Following John's, Loet's, and Terry's posts . . .

I don't think anyone would or could reasonably debate the contribution of
Shannon's framing. Even though (per Shanon-Weaver) it is an "unsatisfying"
notion they present, there is/was a bit of brilliance in that work. STILL,
they too saw that they did not go far enough . . . (framing multiple Levels
of information).

Further to Bateson's "difference" Bateson also saw that his own concept did
not go far enough in that he stated "differences themselves must be
differentiated." But neither does he add any useful details. Instead he
seemed to go in the direction of parables and Freudian psychology as the
only reasonable means (Esalen epistemology lecture) of tracking and
reporting on complex informational roles. Which is to say I think he
recognized the issue, but felt defeated by the challenge (near end of
life?). This also, perhaps, explains his fondness for explaining concepts
in terms of "conversations with my daughter" as a type of reported parable.

On top of this I have noticed Søren Brier's comment that "to whom or to
what" it makes a difference is not remarked on by Bateson. And I would add
that "to what end" it makes a difference is not noted – all of which, I
think, ultimately points in the direction of Terry's notion of work.

>From John Collier's post: Fri Jun 26 20:59:47 CEST 2015
> I believe that information in itself must be interpreted, and is not,
therefore intrinsically meaningful<

I would agree with this as a basic comment, but then "In the good old days"
how is it not DATA that scientists would be, in fact, gathering and
interpreting? Why is there this need to displace the notion of data (as a
specific type of "uninterpreted" information) with a more generic usage of
"information"? Do we really need to add a "meaningless" qualifier (pun
wholly intended) in front of every usage of "information" meant to denote

On Brenner's "faint perfume of reductionism" . . .
Not exactly sure how to take this – it sounds dismissive, is this
meant to suggest
that reductionism is, per se, bad and to be avoided? Is it all to be an
"unexplainable mystery"? As I understand Terry's view (and my own) it is
essentially reductionistic,  but I would also say that I don't think it
strives to be "naively reductionistic."

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