At 19:19 22/03/04, John C Klensin wrote:
The subject is not going to do away as long as people think they have a
fundamental human right to do the equivalent of moving to a cardboard box
under a bridge and then demanding banks and creditcard companies to see
them as creditworthy as their bourgeo
On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 13:19:12 -0500, John C Klensin wrote:
>And, as far as I can tell, you do intelligible English very well.
I am travelling just now but when I come to rest I volunteer to
look over if this would be of value.
Jeffrey Race
--On Friday, 19 March, 2004 18:34 -0700 Vernon Schryver
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: John C Klensin
Last week's version of the spam discussions, led to an
interesting (to me) side-discussion about what was, and was
not, an "Internet connection" service. ...
draft-klensin-ip-service-term
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> Dean Anderson wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > > For example, saying that you're "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" should not be so
> > > easy to do when you're sending email, even though it should still
> > > be easy to set "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" as y
> From: John C Klensin
> Last week's version of the spam discussions, led to an
> interesting (to me) side-discussion about what was, and was not,
> an "Internet connection" service. ...
> draft-klensin-ip-service-terms-00.txt.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-klensin-ip-service-ter
d to understand that proposal so far.]
-Original Message-
From: Dean Anderson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 3:19 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Apology Re: Principles of Spam-abatement
Did anyone expect professional behavior from someone who doesn't
Did anyone expect professional behavior from someone who doesn't have an
AUP on their own sites, someone who supports demonstrated abusers, someone
who associates with court-proven liars, and someone who posts misleading
information about their own legal experiences? I didn't.
Clearly, technical
Well, you are the one trying to attribute statements that "you agree with"
to me, even though I've made it clear that we don't agree, and why we
don't agree.
If you can't understand what your opponents position is, and what points
you agree and disagree with, there is no point in discussing it,
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Doug Royer wrote:
> Dean Anderson wrote (in part):
>
> >> c) Work out what to do about relays and proxies, again to prevent
> >>man-in-the-middle DoS more than anything else. One site should not be
> >>able to generate mail that it "forwards" with fictitious headers and
> >
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ed Gerck) writes:
> Dean,
>
> I'm not gonna feed the troll. ...
NOW you're not gonna feed the troll? where's the "...any more!" ??
it does me no good to filter out postings from known whackjobs if you
and others are just going to reply anyway, often including the very
drivel
Dean,
I'm not gonna feed the troll. The bottom line is that spam
filters are not 100% effective and anti-spam protocols are not
100% effective either, in the same way that your car is not
100% fuel effective. The reason is pretty much the same.
Thus, your indefatigable assertion that there are no
Last week's version of the spam discussions, led to an
interesting (to me) side-discussion about what was, and was not,
an "Internet connection" service. There have been discussions
on and off for years (since before the User Services area was
inactivated) about doing such a set of definitions
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
>
> Dean Anderson wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> >
> > > Dean Anderson wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > > > > What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
> > > > > spam is less th
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> Paul Vixie wrote:
>
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vernon Schryver) writes:
> >
> >
> >>... but I don't see any direct connection between [DNSSEC] and a
> >>replacement for DNS blacklists.
> >
> >
> > i know. but you asked about trust query protocols,
william(at)elan.net wrote:
On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
Paul Vixie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vernon Schryver) writes:
... but I don't see any direct connection between [DNSSEC] and a
replacement for DNS blacklists.
i know. but you asked about trust query protocols, not a
> > ... you asked about trust query protocols, not about blackhole
> > lists. as the creator of the first blackhole list, let me just say,
> > "they don't scale."
>
> Are you saying that a new secure scalable trust query protocol be help?
more of a "new trust system" than what you said. one thi
Robert G. Brown wrote:
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Dean Anderson wrote:
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Robert G. Brown wrote:
...
b) Return the complaint as mail to postmaster of the originating
network with a special error code that would allow it to be counted and
digested easily. One doesn't want to create a
Robert G. Brown wrote:
Right now enabling SPs are insulated from any kind of RFC-based
responses or complaints about spam because MUA's and MTA's have no
predefined protocol for generating such a response in a constructive
way. Most complaints/bounces that are automatically generated by
antivirus
Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 12:26:13 -0500 (EST), Dean Anderson wrote:
...
