Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
I'd be interested to know whether "mattering" is considered within "meaning". I suspect "mattering" is distinct. thinking aloud Science isn't just meaningful. It matters to scientists. Perhaps it's only because it matters to some people, it exists. Re. meaning, I think the connection between meaning and expectation is correct. I agree Shannon is helpful for constructing approaches to explore this. But we expect many things, yet only a few of them really matter. There are many varieties of transcendental argument about information which start from assumed mechanistic properties of nature. Yet we have no certainty about whether nature's apparent regularities are real or not - it is conjecture. There does appear to be a kind of "cybernetic functionalism" (which I think is what Soren is complaining about) which maintains scepticism about reality at one level, and positivism at another. Not all cybernetics is culpable of this however. I would be interested in an approach to information which avoids untestable assumptions about "natural necessity". Is there a "personalist" interpretation of information which starts from concrete personal being (note that 'personal' does not have to mean "individual": persons well be relations), and does not seek to reduce personal being to more abstract "foundations"? From a personalist perspective, information may simply be constraint. Is the difference between things that matter and things that mean something differences in relations between constraints? Bateson's double-bind, which definitely matters to those caught in it, is a particular dynamics of constraint. Bateson also specified constraint dynamics in what he called "symmetrical schizmogenesis" (seen in tit-for-tat engagements, fighting) and "complementary schizmogenesis" (seen in master slave relations). This is a good start A question which I don't think Bateson addresses, but maybe Ashby had an idea about, is what science would look like if we sought agreement about the constraints which we share rather than our theories about causation. I don't think that would be a functionalist pursuit. Best wishes, Mark On 9 April 2016 at 11:21, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: > Dear Pedro, > > > > I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences. > > > > I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor of > meaning in the natural sciences. > > > > Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is observed in > its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it appears to the > observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal representations > of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the changes of state of > the organism were determined by the semantic value of these representations. > Yet all that takes place in the operation of the nervous system is the > structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of relative neuronal > activity proper to a closed neuronal network.” > > http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions > > > > In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”. > > > > My point is about the differentia specifica of inter-human communication > which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations structured by > “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific (social-science) set > of theories and methods to access this domain, in my opinion. In concrete > projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of the information sciences > / information theory. One can also collaborate “interdisciplinarily” at the > relevant interface, notably with the computer sciences. The use of metaphors > in other disciplines, however, cannot be denied. > > > > This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > > > ___ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > -- Dr. Mark William Johnson Institute of Learning and Teaching Faculty of Health and Life Sciences University of Liverpool Visiting Professor Far Eastern Federal University, Russia Phone: 07786 064505 Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Caro Karl, la chiamiamo natura, ma è tutta arte. A. Einstein e S. Hawking pensavano che Dio non giocasse a dadi. Il primo non ha avuto il tempo di ricredersi, il secondo si. Ha perso una scommessa, circa la non emissione di informazione da parte dei buchi neri sostenuta nel 1975, dopo (2004-5) ha dovuto ricredersi. Io da economista, non da fisico, secondo il mio processo di tras-in-forma-azione che ha come "input" (immissione) la materia, l'energia e l'informazione e come "output" (emissione) la materia, l'energia e l'informazione in stato diverso, la pensa(vo) diversamente: ed ho avuto ragione. La natura non ha bisogno di retorica ed è ininterrottamente sottoposta ad un processo di trasinformazione a partire dal "big bang". Nei primi tre vv. della "Genesi", che può condividersi senza avere alcuna fede religiosa, è scritto: "In principio Dio creò il cielo e la terra. La terra era informe e deserta e le tenebre ricoprivano l'abisso e lo spirito di Dio aleggiava sulle acque. Dio disse: 'Sia luce!'. E la luce fu". In questo processo informazione significa dare o prendere forma. Quindi l'informazione "non" è il modo che ciò che è il caso si differenzia da ciò che non il caso, tranne che non si voglia sostituire caso con caos. Io uso "sfondo e primo piano in concomitanza e gioc(o) con interferenza tra i due", perché la conoscenza ha fondamenti biologici e dipende dall'immaginazione umana che si realizza a diversi livelli di inferenza - da molto astratti a molto concreti - e in una dinamica spazio-temporale. Comunque, non ho la pretesa di possedere alcuna verità. E ascolto e leggo sempre con attenzione le parole dette e scritte dagli altri. Specialmente se autorevoli. Grazie. Francesco 2016-04-09 18:24 GMT+02:00 Karl Javorszky : > not in Italian but in full concordance with what Rico ha dito: > information as a concept lies behind all and each of the ways of looking > at the world. Whatever the picture, it has a background to it. > Could it be that a description of