Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 04:27:17PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote: These properties are really awesome. One thing that I'm concerned about is that classic Usenet doesn't really do authenticity. It was easy for people to spoof articles, although there would be _some_ genuine path information back to the point where the spoofed article originated. It seems like if we're talking about using Usenet in an extremely hostile environment, spoofing and forgery are pretty significant threats (including classic problems like spoofed control messages! but also cases of nodes modifying message content). I completely agree with you: I share that concern. I think a *possible* fix for it -- or perhaps fix is too strong a term, let me call it an approach -- is to remove the Path: header (among others) and use the article body's checksum as a unique identifier. Thus node A, instead of telling node B I have article 123456, do you want it?, would say instead, I have an article with checksum 0x83FDE1, do you want it? -- slightly complicating propagation, but not unduly so. I think this can be used to strip out all origination information: when A presents B with articles, B will not be able to discern which originated on A and which are merely being passed on by A. Encrypting everything should stop article spoofing. (Although it doesn't stop article flooding, and an adversary could try to overwhelm the network by injecting large amounts of traffic. Deprecating the Path: header actually makes this easier for an attacker.) The use of encryption also means that private messages can be sent from user U1 to user U2 -- yes, they'll be present on every node (eventually) but only user U2 will be able to decrypt them using her private key. (In other words, the way U2 discovers which messages are directed to her is that she attempts to decrypt them *all*. When it works: that one was for her. Provided an adversary does not have U2's private key, the adversary can't figure out which ones are addressed to her. Or who they're from. Or where they originated. [1]) Your mention of spoofed control messages is spot-on: that's another problem with this. I've been thinking that perhaps the approach to that is to consider only allowing certain control messages: for example, article cancellation probably shouldn't be supported. (I briefly thought about encrypted article cancellation but then realized that it would only work on one node: that belonging to U2 in the example above. Not very useful!) I rather suspect though, that my analysis of this is incomplete and that the best way to figure out how to deal with control messages might be to set up a testbed network and have someone play the role of an adversary. Clearly, the Usenet model is very efficient for one-to-many, but inefficient for many-to-one and one-to-one. However, that same inefficiency is what gives it the ability to survive major node loss and link disruption and still work. It's also what makes it resistant to traffic analysis: when everyone says everything to everyone else, it's much harder to discern who's really talking to who. Speaking of survivability, this recent work: Guaranteed delivery -- in ad-hoc networks http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2013/ad-hoc-networks-0109.html has direct applicability here. Hauepler's algorithm shows that to guarantee delivery to a network of N nodes, delivery to log2(N) nodes will suffice. What all this does *not* give a real-time communications medium. But I'm not at all sure that's desirable. Over the past few years, I've slowly formed the hypothesis that the closer to real-time network communications are, the more susceptible they are to (adversarial) analysis. I can't rigorously defend that -- like I said, it's just a hypothesis -- but if it's correct, then it would be a good idea, when and where possible, to make communications NON-real-time. (Thus it might be a good idea for nodes participating in this kind of network to randomize the time intervals for outbound transmissions, in order to avoid generating a flurry of network activity that can be readily associated with an external event, a location, or a person.) One of other nice features of a Usenet-like architecture is that it works beautifully with sneakernet data transmission. A micro SD card or a USB stick can hold a *lot* of data, and they're easily concealed, traded, or dropboxed. It's not at all unreasonable to conceive of a scheme where daily reports of events inside Elbonia are transmitted by physically carrying them to a location outside Elbonian-controlled network space and injecting them back into the network. Or vice-versa. I'm not saying this is the answer. I'm not even sure it's an answer. But I think it might be the foundation for one. Now if I could just find the funding to work on it for 6-12 months I'd be all set. ;-) ---rsk [1] I suspect that an adversary in possession of a large number of nodes might be