I think these are worth pursuing, but these are not
subjects for the IETF.
IETF's documenting that this is the behavior expected of any firm offering
connectivity is certainly within the IETF's purview.
Paul Vixie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vernon Schryver) writes:
... but I don't see any direct connection between [DNSSEC] and a
replacement for DNS blacklists.
i know. but you asked about trust query protocols, not about blackhole
lists. as the creator of the first blackhole list, let me just
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 17:21:42 -0500 (EST), Robert G. Brown wrote:
>To even START to "fix" this problem, postmaster has to work on the relay
>and be responsive. The relay host manager has to know that their access
>to the entire Internet will be effectively terminated if they don't have
>a working
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 15:48:05 -0500 (EST), Dean Anderson wrote:
>How would you define "responsiveness"?
That's an easy one! 'Does the pollution cease?' is the answer.
Let's pause this very interesting thread for a momentary reality
check. See ROKSO. The world's top spammers, accounting for
th
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 14:04:58 -0500, John Leslie wrote:
>> - If you say that third party organization could assure you that
>> a mail sender is not a spammer, then you must agree that an ISP
>> could check with that organization before adding a password to
>> a RADIUS server or or turn on a D
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 12:26:13 -0500 (EST), Dean Anderson wrote:
>However, I think there are things that show some promise that might be
>harder to adapt to, such as automated text summarization, bayesian
>filters, mail agents that filter on the user's interest in the message
>subject, and such.
How
> From: "Robert G. Brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Mar 14 15:28:51 2004
> Return-Path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Received: from pohl.acpub.duke.edu (pohl.acpub.duke.edu [152.3.233.64])
> by mail.phy.duke.edu (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Dean Anderson wrote:
> On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Robert G. Brown wrote:
>
> > a) Preparse the header so that the entire delivery path is the primary
> > content of the message, with the message itself added (header intact) as
> > an attachment.
>
> This is true now. Many peopl
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Vernon Schryver wrote:
> } From: "Robert G. Brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> } ...
> } The one other place that I think there COULD be room for improvement is
> } to make the process of identifying sites that are originating spam or
> } viruses more rapid and automatic, and to
Dean Anderson wrote (in part):
c) Work out what to do about relays and proxies, again to prevent
man-in-the-middle DoS more than anything else. One site should not be
able to generate mail that it "forwards" with fictitious headers and
evil content so that it appears to come from some hapless
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vernon Schryver) writes:
> ... but I don't see any direct connection between [DNSSEC] and a
> replacement for DNS blacklists.
i know. but you asked about trust query protocols, not about blackhole
lists. as the creator of the first blackhole list, let me just say,
"they don't
Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
> > Dean Anderson wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > > > What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
> > > > spam is less than 100%.
> > >
> > > No, information theory doesn't say that
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Robert G. Brown wrote:
> a) Preparse the header so that the entire delivery path is the primary
> content of the message, with the message itself added (header intact) as
> an attachment.
This is true now. Many people don't know how to parse the headers, but it
obeys a sp
> From: Paul Vixie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > If you believe that "reputation" or "trust" systems might help the
> > spam problem, then the only room for improvement is in the trust query
> > protocol. DNS is a screw driver being used as a hammer in DNS blacklists.
> > However, this is merely a matt
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Eric A. Hall wrote:
> A better analogy is with new checking accounts. Many places won't accept
> checks numbered below 1000, since they indicate that the account has not
> established a track record. Other places will accept the checks after
> verification, other places will a
Hello folks,
"Eric A. Hall" wrote:
> uh, public nudity is (mostly) criminal
Too bad! Actually, what is often proscribed
is lewd behavior, and nudity is often wrongly
considered lewd.