the background is common to each and all > of the pictures one makes of the world? > > Rational thinking has always been cautious and only permitted speaking > about what is clearly delineated. All other is art. > Now we see that Nature is not that well educated in rhetoric, and makes > allusions also to that what is the background in our imagination. She > simply does not use our perspectives and our bifurcations. She uses > background and foreground concurrently and plays with interferences between > the two. > > The general answer to "and relative to what?" is non-existence as such, > the background sui generis. That, to which everything else is different, > just like the thing as such has something common with everything else. The > general idea of how different a background is to the foreground shown/known > could well be the root for the concept of information. That what we know, > what is the case, is no information. Information is how that what is the > case differs from what is not the case. > Karl > On 9 Apr 2016 16:56, "Francesco Rizzo" <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Cari Tutti, >> il concetto o significato di informazione è unico, quel che varia è il >> modo di qualificarlo o quantificarlo in ragione dei diversi tipi o >> categorie di informazione: naturale o termodinamica, genetica, semantica e >> matematica. E questo lo dico da studioso di economia della scienza o >> dell'esistenza, non da studioso di esistenza o della scienza economica. >> Un abbraccio, non solo fisico, ma anche emo-ra-zionale. >> Francesco >> >> 2016-04-09 12:21 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff : >> >>> Dear Pedro, >>> >>> >>> >>> I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural >>> sciences. >>> >>> >>> >>> I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the >>> metaphor of meaning in the natural sciences. >>> >>> >>> >>> Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is >>> observed in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it >>> appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal >>> representations of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the >>> changes of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of >>> these representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the >>> nervous system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations >>> of relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network.” >>> >>> http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions >>> >>> >>> >>> In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”. >>> >>> >>> >>> My point is about the *differentia specifica* of inter-human >>> communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations >>> structured by “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific >>> (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my >>> opinion. In concrete projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of >>> the information
Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
not in Italian but in full concordance with what Rico ha dito: information as a concept lies behind all and each of the ways of looking at the world. Whatever the picture, it has a background to it. Could it be that a description of the background is common to each and all of the pictures one makes of the world? Rational thinking has always been cautious and only permitted speaking about what is clearly delineated. All other is art. Now we see that Nature is not that well educated in rhetoric, and makes allusions also to that what is the background in our imagination. She simply does not use our perspectives and our bifurcations. She uses background and foreground concurrently and plays with interferences between the two. The general answer to "and relative to what?" is non-existence as such, the background sui generis. That, to which everything else is different, just like the thing as such has something common with everything else. The general idea of how different a background is to the foreground shown/known could well be the root for the concept of information. That what we know, what is the case, is no information. Information is how that what is the case differs from what is not the case. Karl On 9 Apr 2016 16:56, "Francesco Rizzo" <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> wrote: > Cari Tutti, > il concetto o significato di informazione è unico, quel che varia è il > modo di qualificarlo o quantificarlo in ragione dei diversi tipi o > categorie di informazione: naturale o termodinamica, genetica, semantica e > matematica. E questo lo dico da studioso di economia della scienza o > dell'esistenza, non da studioso di esistenza o della scienza economica. > Un abbraccio, non solo fisico, ma anche emo-ra-zionale. > Francesco > > 2016-04-09 12:21 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff : > >> Dear Pedro, >> >> >> >> I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences. >> >> >> >> I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor >> of meaning in the natural sciences. >> >> >> >> Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is >> observed in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it >> appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal >> representations of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the >> changes of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of >> these representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the >> nervous system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations >> of relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network.” >> >> http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions >> >> >> >> In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”. >> >> >> >> My point is about the *differentia specifica* of inter-human >> communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations >> structured by “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific >> (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my >> opinion. In concrete projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of >> the information sciences / information theory. One can also collaborate >> “interdisciplinarily” at the relevant interface, notably with the computer >> sciences. The use of metaphors in other disciplines, however, cannot be >> denied. >> >> >> >> This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> >> >> ___ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> > > ___ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Cari Tutti, il concetto o significato di informazione è unico, quel che varia è il modo di qualificarlo o quantificarlo in ragione dei diversi tipi o categorie di informazione: naturale o termodinamica, genetica, semantica e matematica. E questo lo dico da studioso di economia della scienza o dell'esistenza, non da studioso di esistenza o della scienza economica. Un abbraccio, non solo fisico, ma anche emo-ra-zionale. Francesco 2016-04-09 12:21 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff : > Dear Pedro, > > > > I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences. > > > > I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor > of meaning in the natural sciences. > > > > Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is observed > in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it appears to the > observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal representations > of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the changes of state of > the organism were determined by the semantic value of these > representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the nervous > system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of > relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network.” > > http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions > > > > In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”. > > > > My point is about the *differentia specifica* of inter-human > communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations > structured by “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific > (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my > opinion. In concrete projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of > the information sciences / information theory. One can also collaborate > “interdisciplinarily” at the relevant interface, notably with the computer > sciences. The use of metaphors in other disciplines, however, cannot be > denied. > > > > This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > > ___ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear Pedro, I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences. I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor of meaning in the natural sciences. Maturana (1978, p. 49): "In still other words, if an organism is observed in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal representations of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the changes of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of these representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the nervous system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network." http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions In other context, Maturana used the concept of "languaging". My point is about the differentia specifica of inter-human communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations structured by "horizons of meaning" (Husserl). One needs a specific (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my opinion. In concrete projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of the information sciences / information theory. One can also collaborate "interdisciplinarily" at the relevant interface, notably with the computer sciences. The use of metaphors in other disciplines, however, cannot be denied. This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J Best, Loet ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear FIS Colleagues, A brief note on the variety of exchanges. It is quite intriguing that fundamental questions on mathematics (geometry/algebra), computation, quantum mechanics, and biology converge on a pretty similar "information stuff". Considering the social sciences domain too, where information becomes obvious (helas, too obvious to inquire on it!), the timeliness of our discussions is exciting. I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences. The current bio-info revolution concerning omic disciplines, evo-devo, ecology, etc. has stumbled upon meaning although most often in empirical, applied domains. What does mean this or that signal? Gene knockouts, microarrays, computational inference, etc. provide a massive response that has to be interpreted functionally via the new ontologies. Perhaps most theoretical interpretations have gone towards the "in silico" worlds and bio-computational perspectives, but there is plenty of stirring in most fields. In neuroscience, a similar revolution has been occurring, although perhaps at a slower pace, via all the advancements in imaging, connectomics, massive modeling procedures, etc. Meaning is explicitly considered by authors such as Edelman, Fuster, Berthoz, Dehaene, Tononi, Sporns, Frinston, etc. Well, one would like to see how the different notions of info, meaning, memory, knowledge, etc. are elegantly cohered, articulated, and well connected --in my view, always around the advancement of a life cycle. And that should also include the origins and evolutionary path of nervous systems (curiously, they did not appear for info concerns but for osmotic/trophic functions). In both biological and neuronal sciences, this enterprise of linking the advancement of a life cycle with the communication with the environment needs philosophical commitment too, as the itinerary is full of "provincial" ways of thinking that have created artificial borders to the intercommunication of ideas. Some parties have argued that a new info philosophy should be framed, and that should include contribution of the closest schools of thinking (perspectivism/phenomenology for my personal taste). The convergence with physics does not look so far away (as has been