Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-19 Thread Giorgos Keramidas
On Wed, Nov 15, 2000 at 07:01:35PM +0200, Peter Pentchev wrote: On Wed, Nov 15, 2000 at 08:47:22AM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote: * Peter Pentchev [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 06:19] wrote: All right, feel free to flame me a LOT for what follows :) No need for that. (yet) :-)

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-16 Thread Stefan `Sec` Zehl
On Wed, Nov 15, 2000 at 06:02:22PM +0100, Peter Pentchev wrote: On Wed, Nov 15, 2000 at 08:47:22AM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote: * Peter Pentchev [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 06:19] wrote: As far as I can see, FreeBSD (nor any other Unix system I'm aware of) does not provide a way to do

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-16 Thread void
Does anyone remember the article in Phrack, issue 53 I think, about speaking Forth to a Sun's boot-prom in order to write a '0' into the UID member of one's shell's struct proc? -- Ben 220 go.ahead.make.my.day ESMTP Postfix To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-16 Thread David Scheidt
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000, void wrote: :Does anyone remember the article in Phrack, issue 53 I think, about :speaking Forth to a Sun's boot-prom in order to write a '0' into the UID :member of one's shell's struct proc? Yes. It works a treat. Similar steps let you do the same thing with DDB or

changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Peter Pentchev
All right, feel free to flame me a LOT for what follows :) There are situations (at least I could think of some :) where it is necessary to change a running process's credentials. I'm thinking specifically of the effective UID and GID, but I might have to tinker with the real and saved UID's,

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Alfred Perlstein
* Peter Pentchev [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 06:19] wrote: All right, feel free to flame me a LOT for what follows :) No need for that. (yet) :-) There are situations (at least I could think of some :) where it is necessary to change a running process's credentials. I'm thinking specifically

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Peter Pentchev
On Wed, Nov 15, 2000 at 08:47:22AM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote: * Peter Pentchev [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 06:19] wrote: All right, feel free to flame me a LOT for what follows :) No need for that. (yet) :-) ..possibly because I did not make my intentions clear enough :) There are

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Alfred Perlstein
* Peter Pentchev [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 09:02] wrote: Well there's setuid for you. Hmm.. I've also received two private mails so far, pointing me to setuid(). The problem is, I want to force a new UID on *another* process without its knowledge. setuid() only works on the process

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Warner Losh
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peter Pentchev writes: : There are situations (at least I could think of some :) where it is necessary : to change a running process's credentials. I'm thinking specifically of the : effective UID and GID, but I might have to tinker with the real and saved : UID's,

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Warner Losh
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peter Pentchev writes: : Hmm.. I've also received two private mails so far, pointing me to setuid(). : The problem is, I want to force a new UID on *another* process without : its knowledge. setuid() only works on the process invoking it, so : both the 'force' and

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Warner Losh
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Alfred Perlstein writes: : Unless this syscall was restricted to root, or a small subset of : uid's it would cause some severe security issues from my point : of view. Even the small subset of uids would be highly suspect. Warner To Unsubscribe: send mail to

Re: changing a running process's credentials

2000-11-15 Thread Alfred Perlstein
* Warner Losh [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001115 09:16] wrote: In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Alfred Perlstein writes: : Unless this syscall was restricted to root, or a small subset of : uid's it would cause some severe security issues from my point : of view. Even the small subset of uids would be