Anyway it's awfully difficult to really
reconcile nudity with criminal behavior.
Regards,
Charlie P.
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Vernon Schryver wrote:
(A bunch of beautifully said things that I agree with fully)
> If you believe that "reputation" or "trust" systems might help the
> spam problem, then the only room for improvement is in the trust query
> protocol. DNS is a screw driver being used as a
Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> All of the possible good and bad aspects of any possible "trust" or
> "reputation" system are already present in the current system.
Not so.
> - If you say that you can't trust ISPs to check that a new customer
> is not Al Ralsky in disguise
When you cannot trust people like Paul Vixie and Bill Manning to terminate
sites that are engaging in plainly obvious and egregious defamation and
harrassment claiming that IP address space is hijacked when a quick check
of the registry indicates that it isn't, then you also can't trust them to
be
On 3/17/2004 10:47 AM, Ed Gerck wrote:
> "Eric A. Hall" wrote:
>>Not applicable to sales@ or emergency@ type mailboxes.
>
> Why? Should someone arrive at your Sales or Emergency window
> in your office, naked, what would you do?
uh, public nudity is (mostly) criminal, so not a good analogy, a
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> Dean Anderson wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > > What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
> > > spam is less than 100%.
> >
> > No, information theory doesn't say that at all.
>
> Sure it says, and that's wh
Vernon Schryver wrote:
If you believe that "reputation" or "trust" systems might help the
spam problem, then the only room for improvement is in the trust query
protocol. DNS is a screw driver being used as a hammer in DNS blacklists.
However, this is merely a matter of optimization or elegance.
I
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Vernon Schryver) writes:
> ...
> If you believe that "reputation" or "trust" systems might help the
> spam problem, then the only room for improvement is in the trust query
> protocol. DNS is a screw driver being used as a hammer in DNS blacklists.
> However, this is merely a m
"Eric A. Hall" wrote:
>
> On 3/17/2004 9:33 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:
> > accepting incoming communication from someone the world has no hooks
> > into is off the table.
>
> Not applicable to sales@ or emergency@ type mailboxes.
Why? Should someone arrive at your Sales or Emergency window
in your o
On 3/17/2004 9:33 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:
> identities without history will be a dime a dozen, or cheaper.
> spammers with no history could trample your privacy all day long if you
> allowed it.
>
> accepting incoming communication from someone the world has no hooks
> into is off the table.
Not
> From: Paul Vixie
> ...
> identities without history will be a dime a dozen, or cheaper. spammers
> with no history could trample your privacy all day long if you allowed it.
>
> accepting incoming communication from someone the world has no hooks into
> is off the table. allowing the world to
> I might be willing to take a first-first email from someone who has a
> history of not-spamming, without requiring that they suffer a penalty
> (other than my reporting them to the third-party trust agency) if they
> violate that.
no, you would not.
dave, you're not thinking of this as informat
Paul,
PV> but i'll bet my bank has ways of trusting your bank.
...
PV> if your bond is only $30/year then i probably wouldn't trust you no matter
PV> what my bank told me about your insurance company or what your insurance
It depends upon what is being trusted and what the incentives are for
vio
> >It is fundamentally, intrinsically, eternally IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY
> >INDIVIDUAL HUMANS on the internet.
>
>"No one knows you're a dog on the Internet" seems to capture it.
>
>(Dilbert?)
Actually, this cartoon was published in The New Yorker on July 5, 1993,
by Peter Steiner. "On th
"Robert G. Brown" wrote:
>
> Ed, are you not paying attention?
Read below and draw your own conclusions, please.
> It is fundamentally, intrinsically, eternally IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY
> INDIVIDUAL HUMANS on the internet.
Who is talking about humans? I am talking about EMAIL ADDRESSES,
MTA
On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 00:44:58 -0500 (EST), Robert G. Brown wrote:
>Ed, are you not paying attention?
>
>It is fundamentally, intrinsically, eternally IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY
>INDIVIDUAL HUMANS on the internet.