properly claimed by some discussants). Self-production via communication with the environment by assemblages of excitable elements, counting with algorithmic devices that mirror how the inner and outer worlds coalesce, in one case genomes and in the other mystical or Platonic "laws of nature" (what strange existentiality do they have!), may finally represent a common panorama. About the ways and means to overcome the complexity crisis that surrounds even the more modest steps in the information adventure... I have no idea (but to establish a shield with basic consensus in "principled" matters). Best regards--Pedro El 07/04/2016 a las 13:05, Christophe escribió: Dear Soren, To avoid a possible misunderstanding let me say that the MGS has no ambition to reach a ’full Peircean semiotic framework’. The Meaning Generator System has been designed to introduce what looked to me as missing in the young ‘science of cognition’ in the mid 90’s. ‘Meaning’ was a key concept without any model for meaning generation in an evolutionary perspective. The MGS was designed to fill the gap. At that time I did not know about Peirce (was at IBM on very different subjects). Information on Peirce work came in later. The MGS has some compatibility with the Peircean approach as both rely on interpretation. But two key points of the MGS are not really present in the Peircean framework: the evolutionary story from animals to humans and the development of a meaning generation process (Peirce tells about the generated meaning (the Interpretant) but does not tell much about a meaning generation process (the Interpreter)). So my question about the MGS as a possible introduction to the concepts of meaning and experience is not to be understood as strictly part of the Perceian semiotic framework. And the question is still being asked. Best Christophe *De :* Søren Brier *Envoyé :* mercredi 6 avril 2016 02:04 *À :* 'Christophe' *Cc :* fis@listas.unizar.es *Objet :* SV: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS Dear Christophe Never the less we consider that cats and dogs or dolphins –I have played with them all – to have an inner experimental life in order also to support their perceptual skills for instance and they have memory and recognition capabilities. I do appreciate that you work with these things and try to move your modelling more towards a Peircean biosemiotic paradigm. But in what I have seen from you so far I do not think you have moved to a full Peircean semiotic framework. But even if, then bios
Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear Soren, It is very strange for me to read yours as usual very learned text, because your understanding of what it is I am trying to do is so different from my own understanding. Though I have had great pleasure of reading you works over the years I am not sure that you have read much of mine. I read quite a bit of your texts, but I may have misunderstood. In that case, I apologize. Non-biologist usually underestimate the complexity of biological processes. I agree. I do not know what you mean when you write about semiotics that its: status is not different from a methodology or a mathematical theory of communication? You seem to assume some postulate from me that is not explicit in the text. I formulated (quote): A mathematical theory of information (e.g., Shannon) enables us to entertain models that one can use from one level to another, for testing hypothesis. These models may come from biology (e.g. Lotka-Volterra), engineering (anticipatory systems; Dubois), complex systems theory (Simon, Ashby), etc. For example: can interactions among codes be modeled using Lotka-Volterra? (Ivanova &Leydesdorff, 2014; in Scientometrics). The math is not meta, but epi because the other domains can also be considered as specific domains of communication. Maturana, for example, argues that a biology is generated whenever molecules can be communicated (as more complex than atoms exchanged in a chemistry). 3. But of cause if you deny the central idea in systems theory and especially Luhmanns triple autopoietic theory of closed communication systems, which I have accepted but want to put into a semiotic, pragmaticist methodology and metaphysical framework, then of cause we do not speak the same language at all and may be in a situation of incommensurability. I am not so sure that inter-human communications are closed in terms of codes being unambiguous. It seems to me that differently coded communications can always be translated more or less. Luhmann is often too apodictic. For example, his notion of truth as the code for scholarly communication seems not to hold empirically. Lets enjoy the communication. I am sorry if I offended you. Best, Loet It is my feeling that you do not see what I see and attempts to communicate and that you project postulates from scientistic researcher onto my theory blocking you from seeing what it is I want to communicate. So I do not know if we disagree because that demands some mutual level of understanding. Best Søren ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear Soren, In my opinion, there are two issues here (again J ): 1. the issue of non-verbal (e.g., bodily) communication; 2. the meta-biological or transdisciplinary integration vs. the differentiation among the disciplines. Ad 1. Although I don't agree with Luhmann on many things, his insistence that everything communicated among humans is culturally coded, is fully acceptable to me. "Love" is not a counter-example. Unlike animals, our behavior is regulated by codes of communication. Preparing "Love" as a passion, Luhmann spent months in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris reading the emergence of romantic love in the literature of the early 18th century. A similar intuition can be found in Giddens' book "The Transformation of Intimacy". Of course, one sometimes needs bodily presence; Luhmann uses here the concept of "symbiotic mechanisms"; but this is only relevant for the variation. The selection mechanisms - which impulses are to be followed - are cultural. Among human beings, this means: in terms of mutual and/or