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 14/06/13 12:49, Rich Kulawiec wrote: I think a *possible* fix for it -- or perhaps fix is too strong a term, let me call it an approach -- is to remove the Path: header (among others) and use the article body's checksum as a unique identifier. Thus node A, instead of telling node B I have article 123456, do you want it?, would say instead, I have an article with checksum 0x83FDE1, do you want it? -- slightly complicating propagation, but not unduly so. I think this can be used to strip out all origination information: when A presents B with articles, B will not be able to discern which originated on A and which are merely being passed on by A. This was exactly my jumping-off point for Briar: take Usenet, remove the path header, remove cancellation messages, require message IDs to be cryptographic hashes of the content, and require link encryption. :-) Encrypting everything should stop article spoofing. (Although it doesn't stop article flooding, and an adversary could try to overwhelm the network by injecting large amounts of traffic. Deprecating the Path: header actually makes this easier for an attacker.) ...and this is the point where I decided Usenet wasn't the best place to start from. Spam pretty much killed conversation on Usenet - and the spammers weren't even trying to kill it. I have some ideas about how to limit spam/flooding in a decentralised way, if we can assume the network's built on real-world social relationships and some fraction of the users are willing to take part in moderation - but so far they're untested. What all this does *not* give a real-time communications medium. But I'm not at all sure that's desirable. Over the past few years, I've slowly formed the hypothesis that the closer to real-time network communications are, the more susceptible they are to (adversarial) analysis. I can't rigorously defend that -- like I said, it's just a hypothesis -- but if it's correct, then it would be a good idea, when and where possible, to make communications NON-real-time. I agree - if you design the system to tolerate latency, there's scope for using mix network-like techniques against traffic analysis. Many attacks against mix networks are based on correlating messages entering the network with messages leaving it; if the network's peer-to-peer then messages don't enter or leave - the endpoints are inside the network. And if the network uses store-and-forward, senders and recipients don't have to be online at the same time, further frustrating intersection attacks. But best of all, store-and-forward networks can include nodes and edges that don't show up in the adversary's traffic logs at all, because they only communicate over sneakernet or short-range links like Bluetooth and wifi. I'm not saying this is the answer. I'm not even sure it's an answer. But I think it might be the foundation for one. Now if I could just find the funding to work on it for 6-12 months I'd be all set. ;-) Come and work on Briar. We might even be able to find some funding. :-) Cheers, Michael -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRu2sPAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMWR8H/AtxcA41sgvmY1HW3EwDN0/w z8LFbrYvimL/CI34eWvytzKU8on/GyS4nBhJ0PRW7KbBpDm9SKEpi83jXoBDNvrN Ix4hM5dMdNp1dTZB8rI7NEWWOcpR/ChMfEHkV/EDtAZiQX3fzeC1rX3kx0PaqOne a0SRjIxXF/wrfqNN405vvTT6POjI6AEKwHomNdb6mZLsW8X16F7ejn8vpFwkOHQ6 Q4manS2FzVMVb4VmbmjFmrAJqhAaSTxziYbxosJqXqGiy9bugAlcJ14KmE97k4rG rqwM2wjSwiSJ9vdytbPE6Dmav3hpwKtYxzIDvZcN2z4kJ01h42Izah0qsxo= =jCtk -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 05:44:38PM -0400, Richard Brooks wrote: This lead me to start thinking about the possibility of deploying something like Fidonet as a tool for getting around Internet blackouts. Has anyone tried something like that? Usenet has long since demonstrated the ability to route around amazing amounts of damage and flakiness and to maintain communications over very slow (including sneakernet) links. Arguably, that sentence describes the normal operational state of the network on a typical summer day just like this one, 30 years ago. ;-) Usenet has some very nice properties for applications like this: 1. There is no centralization. Thus there is no single target to shut down or block. 2. Messages are not addressed to individuals. This frustrates some traffic analysis. 3. It's transport-agnostic. Messages can be passed via IP, via UUCP, by USB stick, CD, DVD, etc. 4. It's highly delay-tolerant. 