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From: "Abolition 2000" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, December 05, 2000 8:49 PM
Subject: [abolition-caucus] US Report Transatlantic Security Strategies for
the 21st Century
> US Report Transatlantic Security Strategies for the 21st Century
>
> The US Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy Report for Europe
> and NATO was released on 1 December 2000. The report, entitled
> "Strengthening Transatlantic Security" outlines US plans to prepare
> itself and Allies, NATO states in particular, to meet challenges in
> the Translatlantic and global communities in the 21st century. The
> document underlines that the fundamental point of US strategy is to
> maintain NATO as the preeminent organization of American engagement
> in Europe. NATO enlargement is clearly a US objective and the report
> stresses US support for the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a means
> to outreach to potential members. Of notable interest is a
> reiteration of US reliance on deterrence as a cornerstone of security
> and a commitment to US nuclear forces remaining in Europe (see
> section below on NATO and US Nuclear Forces). The document also
> includes arguments for ballistic missile defenses as a viable means
> of protection from states of concern (see below). Below are excerpts
> from sections of interest to those working in nuclear weapons
> abolition. The full report can be downloaded in pdf format at:
> Http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf
>
> US, NATO and Globalization
>
> "In this era of globalization, America and Europe have common
> interests in dealing with security challenges on the periphery of
> the European continent and beyond that can have important
> ramifications for democracy and prosperity within our transatlantic
> community. Globalization and the information revolution bring
> enormous benefits to the transatlantic community, including its
> security structures, but they also increase its vulnerabilities.
> They facilitate efforts by potential adversaries-both hostile states
> and increasingly sophisticated terrorists-to develop or acquire
> nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means to
> deliver them. Humanitarian disasters beyond Europe can have an
> important impact on transatlantic interest and require joint
> US-European responses." (Pg. 3)
>
> European Cooperation
>
> "The defense of North America remains inextricably tied to
> the defense of Europe. The United States tried and failed to isolate
> itself from the devastating wars in Europe during the 20th century,
> which were fought with weapons that are markedly primitive by today's
> standards. We could not isolate ourselves at all from the
> catastrophic effects of an attack against Europe in the 21st century,
> especially if it involved weapons of mass destruction (WMD)...
> "The United States seeks to prevent the proliferation of NBC
> weapons and the means to deliver them, since such proliferation
> directly threatens our security and that of our Allies...
> "The US military presence in Europe plays a critical role in
> protecting our economic interests, as well as facilitating US
> military deployments for both crisis and non-crisis missions to
> assist allies and friends in neighboring regions." (Pgs 7-8)
>
> "Secretary Cohen also reiterated that, in the face of NATO's
> conventional military superiority, hostile states are looking to NBC
> weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate ballistic and cruise
> missiles to offset that superiority. NATO, therefore, needs to
> develop and field the capabilities, doctrine and plans to deal
> effectively with these growing threats." (Pg. 14)
>
> Defense Budgets
>
> "As we encourage our Allies to improve their defense
> capabilities, we are also taking important steps to improve our own
> capabilities and reform our national policies to facilitate the
> sharing of technology...
> "Over-all, the United States has embarked on its largest
> sustained increase in defense spending in 15 years.
> "We have provided commanders and staffs with policy,
> strategy, and doctrinal guidelines for the planning and execution of
> joint and multi-national military operations in NBC environments. The
> guidelines effect not only passive defense capabilities, such as
> medical capabilities, but also active defense and counterforce
> capabilities to enable US military forces to survive, fight, and win
> in NBC-contaminated environments.
> "In addition, the United Kingdom, Canada and others have
> announced increases in defense spending, in real terms, over the next
> several years-the first such increases since the end of the Cold War.
> Still, many Allies have indicated that their current plans are to
> implement fully a disappointingly small number of Force Goals.
> Moreover, some Allies are headed in the wrong direction, either
> seriously considering or carrying out real reductions in defense
> spending. This trend will have to be reversed." (Pgs. 16-17)
>
> NATO and Russia
>
> "The transatlantic community cannot be truly secure if its
> enormous nuclear-armed neighbor, with its rich human and natural
> resources, withdraws behind a new curtain of hostility and
> authoritarian rule or collapses economically." (Pg. 33)
>
> The US Strategy toward the Russian Federation:
> "First, we seek to minimize Russian perceptions of the United
> States and NATO as potential threats to Russia's national security...
> "Second, we seek to expand programs of practical cooperation
> with the Russian Federation on security-related issues...
