Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear list, For clarity, below is the message that I sent to Terry offline, to which he responded. Here are my final remarks. The work presented by Terry uses a mixture of formal and informal terms but, from my point of view, the work lacks rigor. This is highlighted in the demand that constraints have no physical basis and is evident in the discussion concerning "dynamical constraint." The latter serves to illustrate another complaint concerning word density and comfort. A comfort in word juxtapositions is all very well if used, as it was by Charles Peirce, for precise technical purposes, if an equation is not at hand or is currently beyond statement. But something that Peirce required, inherited from his loving father, was a demand for necessity. Recall that for Benjamin and Charles mathematics is the science that draws "necessary conclusions" from premises of any kind. If Charles were to put together "dynamic" and "constraint," for example, you can be sure that he specified exactly what it is that is "dynamic" and specified exactly what a "constraint" is. In fairness, Terry has attempted to do this but, in my view, has failed. It should be clear that constraints are not of themselves dynamic and they may always be applied where degrees of freedom exist, though not exclusively. It appears that the "dynamic" part of "dynamical constraint" refers not to the constraint but to its object. Now, it may seem dumb to harp on this, but I fail to see how the application of a constraint to anything at all, dynamic or static, can be anything other than a posterior determinant. A constraint, like natural selection, necessarily has a physical basis, contrary to what was said, that is the physical basis of the constraint is the physical system itself. It is one that allows the constraining selection, the behavior, involved to take place. A posterior determinant enforces a necessary partial order. And this is something for which we may reasonably expect an equation. Now, anyone familiar with Shannon will know that these ideas cannot fit into Shannon's theory because Shannon deals with probability and transmissions. Indeed, we would need to move from the abstraction of communication to the necessity of apprehension where a more certain language may be brought to task. To abstract constraints away from the physical in any case, necessarily leads to dualism, and a blunt denial of this does not help anyone. Although a well reasoned denial is always worth listening to In trying to understand the language use, I suggested that, perhaps, simple notions such as YUK and YUM were thought of as constraints. In the case of bacteria, YUK and YUM, for me, are not merely "normative." They are manifest behaviors of the physical organism structure. I can say, for example, that this e-coli or that not only experiences YUM as it purses the density of a sugar gradient but that the surface shapes that have formed under its influence (and are refined by the insertion of latent receptors and motor functions), and that may be described as bound holomorphic functors (hyper-functors), are manifestations of the physical YUM. Finally, I find the claims that any of us are taking information theory beyond Shannon spurious. Here I almost certainly diverge from many of my colleagues who hold a nebulas information theory in such high regard and like to mix it up with all the other things that use the term "information" from the variety of European languages. It is fair for me to note, however, that Shannon was a fine applied mathematician and if you wish to move beyond Shannon, you must, at least, command that skill. It seems to me however that a different skill is required to enable us to extract ourselves from the senseless tangle into which we now all head. This is the skill of Schlipp, Reichenbach or Carnap, rigorous epistemology, without it there can be no hope for information theory of any kind of unified science. Regards, Steven My earlier message: I am puzzled concerning your use of the phrase "dynamical constraint" and your reference here to a "dynamical organization for interpretation." What is it exactly that is dynamic? Perhaps you mean to say that the process of interpretation is dynamic and that this process applies one or more static constraints. Such a constraint would be, for example, YUK or YUM. This might be a view consistent with that of Charles Peirce although it seems too analytic for me. This is surely not what you speak of since such a constraint is necessarily the organization of something existent (a priori). How then is this not a posterior determination? Perhaps you mean only to suggest that YUK or YUM are refinable "hardwired" interpretive constraints. In which case interpretation is no immediate process and constraint is not an activity. Perhaps "dynamic" then refers to this refinement and the in situ selection of one or the other? This would be more in line with my thinking. However, I hope you see the c
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear All, RE: Steven Ericsson-Zenith (I am not sure that your comment was posted to FIS) The phrase "dynamical constraint" should not be that unfamiliar or difficult to parse. Constraint on the degrees of freedom of a dynamical system is the most obvious (and the meaning that I have in mind), though I suppose that there could also be other meanings that are possible (such as might characterize the increase in convectional correlation in the formation of Bénard convection cells). I don't see that the notion of constraint need be restricted to some extrinsically imposed static boundary condition. As far as I can tell, this concept is quite unrelated to my friend Stu Kauffman's use of "Yuk or Yum" (a normative—not physico-chemical—distinction), which of course can only apply to something like a living system that is organized to perpetuate its organization by utilizing external resources and avoiding dangerous extrinsic conditions. Indeed, I believe that my simple model of an autogentic system provides an unambiguous description of the minimal dynamical system organization necessary to determine a self/environment relation that embodies an intrinsic good-for/bad-for valuation. In any case, I don't see any reason to think that my use of the concept of dynamical constraint, or constraint in general, to explore the nature of information and agency should imply that this is a case of "posterior determination" rather than an acquired disposition that organizes an autonomous agent's adaptive responses to extrinsic conditions. I hope that this clears up any confusion that my use of this term evoked. RE: Joseph Brenner I think that we are largely in agreement. And I think that you accurately locate our differences in how we understand the contribution of quantum-atomic-molecular properties to these dynamical properties, and to the relationship we call informational. I am generally of the opinion that non-classical quantum effects percolate up to the molecular scale and higher only if very special conditions prevail (such as in photosynthesis), and that otherwise the statistical nature of these influences results in canceling effects. To me it is a bit analogous to the classical vs relativistic distinction in which at mesoscopic spatio-temporal scales (and well below c) relativistic effects can be neglected without any significant error effects. But I agree that this means that (in principle) both extreme scale effects "can sometimes" be relevant, and are ultimately