Hi Sriram,
Thanks for your pointers! I will read them carefully.
Best regards,
Shunwan
> -Original Message-
> From: Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) [mailto:kotikalapudi.sri...@nist.gov]
> Sent: Monday, March 14, 2022 12:45 AM
> To: Zhuangshunwan
> Cc: grow@ietf.org; sidr...@ietf.org
>
Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote on 13/03/2022 16:20:
Not sure why Ben even raised that question. To me, it doesn't seem
relevant. In the route leak detection procedures, the
receiving/validating AS does not require information about the nature
of ASes (RS or not RS) in the AS Path except for
Hi Shunwan,
>> The ASPA verification draft treats the relationship of RS to RS-client
>> as similar to that of Provider to Customer. Seems reasonable? The AS
>> of an RS client includes the RS's AS in its ASPA as a "Provider".
>IMO, the ASPA verification draft regards the relationship between
Nick,
>Ben Maddison wrote on 11/03/2022 07:23:
>> Essential, I would think: how could a far end relying party know that
>> an AS in the middle of a received AS_PATH is a non-transparent IXP RS
>> in order to apply any other treatment?
>given that they're a shrinking rarity, would it not make
