Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Cari colleghi, come ho scritto altre volte senza tanto successo, forse perché com-unico con la lingua italiana, è la mia "Nuova economia" a mediare il rapporto tra biologia e fisica. Difatti nel capitolo 14. di "Valore e valutazioni" (FrancoAngeli, Milano 1999) dichiaro: "In conclusione, ribadisco la necessità di una svolta (?) epistemologica basata sulla compresenza e sulla complementarità della coppia empatia-astrazione e della coppia senso-simbolo, nei processi scientifici, per le tre dimensioni: personale, intersoggettiva e macro-sistemica. Ciò si può ottenere adottando un modello ontogenetico-dialogico centrato sull'ambivalenza o dualità dell'essere, dell'agire e del conoscere, caratterizzato, cioè, dalla coppia differenza-uguaglianza, interno-esterno, astrazione-empatia, soggettivo-oggettivo, senso-simbolo: a partire da Luhmann bisogna andare oltre Luhmann utilizzando il pensiero di Husserl e di Stein". La mia teoria del valore economica, basata sulla combinazione creativa di energia e informazione o sulla combinazione creativa delle tre neg-entropie (termodinamica, eco-biologica o genealogica e matematico-semantica), è intersoggettiva e consente di determinare in modo oggettivo i valori (inter-)soggettivi. "In questa logica definisco i beni culturali e/o naturali in funzione della: testimonianza materiale avente valore di civiltà o meglio la civiltà presente testimonia, conserva, valorizza e gestisce i beni culturali passati; creazione di neg-entropia; soddisfazione del più importante bisogno (economico) di godimento della vita" (F.Rizzo, "Economia del patrimonio architettonico-ambientale", FrancoAngeli, Milano 1983-99). L'armonia che governa il mondo è meravigliosa: bisogna saperla cogliere. Il disaccordo è un'armonia non facilmente compresa. Buone vacanze a Pedro e a tutti. Francesco Rizzo 2015-08-02 9:54 GMT+02:00 Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov < plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com>: > Dear colleagues, > > I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said > "phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong > direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I > assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation > of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our > effort in this direction by the end of the year: > > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/ > > This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of > phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and > biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson) > and other prominent scientists representing their fields. > > I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this > volume. > > Best wishes, > > Plamen > > > > On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff > wrote: > >> Dear colleagues, >> >> >> >> Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is >> according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the >> transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our >> reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction >> between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res >> cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains >> reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science >> which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The >> intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. >> >> >> >> Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet >> in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, >> that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the >> *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold >> in Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to >> one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This >> was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The >> dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly >> discourses, but also stock exchanges. >> >> >> >> Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept >> the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from >> mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and >> others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to >> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences >> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the >> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned >> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of >> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a ki
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark
Dear Pedro and FIS colleagues, First and foremost we want to thank you for the opportunity to share our work and for the stimulating conversation that followed. As for Pedro’s comments and questions, although we agree that bio-neuro-cognitive plausibility may increase the acceptability of our approach we want to note that our base is philosophical/humanistic (physical/mechanicistic in your words) and it is here were we want to differentiate. We do not preclude other stances but holistic plausibility may not be possible and it is not our objective (at the present moment). To be honest we have to say that we have not considered talking. Language is quite a complex system of communication. Although its general characteristics are well defined, and this is my personal opinion, usually philosophical and psychological theories that also account for language have a certain tendency to become entangled. We also appreciate your note about the limits of creativity. Regards have a good vacation, Luis de Marcos Ortega Dpto. Ciencias de la ComputaciónComputer Science Department Universidad de Alcalá University of Alcalá http://www.uah.es/pdi/luis_demarcos De: Fis en nombre de Pedro C. Marijuan Enviado: viernes, 31 de julio de 2015 14:38 Para: 'fis' Asunto: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark Dear Fernando, Luis, and FIS colleagues, In a few days the list will take vacations (it is our tradition that in August we do not make discussions). At your convenience, around next week better, you are invited to make some concluding comments if you find them opportune. The discussion has had quite interesting points and you may have obtained elements of reflection --as we all have had. As an overall opinion, probably distorted and biologically biased, I find the way of thinking of your essay too much relying on mechano-physicalist elements. It is part of what I call the XIX and XX Century "social thermodynamics" complex (social forces, social masses, irreversible social processes, productive forces, etc.). Maybe because of the space-mechanistic view, at the microlevel, the bases of the theory of human act, and the accompanying classifications, have scarce ecological and neurological sense. For instance, the neural areas devoted to the hand are at least ten times larger than the areas devoted to the whole arm (and the tongue has also a disproportionate large representation) both in the sensory and motor cerebral "homunculi". Sure, it is accordance with the behavioral complexity and degrees of freedom of the corresponding actions. The hierarchic approach does not fit well with the biological organization of behavior either. Besides, what about the info value of the actions of other Anthropoidea in their niches--the same as humans? Also, why in the vital acts the info escalates to infinity?, while at the same time "the information of the life world is constant." Creativity in itself is not unbounded, as Kauffman put, the "adjacent possible" holds for the possible technological, creative, and social changes. Regarding the "dignity" and "zooming" of the vital acts, these terms and the way they are used are again alien to elementary cognitive stances... Finally, the most important "action" of the human being is talking. See the "Social Brain Theory" of Baron-Cohen and Dunbar. Talking is second only to sleeping in the daily hours devoted. The relative social, intercultural, historic constancy of that ecological time devoted to talking (and the number of bonding relationships associated) has motivated the concept of "sociotype", within the triad genotype-phenotype-sociotype. This enlarged sociotype was the crucial evolutionary factor of humans. Whatever impinges in the communication practices that subtend the sociotype (writing, books, computers) etc. has a disproportionate impact in the actions, practices, products and artifacts related to human sociality. The cortical space devoted to sociotype dynamics and memory contents is the highest within our brain. Actually, by decreasing our social capabilities, we may concentrate in new cultural activities... Thus, the sociotype would delineate our basic info constraint. I would like to ad several other comments, but it is not the case. The point of view adopted by this essay is quite curious and interesting for both the micro and macro levels, although some more bio-neuro-compatibility would benefit its acceptability, I think. All the best & enjoy the vacations ---Pedro ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear colleagues,
