On Tue, 22 Oct 2013, Valery Smyslov wrote:
attacks (e.g., overloading the receiver with false fragments).
This attack is always possible both with and without fragmentation
(just overloading with false full messages) and IKE is designed to withstand
it.
Partially. For unfragmented IKE, the
Hi, Valery,
On 10/22/2013 5:50 AM, Valery Smyslov wrote:
Hi Joe,
thank you for your review.
Please, see my comments inline.
Hi, all,
I've reviewed the following doc for TSVDIR:
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-04
Although this is not intended as a complete TSVDIR review, I have
checke
HI Tero,
one editorial error, copied from RFC5996:
on Page 22, in the description of Next Payload, the sentence
In the header of an Encrypted payload, the Next Payload field is set
to the payload type of the first contained payload (instead of 0);
conversely, the Next Payload fie
Hi Joe,
thank you for your review.
Please, see my comments inline.
Hi, all,
I've reviewed the following doc for TSVDIR:
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-04
Although this is not intended as a complete TSVDIR review, I have checked
for the typical issues.
Joe
-
