Re: [Fis] Fw: PRINCIPLES OF IS. The Pre-Science of Information

[Francesco Rizzo]

Caro Pedro,
ho inviato un brevissimo messaggio a John Collier, ma non è pervenuto. E'
possibile sapere perché?  Se non è possibile grazie lo stesso.
Francesco

P.s.:grazie.

P.s.Caro John,
hai detto in maniera semplice una grande verità. Tutta la conoscenza è
basata sulla legge dell'informazione,  quindi tutte le scienze non possono
fare a meno della stessa legge con una definizione comune e misurazione
diversa. Altrimenti, come ben dici, si crea solo confusione.
Un abbraccio.
Francesco
P.s. L'ho inviato un paio di ore fa, ma non è arrivato a destinazione:
forse per indirizzo sbagliato.

2017-11-06 16:06 GMT+01:00 Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>:

> Caro Pedro,
> ho inviato un brevissimo messaggio a John Collier, ma non è pervenuto. E'
> possibile sapere perché?  Se non è possibile grazie lo stesso.
> Francesco
>
> P.s.:grazie.
>
> P.s.Caro John,
> hai detto in maniera semplice una grande verità. Tutta la conoscenza è
> basata sulla legge dell'informazione,  quindi tutte le scienze non possono
> fare a meno della stessa legge con una definizione comune e misurazione
> diversa. Altrimenti, come ben dici, si crea solo confusione.
> Un abbraccio.
> Francesco
> P.s. L'ho inviato un paio di ore fa, ma non è arrivato a destinazione:
> forse per indirizzo sbagliato.
>
> 2017-11-06 15:40 GMT+01:00 Pedro C. Marijuan :
>
>> His server rejects quite many messages (from me too). Send to the list...
>> Best --Pedro
>>
>>
>> El 06/11/2017 a las 14:36, Francesco Rizzo escribió:
>>
>> Caro Pedro,
>> ho inviato un brevissimo messaggio a John Collier, ma non è pervenuto. E'
>> possibile sapere perché?  Se non è possibile grazie lo stesso.
>> Francesco
>>
>> P.s.Caro John,
>> hai detto in maniera semplice una grande verità. Tutta la conoscenza è
>> basata sulla legge dell'informazione,  quindi tutte le scienze non possono
>> fare a meno della stessa legge con una definizione comune e misurazione
>> diversa. Altrimenti, come ben dici, si crea solo confusione.
>> Un abbraccio.
>> Francesco
>> P.s. L'ho inviato un paio di ore fa, ma non è arrivato a destinazione:
>> forse per indirizzo sbagliato.
>>
>>
>> 2017-10-06 14:36 GMT+02:00 Pedro C. Marijuan :
>>
>>> Dear Terry and FIS colleagues,
>>> I think you make a good point. I was reminded on the problems my
>>> research group has found in the development of our "Sociotype project",
>>> cooperating with social science groups and psychologists. The lack of
>>> communication  in between those closer to formal fields or just within
>>> natural sciences (our case) and the humanities and social science fields is
>>> amazing. From my point of view they strongly defend some form of
>>> "obscurity", in the sense that they do not accept but a total disciplinary
>>> autonomy often ideologically rooted. Perhaps I am exaggerating, as the
>>> intrinsic complexity of those matters is only amenable to "foundations"
>>> from discoursive approaches... Well, in any case a metaphorical idea about
>>> those principles of Information Science is that they can work as "posts"
>>> where new electric lines may be tended, so that they can bring new light to
>>> new pockets within those ultracomplex realms. The gap between
>>> sceince-humanities might be well crossed by info science.
>>> (Finally let me apologize for not having processed yet all the late
>>> messages, I have a slow digestion)
>>> Best--Pedro
>>>
>>>
>>> El 05/10/2017 a las 19:21, Terrence W. DEACON escribió:
>>>
>>> Dear all,
>>>
>>> I am in agreement with Joseph's suggestion that our discussions of the
>>> foundations of information could be understood as pre-science. Efforts such
>>> as the list of principles proposed by Pedro offer a useful focus of
>>> discussion for working toward a more solid "foundation" precisely because
>>> it helps elicits responses that exemplify the fault lines in our community.
>>> These are not merely points of disagreement but also theoretical boundaries
>>> that need to be clearly identified if we want to seriously map this still
>>> ambiguous conceptual territory. Claims that this issue has been settled or
>>> that there are irresolvable issues involved or that the whole conceptual
>>> territory is useless are unhelpful. We just need to get explicit about our
>>> differences and what motivates them.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 1:45 AM, Joseph Brenner 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,