shared expectations. The realm of expecting the other to entertain expectations, shapes a "second contingency" which is otherwise absent in the animal kingdom. (If you wish, you can consider it as a function of the cortex as a symbiotic mechanism.) This special status of human society should make us resilient against using biological metaphors. Socio-biology has a terrible history since it links social processes with evolutionary ones. The rule of law, however, protects us against "survival of the fittest" as a structure of expectations. One cannot define "the fittest" without using one (coded!) vocabulary or another, and these vocabularies (discourses; Foucault) can be different; but always disciplining. The codes function as selection mechanisms different from an assumed "nature". (Inga Ivanova used the term "fractional manifold".) The selection mechanisms are also coordination mechanisms; their differentiation enables us to process more complexity. 2. As Krippendorff once emphasized, one should be suspicious about using the word "system" in this context because it entails a biological metaphor of integration and wholeness. Because the codes tend to differentiate and thus to generate misunderstandings (variation), the social system can process complexity by an order of magnitude more than any biological system. The notion of "system" tends to reify, whereas in sociological theorizing it is important to keep a firm eye on the second contingency of interacting expectations. The clarification of misunderstandings, for example, enables us to solve problems; sometimes one may need to invent new metaphors and words. From this perspective, the sciences can be considered as rationalized systems of expectations which operate in terms of codes retained above the individual level. (Note that this is different from belief structures - cf. the sociology of scientific knowledge of Bloor and Barnes -- because beliefs remain attributes to agents of communities of agents.) "Transdisciplinary integration" may be needed for one's internal well-being (or soul), but it can be expected to remain a local instantiation. Since we decapitated the ointed body of the King of France, there is no center left (Lyotard). One may feel a need for integration and community. Community is another coded form of communication (religion?). I provocatively advised my students to keep that celebration for the Sunday mornings. Aren't we celebrating our community today? Central to our community is the notion of "information". A mathematical theory of information (e.g., Shannon) enables us to entertain models that one can use from one level to another, for testing hypothesis. These models may come from biology (e.g. Lotka-Volterra), engineering (anticipatory systems; Dubois), complex systems theory (Simon, Ashby), etc. For example: can interactions among codes be modeled using Lotka-Volterra? (Ivanova &Leydesdorff, 2014; in Scientometrics). The math is not meta, but epi because the other domains can also be considered as specific domains of communication. Maturana, for example, argues that a biology is generated whenever molecules can be communicated (as more complex than atoms exchanged in a chemistry). 3. Let me return to the theme of "love": note the transition from "Love" as Christ, and thus the only intimate relations (17th century) to love as passion in interpersonal relations. Here, Husserl is relevant: the intersubjective is secularized. Luhmann proposed to operationalize this as communication. In later work (after 1990), Luhmann than moved from the communication of expectations to "observations". Observations, however, serve us to update the expectations. The dynamics of expectations are the proper subject of a sociology. Observations presume observing "systems"; but it is problematic to consider evolving discourse as a "system" (see above). The codes in the communication of expectations ena
Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear colleagues, In my understanding, both Loet and Søren are right. Loet about how sciences look like today and Sören about the need of integrative processes in the future. Sören: Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative transdisciplinary model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical positivist reductionism on one hand and to postmodernist relativist constructivism on the other in the form of a transdisciplinary concept of Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, implying both subjectivism and objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making processes is a complex multidimensional object of research that necessitates trans-disciplinary theoretical approaches including biological sciences, primarily biosemiotics and bio-cybernetics, cognition and communication sciences, phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of science and philosophical theology (Harney 2015, Davies & Gregersen 2009). Loet: The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at another level than the integration of cognition in the body of an individual. One cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion. Which research program of these two has priority? How do they relate – potentially differently – to information? On all levels, knowledge is a result of two opposed processes – integration and differentiation of information. Here data can be seen as atoms of information. I take it to be self-evident that knowledge is produced by all living organisms, individually and in groups, from bacteria or single cells in a multicellular organism up. So yes, knowledge is not only what individuals have in their bodies as saved data/ information/ knowledge (Here I think of the process of formation ever more complex structures from data to information to knowledge to wisdom (Tom Stonier). Knowledge is shared by communities of practice. Interestingly, there is already today a body of knowledge about integrative research projects, especially developed in applied research such as one aiming at solving wicked, ill-defined, real-world problems such as problems of environment and sustainable development. Also, medicine