuman communication is of a different order because it involves 
intentionality and language. The discourses under 1. and 2. are interhuman 
communication systems. (One has to distinguish levels and should not impose our 
intuitive notion of communication on the processes under study.) In my opinion, 
interhuman communication involves both communication of information and 
possibilities of sharing meaning.

 

The Shannon-type information shares with physics the notion of entropy. 
However, physical entropy is dimensioned (Joule/Kelvin; S = k(B) H), whereas 
probabilistic entropy is dimensionless (H). Classical physics, for example, is 
based on the communication of momenta and energy because these two quantities 
have to be conserved. In the 17th century, it was common to use the word 
"communication" in this context (Leibniz).

 

Best,

Loet

 

-- Original Message --

From: "Terrence W. DEACON" <  dea...@berkeley.edu>

To: "fis" <  fis@listas.unizar.es>

Cc: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <  
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>; "Loet Leydesdorff" <  
l...@leydesdorff.net>

Sent: 11/17/2017 6:34:18 PM

Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes

 

On communication:

 

"Communication" needs to be more carefully distinguished from mere

transfer of physical differences from location to location and time to

time. Indeed, any physical 

Re: [Fis] R: Re: some notes - on the nature of science and communication

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear All,
In the discussion about the nature of science and the role of quantitative and 
qualitative methods I would like to add the following statement:
Logic is the science of rational thinking or reasoning.
http://www.math-inst.hu/~nemeti/whatislogic.html
Logic is not a quantitative science.

This connects to ancient Greek science that sprung out of philosophy of nature 
(even Newton was still natural philosopher) which relied more on reason than on 
observation/experience. And where they indeed made quantitative predictions 
like Eratosthenes who calculated the circumference of the Earth, the central 
part of his prediction was based on logical reasoning.

The main works of Aristotle were the Prior Analytics (Logic), the Physics, the 
Animal History, the Rhetorics, the Poetics, the Metaphysics, the Ethics, and 
the Politics. Today we consider Logic, Physics and Biology to be sciences, 
while Rhetorics, Poetics, Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics are not. How 
compulsory is it for something to be “science” in order to be a respectable 
form of knowledge?
Perhaps it is useful at some point in the development of human knowledge to 
have a holistic view bridging across sciences and other fields? Rational, 
logical view.
Science itself is not everywhere quantitative in its various layers and 
branches. There are theoretical non-observables in quantum mechanics and other 
physical theories and they play important role in their construction and 
operation.

Regarding the other discussion point, the necessity to differentiate between 
"the difference that makes the difference" for a machine and for a living 
organism I would say that the difference exists but is becoming less and less 
clear-cut the more machines become cognitive and intelligent. It is not 
difficult to imagine a limit case where intelligent machine talks to other 
intelligent machine. Would that be then mixing Shannon with (bio)semiotics?

The notion of communication might be constructed in a useful way to cover 
different levels of organisation of phenomena.
As growth of a crystal is different from a growth of a plant is different from 
a growth of a child – and yet it makes sense to talk about growth.
So I see using the word “communication” to machines or why not simplest 
physical systems that interact with other physical systems causing "the 
difference that makes the difference” for the system itself.
Definitions indeed are just the question of making good sense – they are matter 
of choice.

All the best,
Gordana


PS
Mark Burgin and I have sent invitations to contribute to World Scientific 
books: http://is4si-2017.org/publications/
Vol 1 Philosophy and Methodology of Information (G. Dodig-Crnkovic and M. 
Burgin, edts.)
Part 1. Philosophy of information
Part 2. Methodology of information
Part 3. Philosophy of information studies
Part 4. Methodology of information studies

Vol 2 Theoretical Information Studies (M. Burgin and G. Dodig-Crnkovic, edts.)
Part 1. Foundations of information
Part 2. Information theory
Part 3. Information as a natural phenomenon
Part 4. Cognition and intelligence in natural and artificial systems
Part 5. Social, economic and legal aspects of information
Part 6. Technological aspects of information