 In the 2 weeks I have been away, an excellent discussion has
 self-organized as Pedro noted. Any preliminary comments and criticisms of
 Pedro’s 10 Principles I could make now can refer to this. I would have said
 first that Pedro is to be thanked for this construction. Preparing a list
 of principles involves defining not only the content but also the number,
 order and relation between the entries. Zou, Stan and Ted in particular
 have recognized the existence of the list as 

Re: [Fis] Fw: PRINCIPLES OF IS. The Pre-Science of Information

[Francesco Rizzo]

Caro Pedro,
ho inviato un brevissimo messaggio a John Collier, ma non è pervenuto. E'
possibile sapere perché?  Se non è possibile grazie lo stesso.
Francesco

P.s.:grazie.

P.s.Caro John,
hai detto in maniera semplice una grande verità. Tutta la conoscenza è
basata sulla legge dell'informazione,  quindi tutte le scienze non possono
fare a meno della stessa legge con una definizione comune e misurazione
diversa. Altrimenti, come ben dici, si crea solo confusione.
Un abbraccio.
Francesco
P.s. L'ho inviato un paio di ore fa, ma non è arrivato a destinazione:
forse per indirizzo sbagliato.

2017-11-06 15:40 GMT+01:00 Pedro C. Marijuan :

> His server rejects quite many messages (from me too). Send to the list...
> Best --Pedro
>
>
> El 06/11/2017 a las 14:36, Francesco Rizzo escribió:
>
> Caro Pedro,
> ho inviato un brevissimo messaggio a John Collier, ma non è pervenuto. E'
> possibile sapere perché?  Se non è possibile grazie lo stesso.
> Francesco
>
> P.s.Caro John,
> hai detto in maniera semplice una grande verità. Tutta la conoscenza è
> basata sulla legge dell'informazione,  quindi tutte le scienze non possono
> fare a meno della stessa legge con una definizione comune e misurazione
> diversa. Altrimenti, come ben dici, si crea solo confusione.
> Un abbraccio.
> Francesco
> P.s. L'ho inviato un paio di ore fa, ma non è arrivato a destinazione:
> forse per indirizzo sbagliato.
>
>
> 2017-10-06 14:36 GMT+02:00 Pedro C. Marijuan :
>
>> Dear Terry and FIS colleagues,
>> I think you make a good point. I was reminded on the problems my research
>> group has found in the development of our "Sociotype project",  cooperating
>> with social science groups and psychologists. The lack of communication  in
>> between those closer to formal fields or just within natural sciences (our
>> case) and the humanities and social science fields is amazing. From my
>> point of view they strongly defend some form of "obscurity", in the sense
>> that they do not accept but a total disciplinary autonomy often
>> ideologically rooted. Perhaps I am exaggerating, as the intrinsic
>> complexity of those matters is only amenable to "foundations" from
>> discoursive approaches... Well, in any case a metaphorical idea about those
>> principles of Information Science is that they can work as "posts" where
>> new electric lines may be tended, so that they can bring new light to new
>> pockets within those ultracomplex realms. The gap between
>> sceince-humanities might be well crossed by info science.
>> (Finally let me apologize for not having processed yet all the late
>> messages, I have a slow digestion)
>> Best--Pedro
>>
>>
>> El 05/10/2017 a las 19:21, Terrence W. DEACON escribió:
>>
>> Dear all,
>>
>> I am in agreement with Joseph's suggestion that our discussions of the
>> foundations of information could be understood as pre-science. Efforts such
>> as the list of principles proposed by Pedro offer a useful focus of
>> discussion for working toward a more solid "foundation" precisely because
>> it helps elicits responses that exemplify the fault lines in our community.
>> These are not merely points of disagreement but also theoretical boundaries
>> that need to be clearly identified if we want to seriously map this still
>> ambiguous conceptual territory. Claims that this issue has been settled or
>> that there are irresolvable issues involved or that the whole conceptual
>> territory is useless are unhelpful. We just need to get explicit about our
>> differences and what motivates them.
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 1:45 AM, Joseph Brenner 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the 2 weeks I have been away, an excellent discussion has
>>> self-organized as Pedro noted. Any preliminary comments and criticisms of
>>> Pedro’s 10 Principles I could make now can refer to this. I would have said
>>> first that Pedro is to be thanked for this construction. Preparing a list
>>> of principles involves defining not only the content but also the number,
>>> order and relation between the entries. Zou, Stan and Ted in particular
>>> have recognized the existence of the list as such and the work involved.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My own view is that we are all currently involved in reworking the
>>> Foundations of Information Science. These Foundations are not themselves
>>> science, but they look forward to the increased understanding of
>>> Information Science as Terry suggests. I propose the term “Pre-Science” for
>>> this process activity, a pun on the word ‘prescience’ whose normal
>>> definition is foreknowledge or foresight. The people who tend to make
>>> mistakes in this effort will be those who claim that any simple concept or
>>> set of concepts can do the job itself, supported by claims to authorities
>>> such as Peirce. Sets of *principles*, on the other hand, are tools more
>>> difficult to use but they permit directed consideration of 