5. It's content-agnostic. 6. It's highly fault-tolerant. 7. It doesn't require real-time IP connectivity. In areas where IP connectivity is scarce, expensive, intermittment, wiretapped or blocked, this is a big plus. 8. It's standardized. 9. Mature open-source software already exists for it. 10. Peering relationships can be ad-hoc. Not that it would work for this application as-is: the article duplication method would need to be replaced because the current one leaks origin information. But I think that's a solvable problem. I submitted a proposal on this very point a few months ago; haven't heard a thing back, so my guess is that's not going anywhere. But I think with a relatively modest investment, the additional code could be written and a testbed network constructed to figure out if this really is a viable architecture. My hunch (of course) is yes but I'd prefer to remain skeptical until there's some experimental evidence that it'll hold up under the kind of duress we've seen in various countries during the past few years. ---rsk -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
Rich Kulawiec writes: Usenet has long since demonstrated the ability to route around amazing amounts of damage and flakiness and to maintain communications over very slow (including sneakernet) links. Arguably, that sentence describes the normal operational state of the network on a typical summer day just like this one, 30 years ago. ;-) Usenet has some very nice properties for applications like this: 1. There is no centralization. Thus there is no single target to shut down or block. 2. Messages are not addressed to individuals. This frustrates some traffic analysis. 3. It's transport-agnostic. Messages can be passed via IP, via UUCP, by USB stick, CD, DVD, etc. 4. It's highly delay-tolerant. 5. It's content-agnostic. 6. It's highly fault-tolerant. 7. It doesn't require real-time IP connectivity. In areas where IP connectivity is scarce, expensive, intermittment, wiretapped or blocked, this is a big plus. 8. It's standardized. 9. Mature open-source software already exists for it. 10. Peering relationships can be ad-hoc. These properties are really awesome. One thing that I'm concerned about is that classic Usenet doesn't really do authenticity. It was easy for people to spoof articles, although there would be _some_ genuine path information back to the point where the spoofed article originated. It seems like if we're talking about using Usenet in an extremely hostile environment, spoofing and forgery are pretty significant threats (including classic problems like spoofed control messages! but also cases of nodes modifying message content). A lot of the great properties you've mentioned above that Usenet has already demonstrated have more to do with performing well over slow or unreliable network links, but perhaps not over actively hostile ones. Some Usenet clients support PGP signing, but that may be of limited use unless most users can verify and generate signatures. -- Seth Schoen sch...@eff.org Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
@Richard: Alternative infrastructure-type projects like Commotion and other mesh networks can certainly be put in place proactively. In fact, that's a goal of Commotion: encouraging communities to build out their own mesh networks, so residents have more ownership and control over their local infrastructure. When alternative infrastructure is being developed and proactively built out, these communities are more resilient against shutdown of state-controlled networks and can still communicate locally in the case of internet outage. On Wed 12 Jun 2013 06:49:26 AM EDT, Mrs. Y wrote: What about Project Byzantium? http://project-byzantium.org/ The goal of Project Byzantium is to develop a communication system by which users can connect to each other and share information in the absence of convenient access to the Internet. This is done by setting up an ad-hoc wireless mesh network that offers services which replace popular websites often used for this purpose, such as Twitter and IRC. These services and web apps were selected because they are the ones most often used by activists around the world to find one another, exchange information, post media, and organize. They were also selected because they stand the best chance of being easy to use by our intended userbase, which are people using mobile devices like smartphones, MP3 players, and tablet PCs. I interviewed some of the contributors for a podcast on Hacker/maker spaces here: http://packetpushers.net/healthy-paranoia-2-where-no-nerd-has-gone-before/ Michele On 6/11/13 5:44 PM, Richard Brooks wrote: Just finished interacting with people from a number of countries worried