Please let us know as soon as possible if you intend (and even if you do not 
intend) to contribute, in order to help us keep the deadlines.



https://www.chalmers.se/en/staff/Pages/gordana-dodig-crnkovic.aspx



From: Fis > 
on behalf of "tozziart...@libero.it" 
>
Reply-To: "tozziart...@libero.it" 
>
Date: Friday, 17 November 2017 at 17:44
To: Sungchul Ji >, 
"fis@listas.unizar.es" 
>
Subject: [Fis] R: Re: some notes


Dear Sungchul,
I do not have anything against you, therefore sorry for my words, but your 
propositions gave me the opportunity to demonstrate the weirdness of such 
approaches for science.

YOU find it convenient to define communication as an irreducibly triadic 
process (physical, chemical, biological, physiological, or mental).  YOU 
identify such a triadic process with the Peircean semiosis (or the sign 
process) often represented as the following diagram which is isomorphic with 
the commutative triangle of the category theory.  Thus, to YOU, communication 
is a category.

I do not agree at all: therefore, could your proposition be kept as science?
All the scientists agree on the definition (even if operational) of an atom, or 
agree that E=mc^2.  If we are talking of something qualitative, that one agrees 
and another do not, we are not in front of Science.

Sorry,
Nothing personal.



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, 

[Fis] Happiness is a Tautology

[Karl Javorszky]

Happiness is a Tautology



Dear friends,


1)  Introduction

There are very many aspects, levels, perspectives to a discussion that
deserves its name. We all work on understanding a system of highly complex
phenomena, which we call life. A part of it is, or it does, information, a
part of it is, or does, communication. We do not yet know, how to draw a
picture of a working mechanism that lives and contains – or does or
experiences, etc. – communication, and within this – or parallel to that? –
transmits information. The picture is not design-ready yet.

That there is an interdependent system of particular parts which produce
particular effects is maybe a formulation of the idea in a sufficiently
common way, one the partners can basically agree to.

Now here comes a proposal to establish an idea about what this system
produces. The system is in terms of sociology a Betrieb (place of
production), as described by Max Weber. The organisational idea of a
nervous system is brought close to an interested person by C. Northcote
Parkinson’s acute observations about organisations of humans.

We have a complex together of subsystems visualised before ourselves. The
goal is to find the engine which fuels the system and keeps it running,
specifically in view of the need to have a common unit for reasons of
necessary cooperation among the sub-systems. The accountant wishes also for
units of used up fuel, waste, of de-cooperation and de-communalism, but we
shall at first introduce a common currency for the travails of the
different sub-systems while running like they should. This satisfactory,
good, maybe optimal performance level is effortlessly running, in the case
of a healthy individual. We disregard at first the niceties of which kind
and how much of communication and/or information are produced, transmitted,
digested, acted on or learned from. We wish to find the organisational
equivalent of one unit of reinforcement over all kinds of differentiated
activities. The advantages the sub-system derives from doing something well
must be accessible to a reasoned abstraction. The organisational unit
receives one unit of reinforcement for having done one task well: the
reward will serve as a bonus to keep doing that what one does well.
Usually, one calls this self-gratification of the nervous system one shot
of endorphins, but here no attempt is made to speak about things of
Chemistry, here of numbers and men is the song.


2)  The Unit of Fulfilment

The satisfaction we experience if we have resolved something well: this
experience is what we propose to use as unit of consistency in systems that
mimic the central nervous system. The tension release in the moment of lust
when we realise that the task has been done, all went well, it is all
right, we got it, we got away, we got in, etc. is followed by a douche of
enzymes which are usually referred to as endorphins: the intersubjective
existence of the concept is well accessible to all of us.

