Hi,
this article about Indymedia is not liberation tech in the strict sense
of the word. But then a lot of people who are or were involved with
Indymedia are subscribers here and there's considerable overlap of
interest, I'd say?
http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/indymedia-its-time-move/
A local
Geert Lovink and Miriam Rasch (eds), Unlike Us Reader: Social Media
Monopolies and Their Alternatives, Amsterdam: Institute of Network
Cultures, 2013. ISBN: 978-90-818575-2-9, paperback, 384 pages.
Freely downloadable as pdf on:
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 09:03:06PM -0600, Charles Zeitler wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography
Doesn't really work. Essentially, this is expensive
snake oil.
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From: Gary McGraw g...@cigital.com
No doubt all of you have seen the NY Times article about the Mandiant
report that pervades the news this week:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html
I believe it is important to understand the
This is a good illustration how data in use is exposed to physical attacks
on most computing devices.
An interesting side-note is that Android phones are starting to ship with a
hardware security module (HSM), which can be used for crypto operations and
key storage. Duo Security is one company
from: Victoria Robles vcrob...@stanford.edu
Does anyone know someone involved in this movement in Mexico? I'm
trying to get some first-hand information. Thanks!
abrazos,
Vicky
--
Victoria Robles
Stanford University | Class of 2014
B.S. Candidate | Materials Science Engineering
Engineering
Thanks Steve,
Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be less
susceptible?
Brian
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:08 AM, Steve Weis stevew...@gmail.com wrote:
This is a good illustration how data in use is exposed to physical attacks
on most computing devices.
An
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On 2/21/13 10:32 AM, Brian Conley wrote:
Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be
less susceptible?
Not sure if this is what they have in mind, but this particular
technique requires a battery pop to get into fastboot mode,
hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe.
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:37 AM, Parker Higgins par...@eff.org wrote:
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On 2/21/13 10:32 AM, Brian Conley wrote:
Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be
Brian Conley:
hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe.
In any phone where one might be able to open the case, I assume someone
will also just be able to tap the bus lines. Thus, the easy route
(booting off of a special image) might not be simple but these devices
aren't
Always trust Jake to cut right to the bare honest ugly (and depressing!)
truth.
thanks!
B
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.netwrote:
Brian Conley:
hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe.
In any phone where one might be able to open
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On 21/02/13 18:32, Brian Conley wrote:
Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be
less susceptible?
iOS has several classes of encrypted storage. For the
NSFileProtectionComplete class, the class key that protects the
Brian Conley:
Always trust Jake to cut right to the bare honest ugly (and depressing!)
truth.
If you really want to be depressed about mobile security, I encourage
you to acquire the cellebrite UFED forensics device:
http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensic-products/ufed-touch-ultimate.html
Good news everyone! It *looks like we made it*. I'd like to share this
victory video with you
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SEwQRPtUz4feature=youtu.bet=2m13s
The White House
petitionhttps://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/make-unlocking-cell-phones-legal/1g9KhZG7to
make unlocking phones
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 2:08 PM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.netwrote:
It seems like one of the few times the use of something like TRESOR
would improve:
http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor
TRESOR looks very interesting! I wonder what's preventing its kind of
techniques from
TRESOR uses debug registers and only protects key material. It doesn't
protect the code that actually reads that key in or out of the register,
nor any of the data that is actually decrypted with the key. So, it
provides protection just for keys against passive, read-only attacks
against memory.
On 2/21/13 5:27 PM, Yosem Companys wrote:
Sadly, policymakers seem to think we have completely solved the
attribution problem. We have not. This article published in
Computerworld does an adequate job of stating my position:
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=94AB4F98-9BBD-1370-154D49FAA7706BE9
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 8:10 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 09:03:06PM -0600, Charles Zeitler wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography
Doesn't really work. Essentially, this is expensive
snake oil.
so, it's been tried, eh? can you post a link?
On 22/02/13 03:53, Charles Zeitler wrote:
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 8:10 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 09:03:06PM -0600, Charles Zeitler wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography
Doesn't really work. Essentially, this is expensive
snake oil.
so,
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