Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-13 Thread Pacho Ramos
El dom, 11-01-2015 a las 08:11 -0500, Rich Freeman escribió: [...] The main issue I see is that the main objective of using games.eclass is to keep games being used by people in "games" group... but this point if broken as soon as we allow packages to not use that eclass and, then, I see no advanta

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-11 Thread Rich Freeman
On Sat, Jan 10, 2015 at 9:16 AM, Pacho Ramos wrote: > > But I must admit I lost the track of this issue some time ago and I > don't remember why the eclass is still allowed and then both policies > are being used in parallel depending on the maintainer, that is the > reason I haven't suggested the

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-10 Thread Pacho Ramos
El vie, 09-01-2015 a las 23:31 +0100, Michał Górny escribió: [...] > > If I don't misremember Council allowed finally people to not be mandated > > by that "games team" policies and, then, I guess that could finally > > allow to drop that security issue no? :/ > > If it were that simple... but we

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-09 Thread Michał Górny
Dnia 2015-01-08, o godz. 10:45:33 Pacho Ramos napisał(a): > El mié, 07-01-2015 a las 19:19 -0500, Jonathan Callen escribió: > [...] > > The only reason there is a security issue with nethack (and other > > games like it) on Gentoo, and only on Gentoo, is that the games team > > policy requires th

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-09 Thread Luis Ressel
On Thu, 8 Jan 2015 09:16:36 -0600 William Hubbs wrote: > Rich is correct, maintainers are no longer bound by the games team > policy. > I didn't know this. If that's the case, I'd like to proxy-maintain nethack. I'll try and prepare the neccessary ebuild changes. Luis Ressel pgpDC_qIfUsBS.p

[gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-08 Thread Jonathan Callen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 01/08/2015 02:23 AM, Daniel Campbell wrote: > On 01/07/2015 04:19 PM, Jonathan Callen wrote: >> On 01/07/2015 12:15 PM, Matt Turner wrote: >>> On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 7:57 AM, William Hubbs >>> wrote: On Wed, Jan 07, 2015 at 06:49:56AM -0500

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-08 Thread William Hubbs
On Thu, Jan 08, 2015 at 05:53:47AM -0500, Rich Freeman wrote: > On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 4:45 AM, Pacho Ramos wrote: > > El mié, 07-01-2015 a las 19:19 -0500, Jonathan Callen escribió: > > [...] > >> The only reason there is a security issue with nethack (and other > >> games like it) on Gentoo, and

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-08 Thread Rich Freeman
On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 4:45 AM, Pacho Ramos wrote: > El mié, 07-01-2015 a las 19:19 -0500, Jonathan Callen escribió: > [...] >> The only reason there is a security issue with nethack (and other >> games like it) on Gentoo, and only on Gentoo, is that the games team >> policy requires that all game

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-08 Thread Pacho Ramos
El mié, 07-01-2015 a las 19:19 -0500, Jonathan Callen escribió: [...] > The only reason there is a security issue with nethack (and other > games like it) on Gentoo, and only on Gentoo, is that the games team > policy requires that all games have permissions 0750, with group > "games", and all user

Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-07 Thread Daniel Campbell
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/07/2015 04:19 PM, Jonathan Callen wrote: > On 01/07/2015 12:15 PM, Matt Turner wrote: >> On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 7:57 AM, William Hubbs >> wrote: >>> On Wed, Jan 07, 2015 at 06:49:56AM -0500, Philip Webb wrote: 150106 William Hubbs wrote: T

[gentoo-dev] Re: qa last rites -- long list

2015-01-07 Thread Jonathan Callen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 01/07/2015 12:15 PM, Matt Turner wrote: > On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 7:57 AM, William Hubbs > wrote: >> On Wed, Jan 07, 2015 at 06:49:56AM -0500, Philip Webb wrote: >>> 150106 William Hubbs wrote: This one is perfectly safe on a >>> single-user syste