I think having a precised understanding of the problem that the charter is
meant to address is important. I am having a hard time finding a technical
distinction between a "replay attack" and the, by design, nature of DKIM's
independence from transport details.
I have not read all the drafts,
Is this relevant to the charter? Do you doubt the attacks
sufficiently that you would want to object to chartering a working
group to address the issue?
Barry
On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 4:54 PM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>
> On Wed 09/Nov/2022 13:08:15 +0100 Barry Leiba wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >
> >
On Wed 09/Nov/2022 13:08:15 +0100 Barry Leiba wrote:
[...]
Current proposals include the following drafts:
- draft-bradshaw-envelope-validation-extension-dkim
- draft-chuang-replay-resistant-arc
- draft-gondwana-email-mailpath
- draft-kucherawy-dkim-anti-replay
The working group will
