Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Kevin, On 3/25/21 7:40 PM, Fox, Kevin M wrote: > That would be unfortunate. Some clusters won't be able to distinguish if > there is an update or not. If your toolchain is unable to correctly handle changing tags for Docker Images then it is completely broken. This is happening all the time with the 'latest' tag or the branch specific specific aliases (e.g. 'haproxy:2.2' tracking 2.2.x). If you want to ensure that you receive a specific tested version then you could either mirror the tested image onto your infrastructure with a tag of your choice or reference them by digest. Tianon from DOI Team (also put into Cc) directed me to this list of commits that tracks all changes to the 'haproxy' image: https://github.com/docker-library/repo-info/commits/master/repos/haproxy/remote/latest.md > That's one reason I typically follow the distro convention of packaging, of > tacking onto the tag a -1, so if I need to bump them, it can be. -2 when a > new release of the same version comes out. -3 next, etc. Could something like > that be adopted? Unless you are consuming the 'haproxytech/*' images your request is best directed here: https://github.com/docker-library/official-images/ However I don't expect this to be implemented. It seems to introduce much work for very little benefit and might prevent users that accidentally use these tags without understanding them from receiving security fixes. Tianon might or might not authoritatively comment on this :-) Best regards Tim Düsterhus PS: For the folks interested in the rebuild. The update of the 'debian' base image is happening here: https://github.com/docker-library/official-images/pull/9862
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
That would be unfortunate. Some clusters won't be able to distinguish if there is an update or not. That's one reason I typically follow the distro convention of packaging, of tacking onto the tag a -1, so if I need to bump them, it can be. -2 when a new release of the same version comes out. -3 next, etc. Could something like that be adopted? Thanks, Kevin From: Tim Düsterhus Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2021 11:32 AM To: Paul Lockaby Cc: Lukas Tribus; haproxy Subject: Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory Check twice before you click! This email originated from outside PNNL. Paul, On 3/25/21 7:31 PM, Paul Lockaby wrote: > Thanks for all of the responses! So the image version number for HAProxy > stays the same but the hash will update? > Yes exactly. Best regards Tim Düsterhus
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Paul, On 3/25/21 7:31 PM, Paul Lockaby wrote: > Thanks for all of the responses! So the image version number for HAProxy > stays the same but the hash will update? > Yes exactly. Best regards Tim Düsterhus
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Thanks for all of the responses! So the image version number for HAProxy stays the same but the hash will update? > On Mar 25, 2021, at 9:03 AM, Tim Düsterhus wrote: > > Paul, > > On 3/25/21 4:46 PM, Paul Lockaby wrote: >> As a lurker on this list I've always kind of wondered what the policy > is for releasing new containers to address security patches on > dependencies like this. I'm not sure who maintains the "official" > containers for HAProxy but would they do a re-release of the latest > versions to include a patch on a dependency like OpenSSL? >> > > The 'haproxy' image for Docker is maintained by the Docker Official > Images Team [1] [2]. They also handle the necessary rebuilds when the > base image changes. I maintain 2 images as part of the Official Images > program and also contribute to the HAProxy image via Pull Requests. I am > not part of the DOI Team, though. > > Independently from your email I already asked in their IRC whether the > 'debian' base image is going to be rebuilt due to the OpenSSL update. > This would then cause a rebuild of the 'haproxy' image. > > For the images that contain a username (e.g. timwolla/haproxy) the > authors are responsible to trigger a rebuild. > > Best regards > Tim Düsterhus > > [1] https://github.com/docker-library/haproxy/ > [2] https://github.com/docker-library/official-images/
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
[…] > On 25.03.2021., at 17:03, Tim Düsterhus wrote: > […] > > The 'haproxy' image for Docker is maintained by the Docker Official > Images Team [1] [2]. They also handle the necessary rebuilds when the > base image changes. I maintain 2 images as part of the Official Images > program and also contribute to the HAProxy image via Pull Requests. I am > not part of the DOI Team, though. > > Independently from your email I already asked in their IRC whether the > 'debian' base image is going to be rebuilt due to the OpenSSL update. > This would then cause a rebuild of the 'haproxy' image. > > For the images that contain a username (e.g. timwolla/haproxy) the > authors are responsible to trigger a rebuild. > Just to follow-up on this: As Tim has already kindly summarised, the same thing also applies for haproxytech (https://hub.docker.com/u/haproxytech) HAProxy CE images as well, they will get rebuilt on official base image (Debian, Ubuntu, Alpine, etc.) being rebuilt. This includes regular HAProxy CE images, Ingress Controller images, etc. Kind regards, D. -- Dinko Korunic ** Standard disclaimer applies ** Sent from OSF1 osf1v4b V4.0 564 alpha