"No one knows you're a dog on the Internet" seems to capture it.
(Dilbert?)
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> Trust on the sender cannot be proven by the sender (self-assertions cannot
> induce trust -- e.g., "trust me" doesn't work), but must be calculated using
> sources independent of the sender. The sender may hint to a specific trust
> service used, and even
Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
> > spam is less than 100%.
>
> No, information theory doesn't say that at all.
Sure it says, and that's why a spam filter will never be 100%
effective. I guess we
Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> > For example, saying that you're "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" should not be so
> > easy to do when you're sending email, even though it should still
> > be easy to set "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" as your address in your MUA.
>
> The From: address i
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> To implement these solutions, we need an Internet design where we
> recognize that the end points have become much less trusted than the
> connection. This is the opposite of what the DARPA Internet assumed and
> was designed for. So, some things gotta change
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> So the bottom line is that we lack trust.
Nothing truer has ever been said. This is a feature of human society:
People are not trustworthy.
Lacking any way to positively, uniquely, and inalterably identify people
from birth to death, we cannot i
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
>
> Dean Anderson wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
> > >
> > > The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
> >
> > Correct, and I gave an explanation for this in inforamtion theory.
>
> What informati
Ed Gerck wrote:
What interests the IETF are technical spam solutions, for example,
that would prevent email that comes from unidentifiable or rogue
senders/MTAs to be ever received. Not because spam is detected as
such but because untrusted, unidentifiable or rogue senders/MTAs
are detecte
On 3/16/2004 3:41 PM, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> How would introducing trust help with the spam problem? Would the cost
> of doing so perhaps would be so prohibitive that we will not be able to
> do so? Is it really possible to introduce trust that will actually work?
Trust is a contiuum, lik
Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> So the bottom line is that we lack trust.
Depends how you define trust. In my view, the bottom line is that
trust depends on corroboration with multiple channels while today
we have neither (a) the multiple channels nor (b) the corroboration
mechanisms. So, we lack
Ed Gerck wrote:
In a separate thread, under Yakov's suggestion, the solution part of
this discussion is now probably moving on to the closed ASRG list
(with open archive) as posted in
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.asrg.smtpverify/300
I'd like to now address the other part of Yakov's reply
Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
> >
> > The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
>
> Correct, and I gave an explanation for this in inforamtion theory.
What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
spam is
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 18:12:22 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
> >BTW, how can we talk about "actions that have consequences" in terms of a
> >technical solution that the IETF can pursue?
>
>
> The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never wil
"Dr. Jeffrey Race" wrote:
>
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 18:12:22 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
> >BTW, how can we talk about "actions that have consequences" in terms of a
> >technical solution that the IETF can pursue?
>
> The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
> (There are
On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 18:12:22 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
>BTW, how can we talk about "actions that have consequences" in terms of a
>technical solution that the IETF can pursue?
The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
(There are some technical aspects to improving trace
"Dr. Jeffrey Race" wrote:
> I just want to move the
> discussion from the present 'make the victims pay' model to the only
> one that will ever work, viz. 'make the polluters pay'.
This reminds me of that story where the purported polluter (the lamb) was
downstream but was killed anyway by th
On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 15:58:25 -0500, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
>My concern with your approach is with the fact that SPs can employ such
>measures against someone else without proof,
Some do it now. This consideration is unrelated to my proposal.
>simply cutting off
>connectivity for some st
In a separate thread, under Yakov's suggestion, the solution part of
this discussion is now probably moving on to the closed ASRG list
(with open archive) as posted in
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.asrg.smtpverify/300
I'd like to now address the other part of Yakov's reply below, or
"Why
Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 10:27:46 -0500, Nathaniel Borenstein wrote:
This is exactly right -- we have people arguing from two different
paradigms, both fundamentally orthogonal to the expertise of the IETF.
What this suggests to me is that until the larger society -- i.e. the
Dean Anderson wrote:
Given that, should the IETF pursue development of standards to make
abuse reporting easier to facilitate the work of those ISPs that
actually do handle abuse reports properly?
