[Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

[Marcus Abundis]

Following John's, Loet's, and Terry's posts . . .

I don't think anyone would or could reasonably debate the contribution of
Shannon's framing. Even though (per Shanon-Weaver) it is an "unsatisfying"
notion they present, there is/was a bit of brilliance in that work. STILL,
they too saw that they did not go far enough . . . (framing multiple Levels
of information).

Further to Bateson's "difference" Bateson also saw that his own concept did
not go far enough in that he stated "differences themselves must be
differentiated." But neither does he add any useful details. Instead he
seemed to go in the direction of parables and Freudian psychology as the
only reasonable means (Esalen epistemology lecture) of tracking and
reporting on complex informational roles. Which is to say I think he
recognized the issue, but felt defeated by the challenge (near end of
life?). This also, perhaps, explains his fondness for explaining concepts
in terms of "conversations with my daughter" as a type of reported parable.

On top of this I have noticed Søren Brier's comment that "to whom or to
what" it makes a difference is not remarked on by Bateson. And I would add
that "to what end" it makes a difference is not noted – all of which, I
think, ultimately points in the direction of Terry's notion of work.

>From John Collier's post: Fri Jun 26 20:59:47 CEST 2015
> I believe that information in itself must be interpreted, and is not,
therefore intrinsically meaningful<

I would agree with this as a basic comment, but then "In the good old days"
how is it not DATA that scientists would be, in fact, gathering and
interpreting? Why is there this need to displace the notion of data (as a
specific type of "uninterpreted" information) with a more generic usage of
"information"? Do we really need to add a "meaningless" qualifier (pun
wholly intended) in front of every usage of "information" meant to denote
data?

On Brenner's "faint perfume of reductionism" . . .
Not exactly sure how to take this – it sounds dismissive, is this
meant to suggest
that reductionism is, per se, bad and to be avoided? Is it all to be an
"unexplainable mystery"? As I understand Terry's view (and my own) it is
essentially reductionistic,  but I would also say that I don't think it
strives to be "naively reductionistic."

[image: --]
Marcus Abundis
[image: http://]about.me/marcus.abundis

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[Fis] information as physical entity

[Andrei Khrennikov]

  Dear all,
May be some addition to my previous post: information physics and in particular 
recent information approach to QM 
are based on the interpretation of information as primary physical entity, 
similar to energy. Quantum systems carry information and can exchange 
it, experimenters can guess about information exchange between quantum systems 
and the measurement devices. 
Roughly  speaking,  this is the beginning and the end of the information story: 
one does not need further theorizing about 
the "meaning" of information.
yours, andrei   

Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
International Center for Mathematical Modeling
in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden

From: Fis [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf of Terrence W. DEACON 
[dea...@berkeley.edu]
Sent: Monday, June 29, 2015 10:48 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

On Bateson's "difference that makes a difference."

We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of information 
in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined also by MacKay as 
a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures both Shannon's logic and 
Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not all. If one wants to try to 
force this phrase to carry more of the weight of completely characterizing 
information it should be further interpreted. Notice that it is also an 
appropriate quip to describe the concept of physical work— a gradient (or 
difference of potential) that is reduced in a constrained way so that it 
generates an increase in a gradient or difference in potntial or pushes a 
system further from equilibrium.

This double applicability is not merely a terminological coincidence, though I 
don't think that Gregory realized this, since he used this quip to argue for an 
energy/information dichotomy. I have instead argued (most recently in my 
January FIS essay) that both the referential and normative properties of 
information are intimately entangled with the concept of physical work.

Also, in English parlance the phrase to "make a difference" is an idiom that 
means "to matter" or to be significant or of value. I believe that this double 
entendre was intended in order to implicate the normative and goal directed 
aspects of information. Explicating either the aboutness or the normative 
consequence in terms of "bits" therefore inevitably results in reductionistic 
oversimplication. Bits are a relevant measure of intrinsic logical properties 
of the communication medium, but of minimal value in assessing the extrinsic 
relational properties that are implicated in the larger concept of information. 
I think that measuring work (though in ways that are more complex than mere 
physical work) can lead to a more useful incorporation of the referential and 
normative properties that are implied by "information."