Re: [Fis] Fw: PRINCIPLES OF IS. The Pre-Science of Information

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Terry and FIS colleagues,
I think you make a good point. I was reminded on the problems my 
research group has found in the development of our "Sociotype project",  
cooperating with social science groups and psychologists. The lack of 
communication  in between those closer to formal fields or just within 
natural sciences (our case) and the humanities and social science fields 
is amazing. From my point of view they strongly defend some form of 
"obscurity", in the sense that they do not accept but a total 
disciplinary autonomy often ideologically rooted. Perhaps I am 
exaggerating, as the intrinsic complexity of those matters is only 
amenable to "foundations" from discoursive approaches... Well, in any 
case a metaphorical idea about those principles of Information Science 
is that they can work as "posts" where new electric lines may be tended, 
so that they can bring new light to new pockets within those 
ultracomplex realms. The gap between sceince-humanities might be well 
crossed by info science.
(Finally let me apologize for not having processed yet all the late 
messages, I have a slow digestion)

Best--Pedro

El 05/10/2017 a las 19:21, Terrence W. DEACON escribió:

Dear all,

I am in agreement with Joseph's suggestion that our discussions of the 
foundations of information could be understood as pre-science. Efforts 
such as the list of principles proposed by Pedro offer a useful focus 
of discussion for working toward a more solid "foundation" precisely 
because it helps elicits responses that exemplify the fault lines in 
our community. These are not merely points of disagreement but also 
theoretical boundaries that need to be clearly identified if we want 
to seriously map this still ambiguous conceptual territory. Claims 
that this issue has been settled or that there are irresolvable issues 
involved or that the whole conceptual territory is useless are 
unhelpful. We just need to get explicit about our differences and what 
motivates them.


On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 1:45 AM, Joseph Brenner > wrote:


Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,

In the 2 weeks I have been away, an excellent discussion has
self-organized as Pedro noted. Any preliminary comments and
criticisms of Pedro’s 10 Principles I could make now can refer to
this. I would have said first that Pedro is to be thanked for this
construction. Preparing a list of principles involves defining not
only the content but also the number, order and relation between
the entries. Zou, Stan and Ted in particular have recognized the
existence of the list as such and the work involved.

My own view is that we are all currently involved in reworking the
Foundations of Information Science. These Foundations are not
themselves science, but they look forward to the increased
understanding of Information Science as Terry suggests. I propose
the term “Pre-Science” for this process activity, a pun on the
word ‘prescience’ whose normal definition is foreknowledge or
foresight. The people who tend to make mistakes in this effort
will be those who claim that any simple concept or set of concepts
can do the job itself, supported by claims to authorities such as
Peirce. Sets of /principles/, on the other hand, are tools more
difficult to use but they permit directed consideration of several
perspectives at the same time.

Principles are the basis for an interpretation of what is in the
physical and biological processes that are the proper subjects for
non-computational Information Science, without – yet – providing
any explanations. Now this is a lot more philosophical that may
have been expected when the discussion started. However, today,
unlike when Pedro and his colleagues started out, we have the
Philosophy of Information of Luciano Floridi and Wu Kun to work
with, as well as my logic. I am surprised that no-one has yet
referred to Floridi or Wu.