I'm not against a protocol to help share abuse reports. However, I haven't
seen this as much of
Robert G. Brown wrote:
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
...
This is one of the many examples of things that the IETF can do that do
not solve the overall problem, but are very well within the IETF's
charter to make standards and can help with some aspects of the spam
problem. Of c
> From: Nathaniel Borenstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Perhaps the rule of thumb is that if the discussion of a topic
> repeatedly deteriorates into arguments about the philosophical
> underpinnings of civil society, it's not a suitable topic for
> the IETF?
Here's an idea, for
Nathaniel,
NB> What this suggests to me is that until the larger society -- i.e. the
NB> courts and international institutions -- reach a determination of the
NB> "right" paradigm for dealing with spam, the IETF is going to spin its
NB> wheels on these issues.
Not necessarily.
As long as we de
On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 10:27:46 -0500, Nathaniel Borenstein wrote:
>This is exactly right -- we have people arguing from two different
>paradigms, both fundamentally orthogonal to the expertise of the IETF.
>What this suggests to me is that until the larger society -- i.e. the
>courts and internat
As he so often does, I think Dave has put his finger on the nature of
the problem with which we are failing to make progress:
On Mar 12, 2004, at 9:36 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
NB> some of us want to discuss it in terms of property rights, and
others
NB> of us want to discuss it in terms of human
On 12-mrt-04, at 21:45, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
if there is anything the IETF should or should not be doing in the
spam arena (changing existing standards, making new standards, etc.)?
How about this:
As time goes on, an email address gets on more and more spam lists. One
way to avoid this is
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> First of all, I would like to clarify that I am refering to abuse
> reporting not just for open relays, but also for hijacked machines and
> spammers abusing AUPs of their connectivity provider.
Many of the abusers I have reported included hijack
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> In any case, it seems IMHO that there exists a percentage of ISPs that
> either ignore or mishandle abuse reports. On the other hand there exists
> a percentage of ISPs that respond to abuse reports in a timely fashion.
> We seem to be in disagre
Dean Anderson wrote:
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
This is a human problem, not a technical one - the ISPs are unwilling in
many cases to handle abuse reports seriously, or are unwilling to invest
in any kind of infrastructure to detect abuse.
This isn't true. Certainly, it
Ed,
Thank you for the wealth of information. I forwarded this message to the
SMTP-VERIFY subgroup of the ASRG where the current discussion of the
"web of trust" is taking place so we can evaluate the information (the
archive can be found at
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.asrg.smtpverify/). I
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> This is a human problem, not a technical one - the ISPs are unwilling in
> many cases to handle abuse reports seriously, or are unwilling to invest
> in any kind of infrastructure to detect abuse.
This isn't true. Certainly, it is not representa
Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> Go ahead - I am looking for any kind of solutions that the IETF can take
> on in order to reduce the problem. Many solutions have been revolving
> around trust - but in the world where a computer can be easily hijacked,
> trust becomes harder to maintain.
Trust is th
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
> On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 17:03:14 -0500 (EST), Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> >No such thing was ever found. And just the opposite was proved to you in
> >Exactis V. MAPS. That lawsuit was settled out of court,
>
> Dean you have expressed your case well but
> From: Yakov Shafranovich
> > If the IETF would officially define "slum tenement Internet service"
> > (with better words, of course), then truth in advertising laws, the
> I am not sure if it's the IETF's role to define such definition.
There are plenty of RFCs that consist of little more th
Vernon Schryver wrote:
From: Yakov Shafranovich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
How many ISPs actually
willing to do that (although ComCast begun shutting down accounts of
hijacked machines)? What monetary incentive would the ISPs have to do
that? And even if the IETF publishes the BCP, there is no wa
> From: Yakov Shafranovich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ...