> "Third, when Russia's actions or policies raise serious
> concerns about its commitment to values important to the
> transatlantic and wider international communities, we will not remain
> silent."
>
> "In the bilateral arena, the US commitment to stabilizing
> reductions in each side's strategic nuclear forces testifies to our
> desire not to return to the dangerous nuclear competition of the Cold
> War era. These reductions will be accompanied by nuclear-related
> confidence building measures (for example, the recent agreement to
> establish a joint US-Russian center in Moscow to exchange information
> on ballistic missile launches) that demonstrate our desire to work
> with Russia to avoid possible misunderstandings. High-level
> consultations between American and Russian defense and military
> officials also serve as a primary vehicle to improve each side's
> understanding of the other's military doctrines and policies...
>
> "For example, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative,
> the United States is enhancing and enlarging existing programs that
> over the past eight years have helped the Russians to: deactivate
> thousands of nuclear warheads; destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers
> and ballistic missile submarines; improve security of nuclear weapons
> and materials at dozens of sites; prevent the proliferation of
> biological weapons and associated capabilities; begin safe
> destruction of the world's largest stocks of chemical weapons; and
> provide opportunities and inducements for thousands of former Soviet
> weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research
> activities.
>
> "As part of our strategy, we seek to improve our ability to
> cooperate with Russia in crisis response operations by arranging
> joint US-Russian exercises and by cooperating with Russia on theater
> missile defense technologies...
>
> "In the final analysis, our ability to work with Russia to
> reduce Cold War arsenals, prevent the proliferation of WMD, and ease
> the transformation of its political, economic and social institutions
> toward more democratic and free market practices will depend heavily
> on decisions made by Russia." (Pg. 33-36)
>
> NATO and US Nuclear Forces
>
> "In addition to its formidable conventional capabilities to
> respond to any aggression directed against NATO, the United States
> maintains non-strategic nuclear weapons, under highly secure
> conditions, at storage sites in several NATO countries. Since the end
> of the Cold War, the United States, in consultation with its Allies,
> has dramatically reduced the numbers and types of US non-strategic
> nuclear weapons in Europe. For example, all nuclear artillery and
> ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles have been eliminated.
> Together with Allies, we also have modified the readiness criteria
> for forces with a nuclear role and terminated standing peacetime
> nuclear contingency plans.
> The fundamental purpose of US nuclear forces based in Europe
> is-and will remain-to preserve peace and prevent coercion. They
> pro-vide an essential political and military link between the
> European and North American members of the Alliance, as well as
> linkage to US strategic nuclear systems. They make the risks of
> aggression against NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that
> conventional forces alone cannot. The participation of non-nuclear
> Allies in NATO's nuclear posture demonstrates Alliance solidarity,
> determination, and willing-ness to share the risks and
> responsibilities of collective defense. The circumstances in which
> any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by NATO are
> extremely remote, but prudent security planning dictates that we
> maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities
> for the foreseeable future." 15 The UK and France maintain
> independent nuclear forces. Like the United States, they have reduced
> the size of their respective nuclear forces since the end of the Cold
> War.
> (Pgs. 47-48)
>
> Deterrence
>
> "The United States deters threats and potential threats to
> its national security, including those from NBC weapons states, by
> maintaining powerful nuclear and conventional forces. Those who
> would threaten America or its allies in Europe or elsewhere with NBC
> weapons should have no doubt that any attack on us would meet an
> overwhelming and devastating response. DoD also has undertaken a
> comprehensive program to equip, train, and prepare US forces to
> prevail in conditions in which an adversary threatens to use or
> actu-ally uses these weapons against our populations, territories, or
> military forces. This combination of offensive and defense
> capabilities both strengthens deterrence and ensures that we will
> prevail should deterrence fail." (Pgs. 50-51)
>
> Ballistic Missile Defense
> Theater Missile Defense
> "As part of broader efforts to enhance the security of the
> United States, Allied and coalition forces against ballistic missile
> strikes and to complement our counterproliferation strategy, the
> United States is pursuing opportunities for TMD cooperation with NATO
> Partners. The objectives of United States cooperative efforts are to
> provide effective missile defense for coalition forces in both
> Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations against short to medium range
> missiles. In its Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed by
> the proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles, and the
> Alliance reached general agreement on the framework for addressing
> these threats. As part of NATO's DCI, Allies agreed to develop
> Alliance forces that can respond with active and passive defenses
> from NBC attack. Allies further agreed that TMD is necessary for
> NATO's deployed forces.