Going back over the postings to-date, I have noted a few which
seem constitutive of a ‘Pre-Science’ of Information: Emmanuel’s
‘duality’, Stan’s hierarchies; Michel Godron’s and John Torday’s
bridges to biology, Pedro’s reworking of communication, /etc/. I
will resist comments that the concepts of Pre-Science are to be
thrown out as part of non-science or ‘just’ philosophy. As
Koichiro clearly said on 20.09, information can, and in my view is
already, bringing in something new empirically to questions of
space and time. In the Pre-Science of Information, ideally, it
should be possible to retain mechanism /and/ materialism or
realism; computationalism /and /non- or natural computationalism;
information as a physical /reality/ and a non-physical /appearance/.

I look forward with great interest to the lines of development of
this thread.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- 

Re: [Fis] Fw: PRINCIPLES OF IS. The Pre-Science of Information

[Terrence W. DEACON]

Dear all,

I am in agreement with Joseph's suggestion that our discussions of the
foundations of information could be understood as pre-science. Efforts such
as the list of principles proposed by Pedro offer a useful focus of
discussion for working toward a more solid "foundation" precisely because
it helps elicits responses that exemplify the fault lines in our community.
These are not merely points of disagreement but also theoretical boundaries
that need to be clearly identified if we want to seriously map this still
ambiguous conceptual territory. Claims that this issue has been settled or
that there are irresolvable issues involved or that the whole conceptual
territory is useless are unhelpful. We just need to get explicit about our
differences and what motivates them.

On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 1:45 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

> Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,
>
>
>
> In the 2 weeks I have been away, an excellent discussion has
> self-organized as Pedro noted. Any preliminary comments and criticisms of
> Pedro’s 10 Principles I could make now can refer to this. I would have said
> first that Pedro is to be thanked for this construction. Preparing a list
> of principles involves defining not only the content but also the number,
> order and relation between the entries. Zou, Stan and Ted in particular
> have recognized the existence of the list as such and the work involved.
>
>
>
> My own view is that we are all currently involved in reworking the
> Foundations of Information Science. These Foundations are not themselves
> science, but they look forward to the increased understanding of
> Information Science as Terry suggests. I propose the term “Pre-Science” for
> this process activity, a pun on the word ‘prescience’ whose normal
> definition is foreknowledge or foresight. The people who tend to make
> mistakes in this effort will be those who claim that any simple concept or
> set of concepts can do the job itself, supported by claims to authorities
> such as Peirce. Sets of *principles*, on the other hand, are tools more
> difficult to use but they permit directed consideration of several
> perspectives at the same time.
>
>
>
> Principles are the basis for an interpretation of what is in the physical
> and biological processes that are the proper subjects for non-computational
> Information Science, without – yet – providing any explanations. Now this
> is a lot more philosophical that may have been expected when the discussion
> started. However, today, unlike when Pedro and his colleagues started out,
> we have the Philosophy of Information of Luciano Floridi and Wu Kun to work
> with, as well as my logic. I am surprised that no-one has yet referred to
> Floridi or Wu.
>
>
>
> Going back over the postings to-date, I have noted a few which seem
> constitutive of a ‘Pre-Science’ of Information: Emmanuel’s ‘duality’,
> Stan’s hierarchies; Michel Godron’s and John Torday’s bridges to biology,
> Pedro’s reworking of communication, *etc*. I will resist comments that
> the concepts of Pre-Science are to be thrown out as part of non-science or
> ‘just’ philosophy. As Koichiro clearly said on 20.09, information can, and
> in my view is already, bringing in something new empirically to questions
> of space and time.  In the Pre-Science of Information, ideally, it should
> be possible to retain mechanism *and* materialism or realism;
> computationalism *and *non- or natural computationalism; information as a
> physical *reality* and a non-physical *appearance*.
>
>
>
> I look forward with great interest to the lines of development of this
> thread.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Pedro C. Marijuan 
> *To:* 'fis' 
> *Sent:* Friday, September 15, 2017 2:13 PM
> *Subject:* [Fis] PRINCIPLES OF IS
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> As promised herewith the "10 principles of information science". A couple
> of previous comments may be in order.
> First, what is in general the role of principles in science? I was
> motivated by the unfinished work of philosopher Ortega y Gasset, "The idea
> of principle in Leibniz and the evolution of deductive theory"
> (posthumously published in 1958). Our tentative information science seems
> to be very different from other sciences, rather multifarious in appearance
> and concepts, and cavalierly moving from scale to scale. What could be the
> specific role of principles herein? Rather than opening homogeneous realms
> for conceptual development, these information principles would appear as a
> sort of "portals" that connect with essential topics of other disciplines
> in the different organization layers, but at the same time they should try
> to be consistent with each other and provide a coherent vision of the
> information world.
> And second, about organizing the present discussion, I bet I was too
> optimistic with the commentators scheme. In any case, for having a 