It is obvious that the brain is an optimising device. Animals and small
children show that they are out to maximise the output within their system
which we refer to as endorphins. Any person in any experiment can be
assumed to optimise something in their brain which they consider in that
moment, under those circumstances the optimal solution to achieve the best
variant among the available variants. Humans evidently optimise something
by using their brain. Let us give this something the brain tries to
optimise the production of, the name Lust. The term Lebenslust corresponds
to the terms lust of life, soif de vie; Lebensfreude to joy of life, joie
de vivre.

The proposal is to define the unit of lust as one unit of expectation
fulfilment. Then, the system would try to optimise the proportion of
winning bets among all bets it closes with itself. Overdoing it would cause
problems, because either there is no check on the proportion becoming 100%:
then the system could just ossify, become vegetative and drift towards the
borders that segregate the living from the non-living. If there is a
counter-valve in existence, then it does not pay to use trivial solutions,
because the system degenerates and does not produce bets at all, therefore
within fewer bets over all, there are fewer such that could be won.
Cheating is a short-term strategy in the search for inner balance.

The interplay between Sollwert and Istwert, target value and actual value,
can be best demonstrated by the cycle of breathing. Drawing in, one
corrects an actual state towards a target state: in the actual state there
was too much CO2 and not enough O2, so the inhaling got started; at the end
of the inhaling process, there will be too much of O2 and not enough of CO2
in the lungs, therefore that what was heretofore the target state is now
the actual state and the opposite is now the target to reach. There exist
two ideal states and the system never reaches either of them, but
oscillates between opposed sets of 

Re: [Fis] some notes: Precise Qualitative Terms

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear All,

Terry's phrase deserves at least the attention, if not the agreement of all of 
us. In my view, qualitative terms belong in science if they follow some sort of 
logic. There are risks, of fraud and pseudo-science, but these risks cannot be 
avoided in reality by relying on mathematics alone.

Two comments, one negative and one positive:
How is it that despite the risk most of us are able to recognize pseudo-science 
when we see it?
In the sciences indicated by Terry, are not abductions  to the best 
explanations and implications to process dynamics doing some of the necessary 
work?

There seems to be no alternative to living partly with uncertainty, then, at 
all levels, and this is not congenial to some people. The existence of this 
non-congeniality is an example of the science I am talking about.

Best wishes,

Joseph
  - Original Message - 
  From: Terrence W. DEACON 
  To: fis 
  Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2017 5:38 AM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes


  If the definition of science requires quantification and mathematical 
representation then most of biology won't qualify, including molecular and 
cellular biology, physiology, psychology, and neuroscience. Physics envy has 
long ago been abandoned by most working scientists in these fields. This is not 
to say that just any sort of theorizing qualifies, nor can we be sure that 
today's non-quantifiable science won't someday be susceptible to precise 
empirically testable mathematical modeling—even semiotic analyses may someday 
be made mathematically precise—but being empirically testable, even if just in 
precise qualitative terms, is pretty close to being a core defining attribute.


  On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Terrence W. DEACON  
wrote:

On communication:

"Communication" needs to be more carefully distinguished from mere
transfer of physical differences from location to location and time to
time. Indeed, any physical transfer of physical differences in this
respect can be utilized to communicate, and all communication requires
this physical foundation. But there is an important hierarchic
distinction that we need to consider. Simply collapsing our concept of
'communication' to its physical substrate (and ignoring the process of
interpretation) has the consequence of treating nearly all physical
processes as communication and failing to distinguish those that
additionally convey something we might call representational content.

Thus while internet communication and signals transferred between
computers do indeed play an essential role in human communication, we
only have to imagine a science fiction story in which all human
interpreters suddenly disappear but our computers nevertheless
continue to exchange signals, to realize that those signals are not
"communicating" anything. At that point they would only be physically
modifying one another, not communicating, except in a sort of
metaphoric sense. This sort of process would not be fundamentally
different from solar radiation modifying atoms in the upper atmosphere
or any other similar causal process. It would be odd to say that the
sun is thereby communicating anything to the atmosphere.

