>As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
>outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST
>apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811] Sec 2)
>against the origin Autonomous System number which will actually be
>put in
> Having spend the better part of last week stepping a vendor through
> exactly these semantics
while there is no proof of termination of clue insertion, that a BGP/ROV
*implementor* did not get it, justifies the hack.
As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
It doesn't clarify anything for me, but then I happen to know where that
algorithm is defined.
Having spend the better part of last week stepping a vendor through exactly
these semantics, my current mood is that explicit and specific is better.
The intent in having the ref where it is, is to
> Although a little more verbose, perhaps the following is more explicit?
>
> As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
> outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST
> apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics Against the Route
>
On Wed, 2020-03-18 at 12:56 -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
> ( warning: quote depth errors and top posting. keyur's mta, well
> let's
> not get into that :)
>
> > Speaking as a wg member.
>
> and one of the first ROV implementors, tyvm.
>
> > Shouldn’t you be checking the "my autonomous system