Another problem is introduced by the use of the concept of "meaning" in these 
discussions. The term ambiguously connotes both reference and significance, and 
while it is applicable to symbolic and linguistic information, it only 
metaphorically applies to iconic and indexical forms of communication. Thus we 
discern that a sneeze indicates (provides potential information about) an 
allergic response, but doesn't "mean" allergy or nasal irritation. Seeing the 
imprint of a person's face on a coin doesn't "mean" that person. I would not 
want to exclude these semiotic forms of conveying information from our 
consideration of the concept.

Clearly, we need to carefully distinguish the intrinsic logical properties of a 
signal medium (Shannon's usage) from information "about" something not 
intrinsic to that medium, from the "informative value" or normative / 
significant / useful consequence that is the point of interpreting something to 
be about something else.

To fail to make these distinctions and instead flatten our discussions to the 
Shannonian usage is to loose track of the challenge. Let me conclude by noting 
that this troublesome flattening of the meaning of "information" was recognized 
by Shannon and many others, in the formative years of the field. In the words 
of a major figure in the field:

“I didn’t like the term Information Theory. Claude didn’t like it either. You 
see, the term ‘information theory’ suggests that it is a theory about 
information – but it’s not. It’s the transmission of information, not 
information. Lots of people just didn’t understand this... I coined the term 
‘mutual information’ to avoid such nonsense: making the point that information 
is always about something. It is information provided by something, about 
something.” [Interview with R. Fano,  2001]

... and I would add "for something."

— Terry

On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 1:48 AM, Joseph Brenner 
mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>> wro

Re: [Fis] Fw: It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

[Terrence W. DEACON]

On Bateson's "difference that makes a difference."

We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined
also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures
both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not
all. If one wants to try to force this phrase to carry more of the weight
of completely characterizing information it should be further interpreted.
Notice that it is also an appropriate quip to describe the concept of
physical work— a gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
difference in potntial or pushes a system further from equilibrium.

This double applicability is not merely a terminological coincidence,
though I don't think that Gregory realized this, since he used this quip to
argue for an energy/information dichotomy. I have instead argued (most
recently in my January FIS essay) that both the referential and normative
properties of information are intimately entangled with the concept of
physical work.

Also, in English parlance the phrase to "make a difference" is an idiom
that means "to matter" or to be significant or of value. I believe that
this double entendre was intended in order to implicate the normative and
goal directed aspects of information. Explicating either the aboutness or
the normative consequence in terms of "bits" therefore inevitably results
in reductionistic oversimplication. Bits are a relevant measure of
intrinsic logical properties of the communication medium, but of minimal
value in assessing the extrinsic relational properties that are implicated
in the larger concept of information. I think that measuring work (though
in ways that are more complex than mere physical work) can lead to a more
useful incorporation of the referential and normative properties that are
implied by "information."

Another problem is introduced by the use of the concept of "meaning" in
these discussions. The term ambiguously connotes both reference and
significance, and while it is applicable to symbolic and linguistic
information, it only metaphorically applies to iconic and indexical forms
of communication. Thus we discern that a sneeze indicates (provides
potential information about) an allergic response, but doesn't "mean"
allergy or nasal irritation. Seeing the imprint of a person's face on a
coin doesn't "mean" that person. I would not want to exclude these semiotic
forms of conveying information from our consideration of the concept.

Clearly, we need to carefully distinguish the intrinsic logical properties
of a signal medium (Shannon's usage) from information "about" something not
intrinsic to that medium, from the "informative value" or normative /
significant / useful consequence that is the point of interpreting
something to be about something else.

To fail to make these distinctions and instead flatten our discussions to
the Shannonian usage is to loose track of the challenge. Let me conclude by
noting that this troublesome flattening of the meaning of "information" was
recognized by Shannon and many others, in the formative years of the field.
In the words of a major figure in the field:

*“I didn’t like the term Information Theory. Claude didn’t like it either.
You see, the term ‘information theory’ suggests that it is a theory about
information – but it’s not. It’s the transmission of information, not
information. Lots of people just didn’t understand this... I coined the
term ‘mutual information’ to avoid such nonsense: making the point that
information is always about something. It is information provided** by
something, about something.*” [Interview with R. Fano,  2001]

... and I would add "for something."

