Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-05 Thread David Boyes
> Near as I can tell from the information I getting (from Symantec and others), > it's not going to get better anytime soon. > From what I've heard, some folks are advocating a 90-day certificate renewal. > While I don't have an issue with that, it > may make automation more important for

Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-04 Thread Charles Mills
(was: Software Delivery on Tape ...) Hi Folks, As someone who is currently dealing with this - replacing unexpired certificates (to the Digicert Intermediate/CA from the Symantec CA) for our F5s and back-end servers, I can tell you that this is a pain in my butt. Can't renew while

Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-04 Thread Lester, Bob
Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf Of Paul Gilmartin Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 5:14 PM To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU Subject: Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...) [ EXTERNAL ] On Wed, 4 Apr 2018 15:57:02 -0700, Charles Mills wrote: >> As for Certi

Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-04 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Wed, 4 Apr 2018 15:57:02 -0700, Charles Mills wrote: >> As for Certificate Authorities, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? > >Google LOL. >https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-distrust-symantec.html > How will that be removed from my Firefox? Routinely, with updates, or will

Re: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-04 Thread Charles Mills
tin Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 3:53 PM To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU Subject: Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...) On Wed, 4 Apr 2018 17:34:45 -0500, Walt Farrell wrote: > >Of course, you want a checksum method that is strong enough that an attacker >can't create a m

Security (was: Software Delivery on Tape ...)

2018-04-04 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Wed, 4 Apr 2018 17:34:45 -0500, Walt Farrell wrote: > >Of course, you want a checksum method that is strong enough that an attacker >can't create a modified file that will have the same checksum. SHA-1 is no >longer strong enough to guarantee that, from what I've read. SHA-2 should be