is a field where more and more transdisciplinary approaches can be found such as in cancer research where models are made ranging from molecular up to macroscopic social structures, where all disparate research fields such as molecular biology and epidemiology contribute to build a complex, multi-faceted knowledge of the phenomenon. As an illustration, have a look at: http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/td-net/Aktuell.html Two handbooks are also of interest: Hadorn, G.H. et al., 2008. Handbook of transdisciplinary research, Springer Netherlands. Frodeman, R., Klein, J.T. & Mitcham, C. eds., 2010. The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, OUP Oxford. How does information enter this process of integration of knowledge from diverse research domains? Dodig-Crnkovic G., Physical Computation as Dynamics of Form that Glues Everything Together<http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/2/204/pdf>, Information<http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/2/204> (doi:10.3390/info3020204<http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info3020204>) Special Issue on Information: Its Different Modes and Its Relation to Meaning<http://www.mdpi.com/journal/information/special_issues/information_meaning/>, R. Logan Ed., 2012 3(2), 204-218 Best, Gordana Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science Vice Dean of Graduate Education Department of Applied IT Chalmers University of Technology & University of Gothenburg, Sweden http://www.ait.gu.se/kontaktaoss/personal/gordana-dodig-crnkovic/ School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ From: Fis mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>> Organization: University of Amsterdam Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>" mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>> Date: Saturday 2 April 2016 at 13:04 To: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'" mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>>, "fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>" mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>> Subject: Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative transdisciplinary model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical positivist reductionism on one hand and to postmodernist relativist constructivism on the other in the form of a transdisciplinary concept of Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, implying both subjectivism and objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making processes is a complex multidimensional object of research that necessitates trans-disciplinary theoretical approaches including biological sciences, primarily biosemiot
Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative transdisciplinary model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical positivist reductionism on one hand and to postmodernist relativist constructivism on the other in the form of a transdisciplinary concept of Wissenschaft (i.e. knowledge creation, implying both subjectivism and objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making processes is a complex multidimensional object of research that necessitates trans-disciplinary theoretical approaches including biological sciences, primarily biosemiotics and bio-cybernetics, cognition and communication sciences, phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of science and philosophical theology (Harney 2015, Davies & Gregersen 2009). Dear Soren, The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at another level than the integration of cognition in the body of an individual. One cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion. Which research program of these two has priority? How do they relate potentially differently to information? Best, Loet _ Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ; <http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ Honorary Professor, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> SPRU, University of Sussex; Guest Professor <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/> Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> ISTIC, Beijing; Visiting Professor, <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/> Birkbeck, University of London; <http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2016 2:01 PM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS Dear FIS Colleagues, I am attaching herein Soeren's presentation. If you have any trouble with the attachment, the file is in fis web pages too: http://fis.sciforum.net/fis-discussion-sessions/ By clicking on Soeren Brier's session (highlighted in red) you can immediately obtain it. Nevertheless, below there is a selection of more general ideas from the paper. For those interested in FIS "archeology", Soeren presented in January 2004 a discussion session on Information, Autopoiesis, Life and Semiosis. It can be found by scrolling in the same above link. Best greetings--Pedro - Infobiosemiotics Søren Brier, CBS This discussion aims at contributing to the definition of a universal concept of information covering objective as well as subjective experiential and intersubjective meaningful cognition and communication argued in more length in Brier (2015a). My take on the problem is that information is not primarily a technological term but a phenomenon that emerges from intersubjective meaningful sign based cognition and communication in living systems. The purpose of this discussion is to discuss a possible philosophical framework for an integral and more adequate concept of information uniting all isolated disciplines (Brier, 2010, 2011, 2013a+b+c). The attempts to create objective concepts of information were good for technology (Brilliouin 1962) and the development of AI, but not able to develop theories that could include the experiential (subjective) aspect of informing that leads to meaning in the social setting (Brier 2015b). The statistical concept of Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1963/1948) is the most famous objective concept but it was only a technical invention