Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
Mark, thanks for starting an interesting topic.I'd like to highlight a connection between question 2, and the title of this session, and some dynamics of story formation.> 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not> encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)?If you're referring to your specific theory, its ontology seems promising, from the perspective of narrative mechanisms. In a story, similar to your GTI model, the representable elements are only a portion of the whole phenomenological system (your principle 4, I think). Also important to narrative is the impetus and ability to transform, in the manner you describe (principle 2). For a story, this transformation is a central feature, the residue of which can be found in its actual structure. Your distinction between explicitly representable elements, and the overall phenomenon, strikes me as important.This is why: in stories, there are also non-explicit, non-represented phenomenological elements that affect the process of narrative formation, and therefore its information structures. In fact, I would go further to say that such transformations would not be possible without these virtual entities. Ted touched upon this aspect below, and I would like to extend his observation to example that you (Mark) unconsciously provided, at the start of the session:> But just as particle physics finds it handy to have virtual particles and transcendent symmetries over> them, so will we have information types that do not touch the world in an observable way; these will > be required to support clean laws of behavior, yet to be convincingly proposed.Let me focus on the influence of virtual entities, for a moment. I could write a long the explanation about the role of anticipative inference in stories, but here's a more enjoyable example of the same behavior:> *INFORMATION: MYSTERY SOLVING*> > *Mark Burgin*> Professor & Visiting Scholar> Department of Mathematics> University of California at Los AngelesEveryone that has posted towards this topic so far has been compelled, in some way, to generate information structures. This is explicitly expressed as emails in a browser window. But much of the impetus for creating that residue is non-explicit. Aside from everyone's personal urges, an important driver has been the prospect of a mysterious space, one that needs to be filled. Mark launched this session by proposing that an artifact is wanted, and seven of us have already been stirred to assemble ideas that climb towards that unwritten space. Some already-established, explicit structures have been used in the process, such as past theories, and the use of English words on this page. But if those safe forms could satisfy Mark's space of mystery, without any formulative effort from us, I don't think we would have bothered to compose our messages.In the story ecosystem, the drive to assemble a structure (if a writer) or consume it until the final sentence (if a reader), is key. In both cases, the impetus strives towards a shape that has not yet been formed, but aspects hinted at. This seductive pull seems to be stimulated by the interaction between multiple ontological contexts, and structural tensions between them, as well as inferences that there are some central, cohering artifacts that do not yet exist, but should. For this reason, Ted's quantum analogy is apt, as is Mark's reference to the way an information system leverages its own parameters. In stories, the collective, projected information structures of the emerging tale exert a pull over its explicit elements, as they are forming, and also causing them to form.So in response to question 2, I suggest the inclusion of the virtual and tentative factors that stimulate the assembly of information structures - some of which can be seen in a tantalizing nature of 'mystery solving.' ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
Hi Stan I couldnt have said it better sounds like one of my arguments. But, the issue is this: When I say modelling Im using the scientific energetic concept, Ie conservation (1st), growth (2nd) and work (3rd) energy laws that have more or less been proven to be a truth. The same cannot be said for Information theory constructs relating to a living organism. We all know the machine analogy with information theory and the energetic relationships. So here there is no need to point it out. We may use the bits equally for example the speed limit of reading is 16 bits/second. But an individual does not read in bits because eyes dont process bits they process and transduce electromagnetic energy to electrical energy. Bits are the machine analogy. So in reality it's more like a frequency of 0.1Hz. You can use bits as long as we accept that eyes do not process bits. Here's the problem it seems that there is an acceptance that living organisms transduces bits. Above is the difference between a truth and a false. Regards Gavin Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'. Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modelling tools, not actual phenomena. So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not being pulled by gravitation. Gravitation is our way of understanding the falling. We all know these things, so it seems to me that there is no need to point this out. STAN On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz wrote: Ted Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting. My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions. These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is bound to this notion of thingness. GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with living organisms. Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is. GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic, declarative logic and interrogative logic. Having said that... > 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how we define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions. At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full orthogonality from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be the test of any serious proposal, in my view. This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into category theory, GR: It moves into Category theory and Topos my guess is because it's the very basic framework of logic. > 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? GR: for one no living organism uses Information theory constructs to communicate with each other. ie direct languaging. GR: Information theory is a construct used by our society to control machines. > 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between information and an information carrier? GR: Only if we can find direct scientific evidence that organisms use information theory constructs to communicate directly. So far none has been found. Clearly there is a system-level conveyance of information GR: It's not so clear. If I can be pointed to one experiment that proves there is such a thing as information theory constructs within living organism I will be very excited. that "carries" an organizational imperative. GR: More like DNA is an Imperative logical operator. I am intrigued by the notion introduced here recently that suggests "intelligence" as inhabiting this new, non-parametrizable space. GR: oops. Regards Gavin ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'. Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modeling tools, not actual phenomena. So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not being pulled by gravitation. Gravitation is our way of understanding the falling. We all know these things, so it seems to me that there is no need to point this out. STAN On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz wrote: > Ted > > > Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting. > > My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the > business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions. > These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first > class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has > qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is > bound > to this notion of thingness. > > GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with > living organisms. > > > > Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is. > > GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic, > declarative logic and interrogative logic. > > > > Having said that... > > > 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict > distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as > quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? > > I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how > we > define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and > information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions. > At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full > orthogonality > from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to > model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be > the test of any serious proposal, in my view. > > This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into > category theory, > > GR: It moves into Category theory and Topos my guess is because it's the > very basic framework of logic. > > > > 2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not > encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? > > GR: for one no living organism uses Information theory constructs to > communicate with each other. ie direct languaging. > > GR: Information theory is a construct used by our society to control > machines. > > > > 3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction > between information and an information carrier? > > GR: Only if we can find direct scientific evidence that organisms use > information theory constructs to communicate directly. So far none has been > found. > > > > Clearly there is a system-level conveyance of information > > GR: It's not so clear. If I can be pointed to one experiment that proves > there is such a thing as information theory constructs within living > organism I will be very excited. > > > that "carries" an organizational imperative. > > > GR: More like DNA is an Imperative logical operator. > > > I am intrigued by the notion introduced here recently that suggests > "intelligence" as inhabiting this new, non-parametrizable space. > > GR: oops. > > Regards > Gavin > > > > > > > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