about Internet blackouts being used by their governments to help prevent reporting of unpleasant truths, such as vote-rigging. I discussed with them what Telecomics did for Egypt and other Arab countries and what Commotion and mesh-networking may provide. They were enthusiastic about these possibilities, but disappointed when I explained that this was not anything that could be put in place proactively for the moment. This lead me to start thinking about the possibility of deploying something like Fidonet as a tool for getting around Internet blackouts. Has anyone tried something like that? Was wondering if anyone was aware of other approaches for mitigating this type of DoS. -Richard -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Internet blackout
Just finished interacting with people from a number of countries worried about Internet blackouts being used by their governments to help prevent reporting of unpleasant truths, such as vote-rigging. I discussed with them what Telecomics did for Egypt and other Arab countries and what Commotion and mesh-networking may provide. They were enthusiastic about these possibilities, but disappointed when I explained that this was not anything that could be put in place proactively for the moment. This lead me to start thinking about the possibility of deploying something like Fidonet as a tool for getting around Internet blackouts. Has anyone tried something like that? Was wondering if anyone was aware of other approaches for mitigating this type of DoS. -Richard -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet blackout
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2013.06.11 17.44, Richard Brooks wrote: This lead me to start thinking about the possibility of deploying something like Fidonet as a tool for getting around Internet blackouts. Has anyone tried something like that? Not Fidonet, because the world has moved on, but Briar is designed with a similar store-and-forward architecture as a delay-tolerant messaging system with strong security guarantees, intended to work across whatever transport is available in the moment for exactly this kind of situation. While we're a ways from being ready for use in any kind of high-risk (or even low-risk-but-real) scenario, we've got an early alpha out if you want to play with it. We're also looking for more help, especially from developers (Java; Android, Swing, JDBC, concurrency, etc.); we're happy to mentor less-experienced developers. More info here: http://briar.sourceforge.net/get-involved.html. /ad E. - -- Ideas are my favorite toys. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iF4EAREIAAYFAlG3/sgACgkQQwkE2RkM0wpIyQD/d3gZhRQ7gfFOZwD5u5HnIK2H HUVDJgIkIltdL3EmNTwA/RUgVH0i9w6v+5AjuWxHukljXsJgUoI8YmhXPzjoRLdg =LOBj -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Am I missing something? - -- hc voigt kellerabteil.org :: sozialebewegungen.org :: +43 699 19586738 :: kellerabt...@jabber.org :: -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRqdH6AAoJEObsdvLIea2bBcEH/jdWBQNksruGjVRggajg4UUx 2Jk+E7eyH350MXyqLkYTvFi+KzBUBrfQvYwm3SA6yBTqqerlY3Ghn9SVACwFeylA CjryyU54mpEyIlBOFB5fgEdMK1OziMDFTz5jefuQlb8UI16NcN/ywiDAkeBaC7aF pQ2kFtHu4Wf6Z59Rfvejto8LClfBjYPVyzJ3ouiiT0QjirfWlO8r23D5G7OP8yRC Zmkmq96lhuQz9M/INAMxQ29xpS9i3VERJjII4NfcYCycfZDHUHEaFwURGHNZn/Zk 8k/hAXbhyJ4ydb820i+4xXbOXDoaUSxHLwUJ1Etczp3dxZTYZyN0axC1h972xyw= =CjET -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
I heard rumors, on reddit so take this with a grain of salt, that power was being cut off to neighborhoods with protests. As for the capacity to cutoff Internet, I suspect every country to have a contingency for that. -Andrew On Jun 1, 2013, at 10:51 PM, hc voigt sozw...@gmail.com wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Am I missing something? - -- hc voigt kellerabteil.org :: sozialebewegungen.org :: +43 699 19586738 :: kellerabt...@jabber.org :: -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRqdH6AAoJEObsdvLIea2bBcEH/jdWBQNksruGjVRggajg4UUx 2Jk+E7eyH350MXyqLkYTvFi+KzBUBrfQvYwm3SA6yBTqqerlY3Ghn9SVACwFeylA CjryyU54mpEyIlBOFB5fgEdMK1OziMDFTz5jefuQlb8UI16NcN/ywiDAkeBaC7aF pQ2kFtHu4Wf6Z59Rfvejto8LClfBjYPVyzJ3ouiiT0QjirfWlO8r23D5G7OP8yRC Zmkmq96lhuQz9M/INAMxQ29xpS9i3VERJjII4NfcYCycfZDHUHEaFwURGHNZn/Zk 8k/hAXbhyJ4ydb820i+4xXbOXDoaUSxHLwUJ1Etczp3dxZTYZyN0axC1h972xyw= =CjET -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Good day everyone, Le 01/06/2013 12:50, hc voigt a écrit : Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. I am not sure to what extent the blackout is complete. A message was addressed to telecomix earlier on: http://pastebin.com/Y9iJTWEP I'd say they've cut GSM access as well as broadband in some areas, and possibly increased blockade of some particular websites at country level. Would be nice to get more details, though. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Country internet infrastructure is centralized by governmetn-controlled Turk Telecom. They already do website blockade, iirc based on keywords. So I think we can assume they have modern enough equipment to perform blocking and surveillance. Best, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
