Re: [IPsec] Preference of ESP over AH in RFC7321bis question.

I think that would be a very useful document. Quynh. From: Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> Sent: Friday, August 11, 2017 11:05:59 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc: ipsec@ietf.org Subject: Re: [IPsec] Preference of ESP over AH in RFC7321bis question. On Fri,

[IPsec] Preference of ESP over AH in RFC7321bis question.

Hi all, In RFC 7321, we basically said that ESP is preferred over AH. However, that recommendation is not in the current RFC7321bis. Was that an accidental mistake or because people using AH wanted to remove that recommendation ? Thank you, Quynh.

Re: [IPsec] trapdoor'ed DH (and RFC-5114 again)

Hi Paul, Thank you for sharing the paper. A conclusion of the paper was "Our results are yet another reminder that 1024-bit primes should be considered insecure for the security of cryptosystems based on the hardness of discrete logarithms. The discrete logarithm computation for our

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

Hi Tero, That was why I said "around" when talking about security strength. Again, I like your proposed text change! Regards, Quynh. From: Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi> Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 4:45:39 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

.ca> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 9:46:58 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc: IPsecME WG; Tero Kivinen Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt On Thu, 12 May 2016, Dang, Quynh (Fed) wrote: > I like your proposed new text. I also recommend to add something like this:

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

Thursday, May 12, 2016 6:21:13 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc: p...@nohats.ca; IPsecME WG Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt Dang, Quynh (Fed) writes: > I meant implementations conforming to the RFC 4307 which implemented > the group 2. However, users must not u

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

s." and the document says that the groups 2 and 5 are allowed "SHOULD NOT, not MUST NOT". All of these seem to tell users that these groups are allowed to use. Regards, Quynh. From: Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> Sent: Wednesday,

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

. From: Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 11:50:09 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc: IPsecME WG Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt On Wed, 11 May 2016, Dang, Quynh (Fed) wrote: > As I explained before,

Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-08.txt

Hi all, As I explained before, the group numbers 5 and 2 should become "MUST NOT" because they don't provide 112 bits of security. And, all signatures with SHA1 should become "MUST NOT". Regards, Quynh. From: IPsec on behalf

[IPsec] Fw: WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis

pril 14, 2016 11:22 AM To: Dang, Quynh (Fed) Cc: IPsecME WG; Paul Hoffman; Frankel, Sheila E. (Fed) Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis On Thu, 14 Apr 2016, Dang, Quynh (Fed) wrote: > 1) All of the DH-groups smaller than 2K in the table 3.4 must not be used >

Re: [IPsec] WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis

Hi Paul and all, 1) All of the DH-groups smaller than 2K in the table 3.4 must not be used because they are not strong enough. Right now, groups 5, 2 and 22 are being listed as "should not" which means that "must not use unless a user has a strong reason". The problem is that a user can