Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Soren,
What I try to say is that the Piercean triadic pragmatic semiotics includes 
‘meaning’ as generated by the Interpreter but does not tell much about the 
nature of that meaning. And this lack makes difficult to adress questions like: 
what is the reason of being of a meaning?, what can be its content? its 
purpose?, what are its relations with information?, how can it be applied to 
animals and humans (and to AAs)?,  is a meaning always meaningful? and for 
which entities?, ...
Theses questions should be part, I feel, of a transdiciplinarity semiotic 
process philosophy. And I don’t see very well how they can be taken into 
account without the availability of a description or modeling of the 
Interpreter.
Did I miss something?
Best
Christophe





De : Søren Brier 
Envoyé : vendredi 25 mai 2018 13:13
À : Christophe Menant; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Christoph



I am not sure what you mean. In my understanding the important dynamics in 
Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics is that symbols grow and create habits in a web 
of signs in nature as well as in culture viewing the central dynamic process in 
the cosmos as well as man  to be of symbolic nature that through evolution and 
history develops reasoning in many interlocking dimension.



Best

   Søren



From: Christophe Menant 
Sent: 25. maj 2018 09:08
To: Søren Brier ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and 
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean 
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the 
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much 
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a 
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be 
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe





De : Fis > de 
la part de Søren Brier >
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; 
fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is 
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is 
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be 
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary 
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include 
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have 
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a 
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural 
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, , 
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be 
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he 
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one 
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it 
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it, 
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all 
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern 
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other 
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary 
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution, 
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of 
human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





From: l...@leydesdorff.net 
> On Behalf Of Loet 
Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark >; Søren 
Brier >; Krassimir Markov 
>; 
fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res 
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things 
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable 
such as piece of wood.




[Fis] Abiding by the rule

2018-05-25 Thread Pedro C. Marijuan
Participants are reminded about the limit of two messages per 
week--those not abiding are sanctioned offline.


Best--Pedro

 
-

Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group

pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-


---
El software de antivirus Avast ha analizado este correo electrónico en busca de 
virus.
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Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Søren Brier
Dear Christoph

I am not sure what you mean. In my understanding the important dynamics in 
Peirce's pragmaticist semiotics is that symbols grow and create habits in a web 
of signs in nature as well as in culture viewing the central dynamic process in 
the cosmos as well as man  to be of symbolic nature that through evolution and 
history develops reasoning in many interlocking dimension.

Best
   Søren

From: Christophe Menant 
Sent: 25. maj 2018 09:08
To: Søren Brier ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and 
communication has to include meaning. But I'm not sure that the Peircean 
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the 
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much 
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a 
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be 
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe


De : Fis > de 
la part de Søren Brier >
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; 
fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is 
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is 
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be 
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary 
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include 
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have 
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a 
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural 
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, , 
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be 
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he 
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one 
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it 
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it, 
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all 
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern 
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other 
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary 
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution, 
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of 
human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





From: l...@leydesdorff.net 
> On Behalf Of Loet 
Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark >; Søren 
Brier >; Krassimir Markov 
>; 
fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res 
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things 
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable 
such as piece of wood.



Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it 
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The 
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize 
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.



Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a 
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to 
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded. 
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type 
information. The latter can be debated as physical.



In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical 
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution 
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in 
the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Mark Johnson
Dear Søren

I have been interested in Peirce for a long time, but while I've found it
an interesting explanatory framework, I've tended to not find it as
practically useful as other (cybernetic) ways of thinking. I'm puzzled by
this: I think the problem might have something to do with the difference
between "logic" and "explanation", or to be more precise, the different
between a process explanation and a process logic.

Logic is not explanation. It provides a way of generating expectations.
>From a logic, we are able to construct a view on "What might happen". From
that, we can make observations about "What might have happened, but did
not" (which is what Ashby considered to the science of the cybernetician).

Peirce's work is split with regard to logic. Clearly, the existential
graphs are logic (similar to Spencer-Brown and (thanks to Lou for this)
Lewis Carroll). But the semiotic triad? It's an attempt to explain, isn't
it? And in the hands of media studies, it becomes dogmatic (this is an
index, this is an interpretant, etc). How can one use it to make
predictions and test them? And is it really non-foundationalist? It looks
rather like Naturphilosophie, I would suggest...

Cybernetic models, on the other hand, do (I think) articulate a process
logic. It's in McCulloch's "Logic of nervous nets", Ashby's Law, Beer's
VSM, Bateson's Double bind, Howard's Paradoxes of Rationality, and
Shannon's information. And there are deeper formal logics which capture
this - like Lupasco/Brenner, and (maybe) Spencer-Brown. Some of these have
been practically useful - notably, Shannon, Beer, Bateson and Howard - and
Ashby sits behind all of it. And even in generating explanations, I think
Beer's logic of cybernetic transduction is a much better fit to cell-cell
transduction, than Peirce (for example).

There's so much that's tantalising in Peirce (like the quaternions which
hang in the background of his whole family, and which could well be where
he got his triadic obsession from), but it's not clear to me that it all
joins up quite as successfully as you suggest.

Unless I'm missing something...

Best wishes,

Mark

On 24 May 2018 16:47, "Søren Brier"  wrote:

Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality
is bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements
can be useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at
transdisciplinary theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then
we have to include meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural
science do not have experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations.
We can try to develop a logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where
Mark stays in the structural dimension and Loet wants to  enter res
cogitans by probability measures, , maybe because a  philosophical
framework that does not allow meaning to be real. But Peirce keeps working
with the metaphysical stipulations until he reaches a framework that can
integrate experience, meaning and logic in one theory, namely his triadic
pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it because I think it is unique,
but many researcher do not want to use it, because its change in
metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all though most of us
agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern scientific ontology of
irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other than Peirce has
developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary semiotic
process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development
of human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





*From:* l...@leydesdorff.net  *On Behalf Of *Loet
Leydesdorff
*Sent:* 24. maj 2018 07:45
*To:* Burgin, Mark ; Søren Brier ;
Krassimir Markov ; fis@listas.unizar.es
*Subject:* Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans* and*
res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that
things could have been different is not out there in the world as something
seizable such as piece of wood.



Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but
it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others).
The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to
operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the
measurement as information.



Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer
to call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
embedded. One can also 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and 
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean 
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the 
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much 
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a 
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be 
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe



De : Fis  de la part de Søren Brier 

Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is 
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is 
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be 
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary 
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include 
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have 
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a 
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural 
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, , 
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be 
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he 
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one 
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it 
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it, 
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all 
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern 
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other 
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary 
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution, 
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of 
human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





From: l...@leydesdorff.net  On Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark ; Søren Brier ; 
Krassimir Markov ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res 
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things 
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable 
such as piece of wood.



Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it 
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The 
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize 
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.



Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a 
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to 
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded. 
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type 
information. The latter can be debated as physical.



In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical 
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution 
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in 
the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 
(.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can 
prove that this information is not physical.



Best,

Loet





Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net  ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU,  University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor, ISTIC,  Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en





-- Original Message --

From: "Burgin, Mark" >

To: "Søren Brier"