Hi Jens--
On Fri 2015-09-25 00:49:48 -0700, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> I tried to generate test keys with expired user IDs (under faked
> system time), but I failed, with gpg 1.4 as well as 2.1.8. I tried
> to use the options default-sig-expire and default-cert-expire as
> well as ask-sig-expi
Hello,
Yesterday, I included my answer to your question to a different
thread. I should have replied to this post.
I think that your question is relevant to GnuPG community.
On 09/29/2015 02:06 AM, Schlacta, Christ wrote:
> Therefore, I'm looking for a way to have PAM query the ssh-agent
> remo
On 09/30/2015 04:00 AM, Laurent Blume wrote:
> Non-interactively, however, I can't get it to work: gpg-agent always
> spawns a pinentry in the background, and gpg waits for it indefinitely,
> instead of using the PIN provided on the command line.
As far as I know, you can't provide a PIN by comman
On 09/29/2015 09:51 PM, Heiko Folkerts wrote:
AFAIK the exports contain a valid looking key block.
It *looks like* a valid key block, but--if the keytocard operation was
indeed successful--it's actually only a "stub" that does not contain any
private material.
You can check the actual conte
Hi all,
I am new to this list and have a question I couldn't find answered either in
the docs or in the FAQ.
I just started using a smart card with GPG namely the nitro key
www.nitrokey.com . It behaves like a smart card so this shouldcorrespond to
any GPG card as well.
I already had a key pair w
Hello all,
I'm trying to setup automatic file decryption using a smartcard to store
the private key.
Interactively, it all works fine, I get the PIN request, enter it,
decryption works, all good.
Non-interactively, however, I can't get it to work: gpg-agent always
spawns a pinentry in the backg
> Does that mean long-term confidence in elliptic curves would be better
> placed?
I don't know. Sorry. :(
What I do know is that, judging from past experience, our projections on
key lengths need to take into account the possibility of radical
improvements in mathematics that make our original
On 09/29/2015 06:04 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> But you never know when a George Dantzig will appear. And that means I
> think your long-term confidence in RSA is misplaced.
Does that mean long-term confidence in elliptic curves would be better
placed?
Does ECC rely on a stronger mathematical
> AFAIK RSA-3072 (and ElGamal-3072) are comparable to AES-128.
No: they're comparable to AES-128 *at our present level of mathematical
knowledge*. That's a very important qualifier.
Back in the mid-to-late '80s, Ron Rivest declared that 1024-bit RSA keys
would be unbreakable for at least the nex
> Dan Boneh has already published an awe-inspiring paper showing that RSA
> isn't anywhere near as safe as we think it is:
Eh. Correction: *may* not be anywhere near as safe it is. Definitely
shows that our confidence in RSA probably isn't as well-founded as we'd
like.
I did a pretty long write
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 03:33:38PM +0100, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> On 29/09/15 15:28, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> > On Tue 2015-09-29 08:53:32 -0400, Andrew Gallagher
> > wrote:
> >> On 28/09/15 23:16, SGT. Garcia wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 04:10:10PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
On 28-09-2015 22:26, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> RSA-3072 is not all that much stronger than RSA-2048, and RSA-4096 adds even
> less.
AFAIK RSA-3072 (and ElGamal-3072) are comparable to AES-128. That's
strong enough for the forseable future; the only known thing they are
vyulnerable to (except for
On 29/09/15 15:28, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Tue 2015-09-29 08:53:32 -0400, Andrew Gallagher
> wrote:
>> On 28/09/15 23:16, SGT. Garcia wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 04:10:10PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
Do you ever import keys that other people
send you? or keys
On Tue 2015-09-29 08:53:32 -0400, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> On 28/09/15 23:16, SGT. Garcia wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 04:10:10PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>>
>>> Do you ever import keys that other people
>>> send you? or keys you find on the web? or keys attached to e-mail
>>> m
On 28/09/15 20:39, sam...@riseup.net wrote:
> Hi all
Hi!
> Thanks for your comments, not exactly a ringing endorsement!
Well, for some reason I never got the mail that started this discussion,
a reply by Robert J. Hansen was the first I saw of it. And I didn't
check the website. But the quotes f
> I can't offer any conclusive evidence for this, but it is my
> honest estimate that more real-world sensitive traffic volume
> is generated by 1.4.x than 2.x. Consequently, if 1.4.x is in any
> was insecure, this would be of significantly greater benefit to
> a whole class of large institutional
On 28/09/15 23:16, SGT. Garcia wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 04:10:10PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>
>> Do you ever import keys that other people
>> send you? or keys you find on the web? or keys attached to e-mail
>> messages? Are you sure the things imported can't include a secret
On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 04:10:10PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Mon 2015-09-28 16:00:38 -0400, SGT. Garcia wrote:
> > i really want it as the only authentication required that is open password
> > from
> > user logs him in and decrypts the passwords.
> >
> >> > that would be my email acc
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Please respond on-list; I generally don't like answering questions off-list.
Sorry, was too sleepy last night and did not click on "Reply to all".
> So if ECC falls, well -- so will RSA.
Ok quite clear, that means if RSA falls, so had
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