We have reports from inside Taksim that yesterday 3G was unavailable in Taksim itself, but telephony was fine. Simple moving to a street near Taksim would reestablish 3G connectivity. It´s unclear if this is intentional or simply the network being overloaded. Also people seem to be removing password protection from wifi access points near Taksim to facilitate connectivity. Webcams overlooking Taksim have been down since yesterday, and as of today webcams overlooking Istiklal (big street leading up to Taksim) are also down. http://tks.ibb.gov.tr/ - Ruben On 06/01/2013 01:46 PM, Andrew Lewis wrote: I heard rumors, on reddit so take this with a grain of salt, that power was being cut off to neighborhoods with protests. As for the capacity to cutoff Internet, I suspect every country to have a contingency for that. -Andrew On Jun 1, 2013, at 10:51 PM, hc voigt sozw...@gmail.com wrote: Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Am I missing something? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Hey, The Renesys report from Nov 2012 provides some info: http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml Turkey is in the 'Low risk' column (code: TR). Opinions vary though: [...] Turkey, by contrast, has numerous excellent providers (many using networks beyond their own frontiers) but, at last count, there were some 1500 or more web sites blocked. Turkey hasn't shut down the internet to date but could do so at a moment's notice for political reasons From what I've heard, 3G appears to be blocked (overload?) within Taksim, but is ok outside. Apparently people remove passwords from their wifi connections so everyone can use it. Have been asking for clearer reports, but nothing compelling thus far :/ 2013/6/1 hc voigt sozw...@gmail.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Am I missing something? - -- hc voigt kellerabteil.org :: sozialebewegungen.org :: +43 699 19586738 :: kellerabt...@jabber.org :: -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRqdH6AAoJEObsdvLIea2bBcEH/jdWBQNksruGjVRggajg4UUx 2Jk+E7eyH350MXyqLkYTvFi+KzBUBrfQvYwm3SA6yBTqqerlY3Ghn9SVACwFeylA CjryyU54mpEyIlBOFB5fgEdMK1OziMDFTz5jefuQlb8UI16NcN/ywiDAkeBaC7aF pQ2kFtHu4Wf6Z59Rfvejto8LClfBjYPVyzJ3ouiiT0QjirfWlO8r23D5G7OP8yRC Zmkmq96lhuQz9M/INAMxQ29xpS9i3VERJjII4NfcYCycfZDHUHEaFwURGHNZn/Zk 8k/hAXbhyJ4ydb820i+4xXbOXDoaUSxHLwUJ1Etczp3dxZTYZyN0axC1h972xyw= =CjET -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Change l'ordre du monde plutôt que tes désirs. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
No internet blackout in turkey! I am on twitter as purescapism tweeting about the protests all over turkey! Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 15:14, Rayna rayna...@gmail.com wrote: Hey, The Renesys report from Nov 2012 provides some info: http://www.renesys.com/blog/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr.shtml Turkey is in the 'Low risk' column (code: TR). Opinions vary though: [...] Turkey, by contrast, has numerous excellent providers (many using networks beyond their own frontiers) but, at last count, there were some 1500 or more web sites blocked. Turkey hasn't shut down the internet to date but could do so at a moment's notice for political reasons From what I've heard, 3G appears to be blocked (overload?) within Taksim, but is ok outside. Apparently people remove passwords from their wifi connections so everyone can use it. Have been asking for clearer reports, but nothing compelling thus far :/ 2013/6/1 hc voigt sozw...@gmail.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Am I missing something? - -- hc voigt kellerabteil.org :: sozialebewegungen.org :: +43 699 19586738 :: kellerabt...@jabber.org :: -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRqdH6AAoJEObsdvLIea2bBcEH/jdWBQNksruGjVRggajg4UUx 2Jk+E7eyH350MXyqLkYTvFi+KzBUBrfQvYwm3SA6yBTqqerlY3Ghn9SVACwFeylA CjryyU54mpEyIlBOFB5fgEdMK1OziMDFTz5jefuQlb8UI16NcN/ywiDAkeBaC7aF pQ2kFtHu4Wf6Z59Rfvejto8LClfBjYPVyzJ3ouiiT0QjirfWlO8r23D5G7OP8yRC Zmkmq96lhuQz9M/INAMxQ29xpS9i3VERJjII4NfcYCycfZDHUHEaFwURGHNZn/Zk 8k/hAXbhyJ4ydb820i+4xXbOXDoaUSxHLwUJ1Etczp3dxZTYZyN0axC1h972xyw= =CjET -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Change l'ordre du monde plutôt que tes désirs. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Le 01/06/2013 15:33, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : No internet blackout in turkey! I am on twitter as purescapism tweeting about the protests all over turkey! Can you yell which ISP you are using? We have report that TTNet and Turkcell blocked Facebook and Twitter. Could it be possible to get more details on this? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
