Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Hi Scott, this is a very interesting approach. Please, find below my feedback. Kind regards, Oscar. From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2016 5:10 PM To: IPsecme WG (ipsec@ietf.org) Subject: Re: [IPsec] Quantum

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Last month, I listed a series of potential requirements for a shortterm Quantum Resistance solution; several people have commented on these requirements, and here are the votes so far (omitting the "no opinion" votes); I've listed the voters chiefly so that if I mischaracterized their votes,

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Hi Scott, thank you for the list of requirements. My answers are inline. In Berlin, we decided to take up Quantum Resistance as a work item, and that we should start talking about requirements. I'm starting this thread in a hope of kicking off the discussion. First of all, a solution

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) writes: > > Or could we introduce some things now that would make "dropping in" a > > replacement easier? > > Nothing comes to mind; according to the above wild speculation, the > difficulties that people are likely to encounter are more to do with > the implementations,

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Hi Scott, Great list! Responses inline. Best, Tommy > On Aug 11, 2016, at 3:00 PM, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) > wrote: > > In Berlin, we decided to take up Quantum Resistance as a work item, and that > we should start talking about requirements. I’m starting this thread

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

> -Original Message- > From: Michael Richardson [mailto:mcr+i...@sandelman.ca] > Sent: Friday, August 12, 2016 10:13 AM > To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) > Cc: IPsecme WG (ipsec@ietf.org) > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements > > > Scot

Re: [IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote: > - Simplicity; how large of a change to IKE (and IKE implementations) > are we willing to contemplate? > o My opinion: minimizing changes to IKE should be given high priority, > both because “complexity is the enemy of

[IPsec] Quantum Resistance Requirements

In Berlin, we decided to take up Quantum Resistance as a work item, and that we should start talking about requirements. I'm starting this thread in a hope of kicking off the discussion. First of all, a solution to Quantum Resistance that is applicable everywhere would involve replacing the