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Ac1dB1tch3z Vs Linux Kernel x86_64 0day
Today is a sad day..
R.I.P.
Tue, 29 Apr 2008 / Tue, 7 Sep 2010
a bit of history:
MCAST_MSFILTER Compat mode bug found... upon commit! (2 year life on this one)
authorDavid L Stevens
Tue, 29 Apr 2008 10:23:22 + (03:23 -0700)
committer
On Wed, Sep 15, 2010 at 5:33 PM, Christian Sciberras wrote:
>> Yes. Once again: get your homework done!
>>
>>> http://www.codeproject.com/KB/DLL/dynamicdllloading.aspx
>>
>> That's a double DYNAMIC there!
>
> Did you even bother to read the article? The very first paragraph
> states the difference
> Yes. Once again: get your homework done!
>
>> http://www.codeproject.com/KB/DLL/dynamicdllloading.aspx
>
> That's a double DYNAMIC there!
Did you even bother to read the article? The very first paragraph
states the difference between the two.
Oh, and for the records, you can't statically link t
Hello Juha-Matti!
Thanks for mentioning about exploit of Nicolas Krassas for Opera.
I don't read such sites as exploit-db.com and secunia.com, but I read other
sites, such as securityvulns.ru (securityvulns.com). And at his
site (http://securityvulns.com/news/Microsoft/Windows/DLLHijacking.html)
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010 17:45:27 +0200, Stefan Kanthak said:
> BTW: Windows developers and administrators should know their platform.
You're new here, aren't you? :)
Out in the real world, if they have a McSE cert and know enough to keep the
server running, they get the job even if they don't underst
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
___
Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2010:183
http://www.mandriva.com/security/
_
ZDI-10-178: Novell PlateSpin Orchestrate Graph Rendering Remote Code Execution
Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-10-178
September 15, 2010
-- CVSS:
10, (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
-- Affected Vendors:
Novell
-- Affected Products:
Novell eDirectory
-- Vulnerability
> No. Guess where the D in DLL comes from!
> Static linking occurs when the linker builds a binary (this might be a
> DLL.-) using *.OBJ and *.LIB.
> Dynamic linking occurs when the loader loads a binary (again: this might
> be a DLL) into memory and resolves its dependencies.
Oh really?
http://w
Paul Szabo wrote:
> Christian Sciberras wrote:
>
>> ... the user has opened the "bad" file ...
>
> The victim "views" a "data" file, does not (directly) run an executable.
> The data file could be as harmless as a Word document or a plain-text
> file.
Word (resp. MS Office) documents ain't har
Dan Kaminsky wrote:
> h0h0h0. There be history, Larry.
>
> Short version: Go see how many DLLs exist outside of c:\windows\system32.
> Look, ye mighty, and despair when you realize all those apps would be broken
> by CWD DLL blocking.
No, that's the too much shortened version.
The correct versi
Christian Sciberras wrote:
> I wrote my own example POC.
and failed to use it right!
[...]
> DHPOC\example\the-install-folder\
> DHPOC\example\the-install-folder\dhpocApp.exe
> DHPOC\example\the-install-folder\dhpocDll.dll
> DHPOC\example\the-remote-folder
> DHPOC\example\the-remote-folder\exam
==
Secunia Research 14/09/2010
- Microsoft Outlook Content Parsing Integer Underflow Vulnerability -
==
Table of Contents
Affected Softw
We are continuing with the list of security vulnerabilities found in a
number of web applications while testing our latest version of Acunetix
WVS v7 . In this blog post, we will look into the details of a very
serious web vulnerability discovered by Acunetix WVS in Axigen.
"Axigen is an integrate
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