So, while I recognize that there are many methodological contexts in
which it makes little difference whether or not we ignore this
semiotic aspect, as many others have also hinted, this is merely to
bracket from consideration what really distinguishes physical transfer
of causal influence from communication. Remember that this was a
methodological strategy that even Shannon was quick to acknowledge in
the first lines of his classic paper. We should endeavor to always be
as careful.

— Terry






  -- 

  Professor Terrence W. Deacon
  University of California, Berkeley


--


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Re: [Fis] some notes

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Terry and colleagues,

I agree that one should not confuse communication with the substance of 
communication (e.g., life in bio-semiotics). It seems useful to me to 
distinguish between several concepts of "communication".


1. Shannon's (1948) definitions in "The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication". Information is communicated, but is yet meaningfree. 
These notions of information and communication are counter-intuitive 
(Weaver, 1949). However, they provide us with means for the measurement, 
such as bits of information. The meaning of the communication is 
provided by the system of reference (Theil, 1972); in other words, by 
the specification of "what is comunicated?" For example, if money is 
communicated (redistributed), the system of reference is a transaction 
system. If molecules are communicated, life can be generated (Maturana).


2. Information as "a difference which makes a difference" (Bateson, 
1973; McKay, 1969). A difference can only make a difference for a 
receiving system that provides meaning to the system. In my opinion, one 
should in this case talk about "meaningful information" and "meaningful 
communication" as different from the Shannon-type information (based on 
probability distributions). In this case, we don't have a clear 
instrument for the measurement. For this reason, I have a preference for 
the definitions under 1.


3. Interhuman communication is of a different order because it involves 
intentionality and language. The discourses under 1. and 2. are 
interhuman communication systems. (One has to distinguish levels and 
should not impose our intuitive notion of communication on the processes 
under study.) In my opinion, interhuman communication involves both 
communication of information and possibilities of sharing meaning.


The Shannon-type information shares with physics the notion of entropy. 
However, physical entropy is dimensioned (Joule/Kelvin; S = k(B) H), 
whereas probabilistic entropy is dimensionless (H). Classical physics, 
for example, is based on the communication of momenta and energy because 
these two quantities have to be conserved. In the 17th century, it was 
common to use the word "communication" in this context (Leibniz).


Best,
Loet

-- Original Message --
From: "Terrence W. DEACON" 
To: "fis" 
Cc: "Pedro C. Marijuan" ; "Loet Leydesdorff" 


Sent: 11/17/2017 6:34:18 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes


On communication:

"Communication" needs to be more carefully distinguished from mere
transfer of physical differences from location to location and time to
time. Indeed, any physical transfer of physical differences in this
respect can be utilized to communicate, and all communication requires
this physical foundation. But there is an important hierarchic
distinction that we need to consider. Simply collapsing our concept of
'communication' to its physical substrate (and ignoring the process of
interpretation) has the consequence of treating nearly all physical
processes as communication and failing to distinguish those that
additionally convey something we might call representational content.

Thus while internet communication and signals transferred between
computers do indeed play an essential role in human communication, we
only have to imagine a science fiction story in which all human
interpreters suddenly disappear but our computers nevertheless
continue to exchange signals, to realize that those signals are not
"communicating" anything. At that point they would only be physically
modifying one another, not communicating, except in a sort of
metaphoric sense. This sort of process would not be fundamentally
different from solar radiation modifying atoms in the upper atmosphere
or any other similar causal process. It would be odd to say that the
sun is thereby communicating anything to the atmosphere.

So, while I recognize that there are many methodological contexts in
which it makes little difference whether or not we ignore this
semiotic aspect, as many others have also hinted, this is merely to
bracket from consideration what really distinguishes physical transfer
of causal influence from communication. Remember that this was a
methodological strategy that even Shannon was quick to acknowledge in
the first lines of his classic paper. We should endeavor to always be
as careful.

— Terry___
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