In some places they use jammers but no wide Internet block out. I am using turkcell and Turksat. Is that ok with you? Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 16:50, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Le 01/06/2013 15:33, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : No internet blackout in turkey! I am on twitter as purescapism tweeting about the protests all over turkey! Can you yell which ISP you are using? We have report that TTNet and Turkcell blocked Facebook and Twitter. Could it be possible to get more details on this? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Livestream links that you can see what's going on: http://newmedia.pivol.com/dhafeed2.htm http://newmedia.pivol.com/dhafeed.htm http://www.livestream.com/revoltistanbul You can watch but sometimes freezing! Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 16:50, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Le 01/06/2013 15:33, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : No internet blackout in turkey! I am on twitter as purescapism tweeting about the protests all over turkey! Can you yell which ISP you are using? We have report that TTNet and Turkcell blocked Facebook and Twitter. Could it be possible to get more details on this? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Unfortunately I do not have evidence for jammers, it can be maybe so overload... But I do confirm no blackout for Turksat and turkcell for now. Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 17:23, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Le 01/06/2013 16:04, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : In some places they use jammers but no wide Internet block out. I am using turkcell and Turksat. Is that ok with you? Thank you. Do you have stronger evidence of jammers? A picture for instance? Maybe the network is just overloaded in some places? So you confirm Twitter Facebook are not blocked on Turkcell? Or they are not blocked on Turksat? Or both? Thank you:) -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
RT @denizergurel: @pdacosta @nycjim @Reuters there are reports of a DDos Attack in Turkey, not an internet blackout http://t.co/IWZL08lRBw On Sat, Jun 1, 2013 at 7:30 AM, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM arifyildi...@gmail.com wrote: Unfortunately I do not have evidence for jammers, it can be maybe so overload... But I do confirm no blackout for Turksat and turkcell for now. Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 17:23, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Le 01/06/2013 16:04, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : In some places they use jammers but no wide Internet block out. I am using turkcell and Turksat. Is that ok with you? Thank you. Do you have stronger evidence of jammers? A picture for instance? Maybe the network is just overloaded in some places? So you confirm Twitter Facebook are not blocked on Turkcell? Or they are not blocked on Turksat? Or both? Thank you:) -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
-Original Message- From: compa...@stanford.edu To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Cc: Sent: 2013-06-01 10:58:07 GMT Subject: Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey? RT @denizergurel: @pdacosta @nycjim @Reuters there are reports of a DDos Attack in Turkey, not an internet blackout http://t.co/IWZL08lRBw On Sat, Jun 1, 2013 at 7:30 AM, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM arifyildi...@gmail.com wrote: Unfortunately I do not have evidence for jammers, it can be maybe so h ok with zzz theoverload... But I do confirm no blackout for Turksat and turkcell for now. Dr.Arif YILDIRIM On 1 Haz 2013, at 17:23, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Le 01/06/2013 16:04, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : In some places they use jammers but no wide Internet block out. I am using turkcell and Turksat. Is that ok with you? Thank you. Do you have stronger evidence of jammers? A picture for instance? Maybe the network is just overloaded in some places? So you confirm Twitter Facebook are not blocked on Turkcell? Or they are not blocked on Turksat? Or both? Thank you:) -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Sent from XFINITY Connect Mobile App -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