— Terry

On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 1:48 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

>  Dear Terry,
>
> I agree with the distinction you make between the two types of properties
> indicated, but I wish you had stated your point positively. I hope we are
> all not so lazy as not to be able to use modifers such as 'meaningful' with
> information,as Loet suggests. If one does not, does that mean that one will
> be in a position to establish a single monolithic interpretation for
> information? In the exchange below, there is thus a faint perfume of
> reductionism that floats around the focus on properties of informational
> entities without reference to the necessary energetic processes of their
> production, transmission and reception. But your post was less than four
> full lines . . .
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Terrence W. DEACON 
> *To:* Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* fis 
> *Sent:* Friday, June 26, 2015 9:17 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM
>
> Dear Marcus,
>
> Thank you for this simple and absolutely essential intervention. Allowing
> ourselves the freedom to use the same term—

[Fis] Fw: It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Terry,

I agree with the distinction you make between the two types of properties 
indicated, but I wish you had stated your point positively. I hope we are all 
not so lazy as not to be able to use modifers such as 'meaningful' with 
information,as Loet suggests. If one does not, does that mean that one will be 
in a position to establish a single monolithic interpretation for information? 
In the exchange below, there is thus a faint perfume of reductionism that 
floats around the focus on properties of informational entities without 
reference to the necessary energetic processes of their production, 
transmission and reception. But your post was less than four full lines . . .

Best,

Joseph


- Original Message - 
From: Terrence W. DEACON 
To: Marcus Abundis 
Cc: fis 
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2015 9:17 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM


Dear Marcus,


Thank you for this simple and absolutely essential intervention. Allowing 
ourselves the freedom to use the same term—'information' which is the defining 
term for this entire enterprise—for such different relationships as intrinsic 
signal properties and extrinsic referential and normative properties is a 
recipe for irrelevance. 


— Terry


On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 10:33 AM, Loet Leydesdorff  wrote:

  Dear Marcus and colleagues, 



  Katherine Hayles (1990, pp. 59f.) compared this discussion about the 
definition of “information” with asking whether a glass is half empty or half 
full. Shannon-type information is a measure of the variation or uncertainty, 
whereas Bateson’s “difference which makes a difference” presumes a system of 
reference for which the information can make a difference and thus be 
meaningful. 



  In my opinion, the advantage of measuring uncertainty in bits cannot be 
underestimated, since the operationalization and the measurement provide 
avenues to hypothesis testing and thus control of speculation (Theil, 1972). 
However, the semantic confusion can also be solved by using the words 
“uncertainty” or “probabilistic entropy” when Shannon-type information is meant.



  I note that “a difference which makes a difference” cannot so easily be 
measured. J I agree that it is more precise to speak of “meaningful 
information” in that case. The meaning has to be specified in the system of 
reference (e.g., physics and/or biology).



  Best,

  Loet





  References:



  Hayles, N. K. (1990). Chaos Bound; Orderly Disorder in Contemporary 
Literature and Science Ithaca, etc.: Cornell University.

  Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ London: 
North-Holland.




--

  Loet Leydesdorff 

  Emeritus University of Amsterdam
  Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

  l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
  Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of Sussex; 

  Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

  Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London; 

  http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en



  From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Marcus Abundis
  Sent: Friday, June 26, 2015 7:02 PM
  To: fis@listas.unizar.es
  Subject: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM



  Dear Andrei,



  I would ask for clarification on whether you speak of "information" in 
your examples as something that has innate "meaning" or something that is 
innately "meaningless" . . . which has been a core issue in earlier exchanges. 
If this issue of "meaning" versus "meaningless" in the use of the term 
"information" is not resolved (for the group?) it seems hard (to me) to have 
truly meaningful exchanges . . . without having to put a "meaningful" or 
"meaningless" qualifier in front of "information" every time it is use.



  Thanks.



   


  Marcus Abundis

  about.me/marcus.abundis
 

 

  
   
   




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-- 

Professor Terrence W. Deacon
University of California, Berkeley





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