Re: [Fis] Fw: PRINCIPLES OF IS. The Pre-Science of Information

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Joseph, Pedro and FISers,


On 02 Oct 2017, at 10:45, Joseph Brenner wrote:


Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,

In the 2 weeks I have been away, an excellent discussion has self- 
organized as Pedro noted. Any preliminary comments and criticisms of  
Pedro’s 10 Principles I could make now can refer to this. I would  
have said first that Pedro is to be thanked for this construction.  
Preparing a list of principles involves defining not only the  
content but also the number, order and relation between the entries.  
Zou, Stan and Ted in particular have recognized the existence of the  
list as such and the work involved.


My own view is that we are all currently involved in reworking the  
Foundations of Information Science. These Foundations are not  
themselves science, but they look forward to the increased  
understanding of Information Science as Terry suggests. I propose  
the term “Pre-Science” for this process activity, a pun on the word  
‘prescience’ whose normal definition is foreknowledge or foresight.  
The people who tend to make mistakes in this effort will be those  
who claim that any simple concept or set of concepts can do the job  
itself, supported by claims to authorities such as Peirce. Sets of  
principles, on the other hand, are tools more difficult to use but  
they permit directed consideration of several perspectives at the  
same time.


Principles are the basis for an interpretation of what is in the  
physical and biological processes that are the proper subjects for  
non-computational Information Science, without – yet – providing any  
explanations. Now this is a lot more philosophical that may have  
been expected when the discussion started. However, today, unlike  
when Pedro and his colleagues started out, we have the Philosophy of  
Information of Luciano Floridi and Wu Kun to work with, as well as  
my logic. I am surprised that no-one has yet referred to Floridi or  
Wu.


Going back over the postings to-date, I have noted a few which seem  
constitutive of a ‘Pre-Science’ of Information: Emmanuel’s  
‘duality’, Stan’s hierarchies; Michel Godron’s and John Torday’s  
bridges to biology, Pedro’s reworking of communication, etc. I will  
resist comments that the concepts of Pre-Science are to be thrown  
out as part of non-science or ‘just’ philosophy. As Koichiro clearly  
said on 20.09, information can, and in my view is already, bringing  
in something new empirically to questions of space and time.  In the  
Pre-Science of Information, ideally, it should be possible to retain  
mechanism and materialism or realism; computationalism and non- or  
natural computationalism;



It is hardly possible to retain digital mechanism (computationalism)  
and materialism at the ontological level. But we keep them at the  
phenomenological level, and this makes it more solid, somehow, and yet  
quasi-vaccinated against reductionism.


That might not concern you, except by being neutral on mechanism.  
Mechanism is not much a question of truth than of right. The eventual  
question will be "do you accept that your daughter or son marries  
someone who get an accident but survived with an artificial digital  
brain.


People must keep distinct the idea that we are this or that machine,  
(the metaphor use) with the idea that we have a description level at  
which a universal machine can emulate us. I have shown that Mechanism  
makes the physical reality, and consciousness, essentially non  
computable things, and that all machines eventually can understand why  
it has to be like that IF they are correct (or consistent) machines.


If we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and the  
physical becomes a sort of statistics on machine's "dreams" ("dreams"  
are computations seen from inside, defined using recursion theoretical  
method (alas rarely known).




information as a physical reality and a non-physicalappearance.


Why not "information as mental reality" and a physical appearance? (We  
might come back on this, but I don't think there are any evidence for  
a primitive physical reality, even without computatiionalism. Indeed  
my woprk consists ins showing how the obsevre this and get evidence  
for primitive matter or matter evolving from "machine's dream").


So I don't know. I agree with Pedro that we should clarify our  
relation with respect to Plato and Aristotle, or just be clear on what  
we are willing to assume at the start. What follows are just some  
remarks around this.


Information has third person aspects, like with Shannon theorem, and  
first person, subjective, aspects, like meaning. Here mathematical  
logic has a lot to say. I know better the semantic of Tarski and  
Kripke than the semiotic of Peirce, but it seems to me that some  
relation could be made, and could be related with the intensional/ 
extensional semantics of computer programs and formal  belief systems.  
In this context category theory might be helpful to build