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Paul, On 3/25/21 4:46 PM, Paul Lockaby wrote: > As a lurker on this list I've always kind of wondered what the policy is for releasing new containers to address security patches on dependencies like this. I'm not sure who maintains the "official" containers for HAProxy but would they do a re-release of the latest versions to include a patch on a dependency like OpenSSL? > The 'haproxy' image for Docker is maintained by the Docker Official Images Team [1] [2]. They also handle the necessary rebuilds when the base image changes. I maintain 2 images as part of the Official Images program and also contribute to the HAProxy image via Pull Requests. I am not part of the DOI Team, though. Independently from your email I already asked in their IRC whether the 'debian' base image is going to be rebuilt due to the OpenSSL update. This would then cause a rebuild of the 'haproxy' image. For the images that contain a username (e.g. timwolla/haproxy) the authors are responsible to trigger a rebuild. Best regards Tim Düsterhus [1] https://github.com/docker-library/haproxy/ [2] https://github.com/docker-library/official-images/
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Hello! As a lurker on this list I've always kind of wondered what the policy is for releasing new containers to address security patches on dependencies like this. I'm not sure who maintains the "official" containers for HAProxy but would they do a re-release of the latest versions to include a patch on a dependency like OpenSSL? Thanks, -Paul > On Mar 25, 2021, at 7:28 AM, Lukas Tribus wrote: > > FYI > > -- Forwarded message - > From: OpenSSL > Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 at 15:03 > Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory > To: , OpenSSL User Support ML > , OpenSSL Announce ML > > > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA256 > > OpenSSL Security Advisory [25 March 2021] > = > > CA certificate check bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT (CVE-2021-3450) > > > Severity: High > > The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the > certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. > > Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in > the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added > as an additional strict check. > > An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a > previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA > certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check > that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. > > If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity > for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" > values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where > a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the > strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and > server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or > removed by an application. > > In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the > X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose > for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server > applications, override the default purpose. > > OpenSSL versions 1.1.1h and newer are affected by this issue. Users of these > versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. > > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th March 2021 by Benjamin Kaduk > from Akamai and was discovered by Xiang Ding and others at Akamai. The fix was > developed by Tomáš Mráz. > > > NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing (CVE-2021-3449) > = > > Severity: High > > An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation > ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello > omits > the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial > ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL > pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service > attack. > > A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which > is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this > issue. > > All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of these versions > should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. > > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was > developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia. > > Note > > > OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. > Extended > support is available for premium support customers: > https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html > > OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind. > The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed. > > Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1. > > References > == > > URL for this Security Advisory: > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt > > Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional > details > over time. > > For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: > https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > > iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEhlersmDwVrHlGQg52cTSbQ5gRJEFAmBcl6sACgkQ2cTSbQ5g > RJGvnAgAtG6I7rfokDC9E5yB26KC3k0Vasfq5iH/aZz0CNRyOokWJBUyyNIVjqr0 > 2eZP7VsQT7zRM+tgh9c8MwH3FIghtpwJRJls4qZDHKoXts7JH4Ul4NLPd546x7xA > GcKNwTD4NkZbTqtZ72NTgliInzrj0MCC8jqQrIIkcAIleGNzvZ0f64jdE+vBXoqX > M2FOhWiA/JkAKtB3W7pthIt25qkOwHbrpTy+UUp/S5QD779NJ/EOYcsOFBRfLZiP > gA6QILuW2L55lhG6Y2u+nVE3UI2hqd2hGgSAvDIPr2lVJxq0LQpgHca7Gj5bfIRo > GLDz7n0FhN6n7NBqetP+nlHmYivcSg== > =XIXK > -END PGP SIGNATURE- >