> This is a human problem, not a technical one - the ISPs are unwilling in
> many cases to handle abuse reports seriously, or are unwilling to invest
> in any kind of infrastructure to detect abuse. For example, one of the
> ideas floating ar
Einar Stefferud wrote:
NSF dropped the AUP in 1994 as access was opened up to all who could afford it
and the trustworthiness of the internet has gone downhill ever since because
there is no longer any obvious incentive to inhibit bad behavior.
Reasonable trustworthiness is no longer a hallmark
Ed Gerck wrote:
Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
This discussion got me thinking about the need to state clearly that the
IETF's goal is not to solve the spam problem.
Inadequate design cannot be corrected?
The *possibility* of spam is due to an Internet design based on an
honor system for the end po
Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
On 14-mrt-04, at 12:49, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
...
The only solution is one which removes from connectivity those
who dump their trash on the commons. This is easy to do.
I don't think there are any easy answers here. If there were, they would
have long since be i
Vernon Schryver wrote:
From: "Dr. Jeffrey Race" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
The only solution is one which removes from connectivity those
who dump their trash on the commons. This is easy to do.
That is true in theory. In practice it has been difficult. I'm not
referring to the lies and whines o
> From: "Dr. Jeffrey Race" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 11:12:12 +0100, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
> >What we need here is a fundamentally different approach: one where
> >desired communication is tagged as such explicitly.
>
> You are right a different approach is needed, but not t
At 07:56 AM 3/14/2004, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote...
>On 14-mrt-04, at 12:49, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
>
>>You are right a different approach is needed, but not this one
>>because it does not admit communication from strangers.
>
>I addressed this part at the end of my message. A mechanism to allow
On 14-mrt-04, at 12:49, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
What we need here is a fundamentally different approach: one where
desired communication is tagged as such explicitly.
You are right a different approach is needed, but not this one
because it does not admit communication from strangers.
I addressed
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 11:12:12 +0100, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
>What we need here is a fundamentally different approach: one where
>desired communication is tagged as such explicitly.
You are right a different approach is needed, but not this one
because it does not admit communication from stra
On 14-mrt-04, at 2:49, Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
This is the IETF - an organization that sets some of the standards for
the Internet. What should the IETF be doing and NOT doing be in the
fight against spam.
Spam is only one example of communication that is desired by the sender
but not the rec
AHA! Thanks Ed;-)...
That is the best expose' of the current situation that I have so far seen.
I would like to add that this outcome was possible because at the time of SMTP/RFC822
conception and standardization in the early '80's, the ARPA/NSF
Internet had an Honor System based on the fact
Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
> This discussion got me thinking about the need to state clearly that the
> IETF's goal is not to solve the spam problem.
Inadequate design cannot be corrected?
The *possibility* of spam is due to an Internet design based on an
honor system for the end points. The m
Vernon Schryver wrote:
From: Yakov Shafranovich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Since the IETF is a standards organization, can both you and vsj tell us
in your opinion, if there is anything the IETF should or should not be
doing in the spam arena (changing existing standards, making new
standards, etc.)?
On Sat, 13 Mar 2004 17:03:14 -0500 (EST), Dean Anderson wrote:
>No such thing was ever found. And just the opposite was proved to you in
>Exactis V. MAPS. That lawsuit was settled out of court,
Dean you have expressed your case well but in the end you must agree
none of this is persuasive beca
On 12 Mar 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:
> ultimately it was found that no law or regulation required carriage, and
> that an ISP (whether in the US, Canada, or EU) could subscribe to any
> blackhole list they wanted, and the only recourse any of their customers
> had was whatever was explicitly spelled o
On 12 Mar 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:
> ultimately it was found that no law or regulation required carriage, and
> that an ISP (whether in the US, Canada, or EU) could subscribe to any
> blackhole list they wanted, and the only recourse any of their customers
> had was whatever was explicitly spelled
I posted my original message to the IETF list for a reason instead of
replying to Paul and Vernon privately. My question is really directed to
all of you:
This is the IETF - an organization that sets some of the standards for
the Internet. What should the IETF be doing and NOT doing be in the
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