Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear Plamen and colleagues, What you propose is an excellent initiative, besides the multidisciplinary nature of that compilation may inspire a genuine dialog on today's sciences and phenomenology. As for Marcos' response, he is quite right (my hurried message was not very accurate with some wordings). Best vacations to all, --Pedro BlackBerry de movistar, allí donde estés está tu oficin@ -Original Message- From: Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com Sender: Fis fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2015 09:54:44 To: Loet Leydesdorffl...@leydesdorff.net Cc: fisfis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism Dear colleagues, I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said phenomenological philosophy, is essential, but may go in the wrong direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our effort in this direction by the end of the year: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/ This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson) and other prominent scientists representing their fields. I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this volume. Best wishes, Plamen On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net wrote: Dear colleagues, Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res cogitans*. It is not being like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science which follows (in *The Crisis*) is anti-positivistic. The intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to one another not only in being, but also in terms of expectations. This was elaborated as dual contingency (among others, by Parsons). The dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly discourses, but also stock exchanges. Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: As long as we are born from mothers ... He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind of materialism. Luhmann criticized Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider meaning (*Sinn*) as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see this connection). In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the *expected* uncertainty
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear colleagues, I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said phenomenological philosophy, is essential, but may go in the wrong direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our effort in this direction by the end of the year: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/ This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson) and other prominent scientists representing their fields. I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this volume. Best wishes, Plamen On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net wrote: Dear colleagues, Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res cogitans*. It is not being like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science which follows (in *The Crisis*) is anti-positivistic. The intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to one another not only in being, but also in terms of expectations. This was elaborated as dual contingency (among others, by Parsons). The dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly discourses, but also stock exchanges. Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: As long as we are born from mothers ... He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind of materialism. Luhmann criticized Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider meaning (*Sinn*) as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see this connection). In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground that does not exist. J Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in these terms? Best, Loet -Original Message- From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E. Ulanowicz Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM To: Joseph Brenner Cc: fis Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism Dear Joseph et al., I'm afraid I can't
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear colleagues, Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction between res extensa and res cogitans. Intersubjectivity is res cogitans. It is not being like in the Latin esse, but it remains reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science which follows (in The Crisis) is anti-positivistic. The intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. Descartes focused on the subjective Cogito. According to him, we meet in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the cogitatum: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to one another not only in being, but also in terms of expectations. This was elaborated as dual contingency (among others, by Parsons). The dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly discourses, but also stock exchanges. Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: As long as we are born from mothers ... He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind of materialism. Luhmann criticized Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider meaning (Sinn) as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the homo economicus or agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see this connection). In sum, phenomenological is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the phenomena without invoking explaining principles a priori. The question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of this reality. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl's critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of reality to res extensa (that what is). Derivatives of esse such as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the expected uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground that does not exist. J Note that this discussion is different from the one about being versus becoming (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is life/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies nature as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in these terms? Best, Loet -Original Message- From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E. Ulanowicz Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM To: Joseph Brenner Cc: fis Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism Dear Joseph et al., I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering. The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own. I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events. Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such phenomenology
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
(*Sinn*) as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see this connection). In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground that does not exist. J Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in these terms? Best, Loet -Original Message- From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E. Ulanowicz Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM To: Joseph Brenner Cc: fis Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism Dear Joseph et al., I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering. The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own. I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events. Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such phenomenology! (See Section 3 in http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/Reckon.pdf.) The best, Bob Dear Mark, Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called Speculative Realism which is proposed as a replacement. What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think is possible, however, is to reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with information science. This places information science in a proper intersubjective context where its utility can be seen. For discussion, I hope. Best, Joseph ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear Mark, Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called Speculative Realism which is proposed as a replacement. What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think is possible, however, is to reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with information science. This places information science in a proper intersubjective context where its utility can be seen. For discussion, I hope. Best, Joseph - Original Message - From: Mark Johnson To: fis Sent: Saturday, August 01, 2015 1:18 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark Dear Fernando, Without wanting to spawn a new debate, I think it might be useful to flag something up about the 'phenomenology' that you mention. I understand Joseph's reaction to what to you say and I agree. However, phenomenology is a rich a complex topic, and few scholars have the tenacity to delve deeply into the difficult and detailed thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, tracing it's evolution in French existentialism, hermeneutics, or from Schutz to Berger, Luckmann, Parsons and then Luhmann. At the very least there is the division between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology with its transcendental ego to which Heidegger and many others objected, and the existential phenomenology of everyday experience which Heidegger developed instead. Husserl, for his part thought Heidegger had completely misunderstood him. To say he might have been right is not to take away the genius of Heidegger's own insights. The point is, when we say phenomenology, what do we mean? Joseph's concern relates (I think) to what appears to be a missing account of intersubjectivity in your paper. But of course, intersubjectivity was a central concern for Husserl, and his ideas on it were much refined by Schutz, who seems to me to be a critically important figure (I'm grateful to Loet for pointing me in Schutz's direction!). To be 'phenomenological' does not preclude intersubjectivity. However, if you are Heideggerian, then I think it is true that Heidegger's understanding of human relations is rather weak (interesting to reflect on this in relation to Heidegger's politics!) I suspect that the phenomenological literature and its history is of considerable relevance to current debates about information. Best wishes, Mark On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Fernando Flores fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se wrote: Dear Mark Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term “foundational” is more philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense our intentions which are “very” practical. (This is a term which we could leave behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in “instituting” a new concept of “information”. Our work is “foundational” only in one aspect, and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify human acts in such a way that their informational value could be “operative” (useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as “variety” the measure of the “states of a system”, the series of von Mises/Popper could be
Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Dear Joseph et al., I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering. The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own. I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events. Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such phenomenology! (See Section 3 in http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/Reckon.pdf.) The best, Bob Dear Mark, Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called Speculative Realism which is proposed as a replacement. What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think is possible, however, is to reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with information science. This places information science in a proper intersubjective context where its utility can be seen. For discussion, I hope. Best, Joseph ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