based on a mathematical concept of entropy, but never intended to encompass meaning. Norbert Wiener (1963) combined the mathematics statistical with Boltzmanns thermodynamically entropy concept and defined information as neg-entropy. Wiener then saw the statistical informations entropy as a representation for mind and the thermodynamically entropy as representing matter. So he thought he had solved the mind matter problem through his and Schrödingers (1944/2012) definition of information as neg-entropy. The idea was developed further into an evolutionary and ecological framework by Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 19827) resulting in an ecological cybernetic concept of mind as self-organized differences that made a difference for a cybernetically conceptualized mind (Brier 2008b). But this concepts that could not encompass meaning and experience of embodied living and social systems (Brier 2008a, 2010, 2011). My main point is that from the present material, energetic or informational ontologies worldview we do not have any idea of how life, feeling, awareness and qualia could emerge from that foundation. Ever since Russell and Whiteheads attemp
[Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS
Dear FIS Colleagues, I am attaching herein Soeren's presentation. If you have any trouble with the attachment, the file is in fis web pages too: http://fis.sciforum.net/fis-discussion-sessions/ By clicking on Soeren Brier's session (highlighted in red) you can immediately obtain it. Nevertheless, below there is a selection of more general ideas from the paper. For those interested in FIS "archeology", Soeren presented in January 2004 a discussion session on Information, Autopoiesis, Life and Semiosis. It can be found by scrolling in the same above link. Best greetings--Pedro - Infobiosemiotics Søren Brier, CBS This discussion aims at contributing to the definition of a universal concept of information covering objective as well as subjective experiential and intersubjective meaningful cognition and communication argued in more length in Brier (2015a). My take on the problem is that information is not primarily a technological term but a phenomenon that emerges from intersubjective meaningful sign based cognition and communication in living systems. The purpose of this discussion is to discuss a possible philosophical framework for an integral and more adequate concept of information uniting all isolated disciplines (Brier, 2010, 2011, 2013a+b+c). The attempts to create /objective concepts/ of information were good for technology (Brilliouin 1962) and the development of AI, but not able to develop theories that could include the /experiential (*subjective*) aspect/ of informing that leads to meaning in the social setting (Brier 2015b). The statistical concept of Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1963/1948) is the most famous objective concept but it was only a technical invention based on a mathematical concept of entropy, but never intended to encompass meaning.Norbert Wiener (/1963) /combined the mathematics statistical with Boltzmann’s thermodynamically entropy concept and defined information as neg-entropy. Wiener then saw the statistical information’s entropy as a representation for mind and the thermodynamically entropy as representing matter. So he thought he had solved the mind matter problem through his and Schrödinger’s (1944/2012) definition of information as neg-entropy. The idea was developed further into an evolutionary and ecological framework by Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 19827) resulting in an ecological cybernetic concept of mind as self-organized differences that made a difference for a cybernetically conceptualized mind (Brier 2008b). But this concepts that could not encompass meaning and experience of embodied living and social systems (Brier 2008a, 2010, 2011). My main point is that from the present material, energetic or informational ontologies worldview we do not have any idea of how life, feeling, awareness and qualia could emerge from that foundation. Ever since Russell and Whitehead’s attempt in Principia Mathematica to make a unified mathematical language for all sciences and logical positivism failed (Carnap, 1967 & Cartwright et.al. 1996),the strongest paradigm attempting in a new unification is now the info-computational formalism based on the mathematic calculus developed by Gregory Chaitin (2006 and 2007) ). The paradigm is only in its early beginning and is looking for a concept of natural computing (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012) going beyond the Turing concept of computing. But even that still does not encompass the experiential feeling mind and the meaning orienting aspect of intersubjective communication wither be only sign or also language based. So far there is no conclusive evidence to make us believe that the core of reality across nature, culture, life and mind is purely absolute mathematical law as Penrose (2004) seems to suggest or purely computational.Meaning is a way of making ‘sense’ of things for the individual in the world perceived. It is a non-mathematical existential feeling aspect of life related to reflection past, present and future of existence in the surrounding environment, in humans enhanced by language, writings, pictures, music through culture. In animals cognition and communication are connected to survival, procreation and pleasure. In humans beings cognition develops into consciousness through subjective experiential and meaning based (self-) reflection of the individual’s role in the external world and becomes an existential aspect. My conclusion is therefore that a broader foundation is needed in order to understand the basis for information and communication in living systems. Therefore we need to include a phenomenological and hermeneutical ground in order to integrate a theory of interpretative//subjective/ and intersubjective meaning and signification with a theory of /objective/ information, which has a physical grounding (see for instance Plamen, Rosen & Gare 2015). Thus the question is how can we est
