On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 06:48:57PM -0400, C. Scott Ananian wrote:
> On Tue, 19 Apr 2005, David Meybohm wrote:
>
> >But doesn't this require assuming the distribution of MD5 is uniform,
> >and don't the papers finding collisions in less show it's not? So, your
> >birthday-argument for calculating t
On Tue, 19 Apr 2005, David Meybohm wrote:
But doesn't this require assuming the distribution of MD5 is uniform,
and don't the papers finding collisions in less show it's not? So, your
birthday-argument for calculating the probability wouldn't apply, because
it rests on the assumption MD5 is uniform
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 12:43:23AM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote:
>
> I'm not going to do the sums, but I would hazard a guess that it's more
> likely your PC suffered a cosmic-ray-induced memory fault - EACH OF THE
> FOUR TIMES YOU TESTED IT - causing it to report the same MD5, than that
> you actua
On Mon, 18 Apr 2005, Andy Isaacson wrote:
If you had actual evidence of a collision, I'd love to see it - even if
it's just the equivalent of
% md5 foo
d3b07384d113edec49eaa6238ad5ff00 foo
% md5 bar
d3b07384d113edec49eaa6238ad5ff00 bar
% cmp foo bar
foo bar differ: byte 25, line 1
%
But in the abse
On Sun, 17 Apr 2005, Horst von Brand wrote:
crypto-babble about collision whitepapers is uninteresting without a
repo that has real collisions. git is far too cool as is - prove I
Just copy over a file (might be the first step in splitting it, or a
header file that is duplicated for convenience, .
[trimmed cc list, nobody wants to read this noise]
On Sat, Apr 16, 2005 at 11:35:39PM +0200, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
> >> (1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
> >>Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD documents.
> >
> > Dude! You could have been *f
On Sun, Apr 17, 2005 at 12:38:37AM -0400, David A. Wheeler wrote:
> The probability of an accidental overlap for SHA-1 for two
> different files is absurdly remote; it's just not worth worrying about.
>
> However, the possibility of an INTENTIONAL overlap is a completely
> different matter. I thi
Linus wants to drive ahead, and ignore the collision issue for now,
and has been dismissive of the risks, he wants a result not heart
searching, and the list comments exhibit a confusion with the
engineering problem of avoiding accidental collisions v deliberate sabotage.
Since this is not a show-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
[...]
> Linus has already weighed in that he doesn't give a crap. All the
> crypto-babble about collision whitepapers is uninteresting without a
> repo that has real collisions. git is far too cool as is - prove I
> should be concerned.
Just copy over a file (might be t
I have nothing further to contribute to this subtopic.
Good luck with it.
--
I won't rest till it's the best ...
Programmer, Linux Scalability
Paul Jackson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 1.650.933.1373,
1.925.600.0401
-
To unsubscribe from this list: se
> "Tkil" == Tkil <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Tkil> but the chance of any collision at all wigs me out.
> "Paul" == Paul Jackson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Paul> Guess you're just going to get wigged out then.
Wig wig. :)
I didn't mean "wigs me out to the point I won't use it" but mo
Paul Jackson wrote:
what I'm talking about is the chance that somewhere, sometime there will
be two different documents that end up with the same hash
I have vastly greater chance of a file colliding due to hardware or
software glitch than a random message digest collision of two legitimate
docume
> but the chance of any collision at all wigs me out.
Guess you're just going to get wigged out then.
--
I won't rest till it's the best ...
Programmer, Linux Scalability
Paul Jackson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 1.650.933.1373,
1.925.600.0401
-
To u
> "Brian" == Brian O'Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Brian> (1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context
Brian> of Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD
Brian> documents.
Was this whole-document based, or was it blocked or otherwise chunked?
I'm
Hi!
> We've already computed the chances of a random pure hash collision
> with SHA1 - it's something like an average of 1 collision every
> 10 billion years if we have 10,000 coders generating 1 new file
> version every minute, non-stop, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
GIT is safe even for the
> sysadmins realize that there are an infinante number of files that map to
Sysadmins know that there are an infinite ways for their
systems to crap out, and try to cover for the ones that
there is a snow balls chance in Hades of them seeing in
their lifetime.
--
I won't rest
> what I'm talking about is the chance that somewhere, sometime there will
> be two different documents that end up with the same hash
I have vastly greater chance of a file colliding due to hardware or
software glitch than a random message digest collision of two legitimate
documents.
I've lost
rnel.org
Subject: Re: Re: SHA1 hash safety
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Petr Baudis wrote:
I know the current state of the art here. It's going to take more than
just hearsay to convince me that full 128-bit MD5 collisions are likely.
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/MD5_collisions.html
OK, OK, I spoke t
te: Sat, 16 Apr 2005 10:58:15 -0400 (EDT)
From: C. Scott Ananian <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: David Lang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: SHA1 hash safety
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
(1) I
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
Three points:
(1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD documents.
(2) The HMAC (ethernet-harware-address) of any interface _should_
help to make a unique Id.
you want a u
Please see below:
C. Scott Ananian wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
>
>> (1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
>>Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD documents.
>
>
> Dude! You could have been *famous*! Why the
> aitch-ee-do
Scott wrote:
> Please, let's talk about hash collisions responsibly.
Agreed.
Chasing down links from the one Petr provided:
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/MD5_collisions.html
the best read I found was:
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/357.pdf
As the aut
On Sat, Apr 16, 2005 at 10:58:15AM -0400, C. Scott Ananian wrote:
> Even given the known weaknesses in MD5, it would take much more than a
> million documents to find MD5 collisions. I can only conclude that the
> hash was being used incorrectly; most likely truncated (my wild-ass guess
> would
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Petr Baudis wrote:
I know the current state of the art here. It's going to take more than
just hearsay to convince me that full 128-bit MD5 collisions are likely.
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/MD5_collisions.html
OK, OK, I spoke too sloppily. Let me rephrase:
It's going
Dear diary, on Sat, Apr 16, 2005 at 04:58:15PM CEST, I got a letter
where "C. Scott Ananian" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> told me that...
> On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
>
> >(1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
> > Document management systems containing ~10^6
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Brian O'Mahoney wrote:
(1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD documents.
Dude! You could have been *famous*! Why the
aitch-ee-double-hockey-sticks didn't you publish this when you found it?
S
Three points:
(1) I _have_ seen real-life collisions with MD5, in the context of
Document management systems containing ~10^6 ms-WORD documents.
(2) The HMAC (ethernet-harware-address) of any interface _should_
help to make a unique Id.
(3) While I havn't looked at the details of the plumbi
On Sat, 16 Apr 2005, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* David Lang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
this issue was raised a few days ago in the context of someone
tampering with the files and it was decided that the extra checks were
good enough to prevent this (at least for now), but what about
accidental collisions?
* David Lang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> this issue was raised a few days ago in the context of someone
> tampering with the files and it was decided that the extra checks were
> good enough to prevent this (at least for now), but what about
> accidental collisions?
>
> if I am understanding
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