I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said
"phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong
direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I
assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation
of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our
effort in this direction by the end of the year:
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/
This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of
phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and
biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson)
and other prominent scientists representing their fields.
I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this
volume.
Best wishes,
Plamen
On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff
wrote:
> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is
> according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the
> transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our
> reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction
> between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res
> cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains
> reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science
> which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The
> intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions.
>
>
>
> Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet
> in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained,
> that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the
> *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in
> Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to
> one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This
> was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The
> dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly
> discourses, but also stock exchanges.
>
>
>
> Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept
> the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from
> mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and
> others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
> Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
> sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
> sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
> that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
> the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
> of materialism.
>
>
>
> Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
> meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion,
> this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication
> theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories
> (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or
> agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order
> attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of
> second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very
> much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see
> this connection).
>
>
>
> In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the
> phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The
> question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are
> also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by
> material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s
> critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of
> “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such
> as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the
> *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground
> that does not exist. J
>
>
>
> Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus
> “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is
> “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies
> “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in
> these terms?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E.
> Ulanowicz
> Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM
> To: Joseph Brenner
> Cc: fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phen
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear colleagues,
Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is according
to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the
transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our
reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction
between res extensa and res cogitans. Intersubjectivity is res cogitans. It
is not "being" like in the Latin esse, but it remains reflexively available.
Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science which follows (in "The
Crisis") is anti-positivistic. The intersubjectivity is constructed and we
live in these constructions.
Descartes focused on the subjective Cogito. According to him, we meet in the
doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, that is,
God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the cogitatum:
that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in Transcendency,
but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to one another not
only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This was elaborated as
"dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The dynamics of
inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly discourses, but
also stock exchanges.
Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept
the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from
mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and
others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to
Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences
sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the
sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned
that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of
the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind
of materialism.
Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider
meaning ("Sinn") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this
is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory
based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories
(micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the homo economicus or
agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order
attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of
second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very
much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see
this connection).
In sum, "phenomenological" is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the
phenomena without invoking explaining principles a priori. The question,
however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of
this "reality". Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material
conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl's critique
of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of "reality" to
res extensa (that what "is"). Derivatives of esse such as ontology dominate
the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the expected uncertainty in
a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground that does not exist. J
Note that this discussion is different from the one about "being" versus
"becoming" (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is
"life"/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies
"nature" as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in
these terms?
Best,
Loet
-Original Message-
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E.
Ulanowicz
Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear Joseph et al.,
I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I
never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also
a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering.
The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in
abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of
classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe
the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting
mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological
description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to
identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is
vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own.
I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified
networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly
understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events.
Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the
only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology i