part of the complete picture. I just don't see how these effects change the dynamical system requirements that determine how a relation of reference or significance is intrinsically established for that system (i.e. IN and BY that system independent of this being assessed by an external "observer" - whether explicitly or implicitly). As to the various interpretations of the quantum measurement problem, I also agree that my view is not the mainstream view, but it is not purely idiosyncratic either. There is more work needed here. For me, to make the claim that quantum indeterminacy is the "... foundation of the dualisms at higher levels of reality" abandons the most interesting game in town by just positing its irresolvability. To me this just ends inquiry into this interesting mystery by invoking another mystery that is claimed to be irresolvable. I take the view of Richard Feynman who said about quantum physics "... I don't understand it. Nobody does" — by which he means that nobody has a clear idea of why it must be the way it is. I am skeptical of those who claim they know, or know that it has no deeper resolution. In this respect, I am comfortable in my minority opinion. But disagreement at this most basic theoretical level doesn't undermine our ability to come to a convergent understanding of many of the higher-order phenomena we have discussed, including the organization of dynamical systems able to intrinsically determine the reference and significance of information. In this and other arenas I look forward to interesting critical debates to shed more light on these concepts. Thanks, Terry On 2/2/15, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote: > Dear All, > > I would like to thank Terry for his detailed analysis of my comments on his > work. I should repeat that I consider his theory as a necessary part of any > emerging theory of information and going beyond Shannon. I also commend him > for indicating where it is 'incomplete' (sic), subject to differences of > opinion as to what may be relevant from other approaches which have not been > explicitly discussed in his paper. > > One interesting place to start might be the following statement by Terry: > "Only the linkage between them (JEB: the molecular phenomena of the model) > that constitutes autogenesis lacks a known empirical exemplar. It is an > empirical question whether this can occur, and what conditions and types of > molecules this would require. I see no physico-chemical reason to doubt
[Fis] Fwd: Re: Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear All, I would like to thank Terry for his detailed analysis of my comments on his work. I should repeat that I consider his theory as a necessary part of any emerging theory of information and going beyond Shannon. I also commend him for indicating where it is 'incomplete' (sic), subject to differences of opinion as to what may be relevant from other approaches which have not been explicitly discussed in his paper. One interesting place to start might be the following statement by Terry: "Only the linkage between them (JEB: the molecular phenomena of the model) that constitutes autogenesis lacks a known empirical exemplar. It is an empirical question whether this can occur, and what conditions and types of molecules this would require. I see no physico-chemical reason to doubt this possibility." According to my view of real molecules as instantiating both actual and potential properties, the linkage between them does also. If this picture is correct, we have a correct way of looking at the phenomena themselves. We can then accept the value of the model, which does not violate the principle but ignores it, but not forget this additional principle when returning to reality. My view is, admittedly, dependent on acceptance of the reality of quantum entities and their most complex (non-Boolean) properties as the foundation of the dualisms at higher levels of reality. However, I believe I am not alone here. I therefore look forward to further discussions of Terry's approach to information in which the additional physics and its dynamic logic might be explicitly taken into account. Many thanks again, Joseph >Message d'origine >De : dea...@berkeley.edu >Date : 31/01/2015 - 00:10 (PST) >À : joe.bren...@bluewin.ch >Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es >Objet : Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture? > >Hi Joseph, > >Indeed there is much more to discuss than I could include in this >already too long discussion paper. The related "absence" issues are of >course critical to my thinking. I value your continued feedback on >these issues as well. > >I think you do a quite adequate job of restating the autogenesis >hypothesis in your first paragraph. I also agree with your comment >about the model of autogenesis being incomplete because it does not >specify the necessary stereochemical properties of the interacting >molecules, or for that matter the energy flux that is required to >drive reciprocal catalysis, the shapes and charges of molecules that >tend to self assemble into containers (like viral capsids), the >rate-coupling required for reciprocal catalysis and self-assembly to >be reciprocally supportive, and the entropy production of the whole >process, etc., etc. Yes, much simulation and lab work lies ahead. > >I actually don't see a problem there, however, nor do I think this >results in circularity. Nothing at the molecular level smuggles in >properties that define information in the model. All that matters for >my purpose is that I am not postulating any unrealistic atomic and >molecular properties. > >When Ludwig Boltzmann used an idealized thought experiment for >formulate his atomistic account of the 2nd law of thermodynamics with >particles that didn't even interact, it was sufficient to model the >general logic of entropy increase. No real atoms, no real physics, >just the logic of time and random change in position. The model >captured what was minimally necessary and no more. Yes, Gibbs and >others fine-tuned the account, adding the role of free-energy and many >dimensions of interactions, but Boltzmann's thought experiment laid >the foundation. So I don't consider the abstraction involved in the >autogenesis model to be an intrinsic fatal flaw. The question is >whether or not it is too simple, or whether it violates some basic >physico-chemical principles. I can't see how you can doubt that it is >a realistic model, since both component processes are well-studied >molecular phenomena with innumerable exemplars available. Only the >linkage between them that constitutes autogenesis lacks a known >empirical exemplar. It is an empirical question whether this can >occur, and what conditions and types of molecules this would require. >I see no physico-chemical reason to doubt this possibility. > >Your question about "qualitative signification" and my concept of >"work saving" seemed to lead inexplicably into a comment about "human >and social history." Lost me there. But you also seemed to suggest >that the autogenic model provided no fixed ground for making a >qualitative assessment (significance). I believe that it does. > >In the autogenic model this depends on there being a fixed amount of >chemical work required to reconstitute an autogenic complex from a >specific state of disaggregation. This differential can be assigned a >finite repeatable value (again not specifying specific molecules). >This functionally defined threshold provides the reference value that >I arg