> "Several Allies currently field or will shortly acquire lower
> tier TMD systems. For example, Germany and the Netherlands both field
> the PAC-2 missile and naval forces of several Allies are considering
> cooperation with the United States to field maritime missile
> defenses. An important development in the operational TMD area was
> the creation in December 1999 of a trilateral US-German-Dutch
> Extended Air Defense Task Force. The Alliance is undertaking a
> feasibility analysis for a layered defense architecture. As the
> ballistic missile threat to Europe evolves in the direction of longer
> ranges, the Alliance will need to consider further measures of
> defense incorporating upper-tier TMD and/or a defense against
> longer-range missiles." (Pg. 53)
>
> National Missile Defense
> "Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea do not need long-range
> missiles to intimidate their neighbors; they already have
> shorter-range missiles to do so. Instead, they want long-range
> missiles to coerce and threaten more distant countries in North
> America and Europe. They presumably believe that even a small number
> of missiles, against which we have no defense, could be enough to
> inhibit US actions in support of our Allies or coalition partners in
> a crisis.
> "Based on our assessment of these trends, the United States
> has concluded that we must counter this threat before one of these
> states attempts to blackmail the United States from protecting its
> interests, including commitments to our Allies in Europe and
> elsewhere. Thus, the United States is developing a NMD system that
> would protect all 50 states from a limited attack of a few to a few
> tens of warheads.
> "NATO's Strategic Concept recognizes that "(t)he Alliance's
> defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the
> proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and
> their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including
> through work on missiles de-fenses." As the US. NMD effort
> progresses, we need to continue close consultations with our Allies
> on relevant policy and technical issues.
> "Although Moscow argues to the contrary, the limited NMD
> system the United States is developing would not threaten the Russian
> strategic deterrent, which could overwhelm our defense even if
> Russian strategic forces were much lower than levels foreseen under
> existing US-Russian strategic arms reduction agreements. Moreover,
> the US proposal to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
> Treaty include measures of cooperation and transparency that would
> give Russia confidence that the NMD system was not being expanded
> beyond its limited scale. China has a more modest nuclear force than
> Russia, but has a multi-faceted nuclear modernization program that
> predates NMD. Our NMD system is not designed to neutralize China's
> strategic capabilities. NMD is a complement to our policies of
> deterrence and prevention, not a substitute. We will continue to rely
> on diplomacy, arms control and traditional deterrence-the credible
> threat of an overwhelming and devastating response-to dissuade states
> of concern from attacking or coercing their neighbors or anyone
> else.17 But today, when a state of concern might attempt to coerce
> the United States or it Allies, it is not prudent to rely exclusively
> on deterrence by overwhelming response, especially when we have the
> option of a limited, but effective defense.
> "The NMD we envisage would reinforce the credibility of US
> security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. Europe
> would not be more secure if the United States were less secure from a
> missile attack by a state of concern. An America that is less
> vulnerable to ballis-tic missile attack is more likely to defend
> Europe and common Western security interests than an America that is
> more vulnerable. As consultations proceed with our Allies on NMD, we
> realize that Allies will continue to consider the appropriate role of
> missile defenses in their respective national security strategies. In
> keeping with the fun-damental principle of the Alliance that the
> security of its members is indivisible, the United States is open to
> discussing possible cooperation with Allies on longer-range ballistic
> missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and cooperation
> in the area of TMD. As President Clinton said in May 2000, "every
> country that is part of a responsible inter-national arms control and
> nonproliferation regime should have the benefit of this protection."
> "In September 2000, President Clinton announced that while
> NMD was sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued
> develop-ment and testing, there was not sufficient information about
> the techni-cal and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system
> to move forward with deployment. In making this decision, he
> considered the threat, the cost, technical feasibility and the impact
> on our national security of proceeding with NMD. The President's
> decision will provide flexibility to a new administration and will
> preserve the option to deploy a national missile defense system in
> the 2006-2007 time frame."
> 17 Similarly, the independent British and French nuclear deterrents
> would not be undermined by the NMD capabilities allowed under the US
> proposal to modify the ABM Treaty.
> (Pgs. 54-55)
> --
>
>
> Carah Lynn Ong
> Coordinator, Abolition 2000
>
>
> "He aha te nui mea o te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata" (A
> Maori saying)
>
> Translation: "What is the most important thing in the world? It is
> the people, the people, the people."
>
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