Chloe Hoffman scripsit:
You may want to take a look at Stewart v. Abend.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=USvol=495invol=207
An interesting case, but not really apropos, because the pre-1976
copyright renewal scheme, like the corresponding termination provisions
in
. Conversion
by mere mechanical act doesn't constitute creation of
derivative work.
regards,
alexander.
To: Alexander Terekhov/Germany/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Alexander Terekhov scripsit:
Why is it a derivative work
Alexander Terekhov scripsit:
To me, compilers (and tools like http://world.altavista.com)
do nothing but transliteration, not translation in the
legal sense. I may be wrong, of course.
A strong point, certainly; but I think legal language, like ordinary
language, applies mechanical to only
In addition to the point made, you might inquire whether what a machine
does when compiling code is an apt comparison to what an individual does
when translating text. My answer is no since machines cannot be authors
under Copyright law.
Rod
On Mon, 9 Feb 2004, John Cowan wrote:
Alexander
Alexander Terekhov scripsit:
To me, compilers (and tools like http://world.altavista.com)
do nothing but transliteration, not translation in the
legal sense. I may be wrong, of course.
I may be off the mark, but to me, part of the implied question
(perhaps in an earlier post?) is whether
Rod Dixon scripsit:
In addition to the point made, you might inquire whether what a machine
does when compiling code is an apt comparison to what an individual does
when translating text. My answer is no since machines cannot be authors
under Copyright law.
Questionless. But machines don't
Cowan'
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Scott,
my understanding is the same as Larry's. Copyright provides exclusive
plenary rights to the owner. Patents provide the owner only with the
right to exclude others. I think the distinction was grounded in the
fact
John Cowan wrote:
[...]
Questionless. But machines don't compile code, people use
machines to compile code. Similarly, you can use the GIMP
to colorize a photograph (thus creating a derivative work),
Absent some additional creative input (e.g. selection of
color) from human being, I
PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 10:34 AM
To: Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
If, when impeded in some way from undertaking one of the actions
exclusive
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
If, when impeded in some way from undertaking one of the actions
exclusive to the copyright holder, a copyright holder could go to court
and use the copyright rights to overcome the impediment - that would be
an exercise of an affirmative right.
In
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
- rights that are enumerated in the Bill of Rights, such as relating to
free speech;
Well, very good. Let's take free speech and plug it into your
explication of affirmative rights:
If, when impeded in some way from undertaking one of the actions
]
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 1:19 PM
To: Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
- rights that are enumerated in the Bill of Rights, such as relating
to free speech;
Well, very good. Let's take
(not to Bob).
-- Scott
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 1:19 PM
To: Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
- rights
Hmm...there is a part of your argument that is appealing in a conceptual
sense, and I think it would be correct to say that Copyright law has
allowed for distinctions between the compiled program and source code. For
example, one could refer to source code as a literal aspect of software
and at
helpful to think of copyright
as a negative right.
-- Scott
-Original Message-
From: Tony Stanco [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, February 07, 2004 8:07 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal); 'John Cowan'
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act
Ruth A. Kramer wrote:
I may be off the mark, but to me, part of the implied question
(perhaps in an earlier post?) is whether a compiled program is a
derivative work of the compiler?
IANAL, but in my understanding it is not. It is, however, a derived
work of the source code, IIUC.
Usually
transferred the asserted copyright to someone else (not to Bob).
-- Scott
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 1:19 PM
To: Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts
: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Scott,
my understanding is the same as Larry's. Copyright provides exclusive
plenary rights to the owner. Patents provide the owner only with the
right to exclude others. I think the distinction was grounded in the
fact that it would be hard to conflict
Putting aside the issue that a 3 line computer program may lack the
minimal indicia of originality to be copyrightible in the first place,
strictly speaking, what Bob may do with his derivative work (if that one
line code is copyrightible) may depend upon whether Bob wants to
distribute the work
John Cowan wrote:
[...]
A tarball that contains works by various authors is a compilation
work; a compiled program made from that tarball is a derivative
work of the individual files of the tarball, ...
Why is it a derivative work? I could imagine a computer
(interpreter) that can run
regards,
Tony
- Original Message -
From: Lawrence E. Rosen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'John
Cowan' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 8:39 PM
Subject: RE: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Scott Peterson
Alan writes an original computer program. It is 3 lines long. It is called
Hello world.
Bob takes Alan's program and replaces line 2. The new program is called
Goodbye asshole.
Goodbye asshole is a derivative work.
If Bob did not have Alan's permission to create a derivative work then he
gets
is exclusive and no one may impose a condition without that
person's concious agreement to waive that right.
-- Scott
-Original Message-
From: daniel wallace [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 6:44 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
A copyright holder does not have a right to make a copy. Rather, the
copyright holder has the right to prevent others from making a copy.
Of course the copyright holder has the right to make a copy of the work.
That is to say that each person has a duty
: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
A copyright holder does not have a right to make a copy. Rather, the
copyright holder has the right to prevent others from making a copy.
Of course the copyright holder has the right
Scott writes:
(A)
You say: each person has a duty not to hinder him [the author making a
copy of his own work].
I am aware of no basis in US copyright law for such a duty. I am aware
of no basis in US copyright law for a positive right to make a copy. By
writing something down, you become
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Scott writes:
(A)
You say: each person has a duty not to hinder him [the author making a
copy of his own work].
I am aware of no basis in US copyright law for such a duty. I am aware
of no basis in US copyright law for a positive right to make a copy. By
: John Cowan [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 1:08 PM
To: Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal)
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
A copyright holder does not have a right to make a copy. Rather, the
copyright
Ferrell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 4:49 PM
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
A copyright owner (owner of a wholly original work) has a number of
affirmative exclusive rights:
17 U.S.C.A. § 106
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 4:49 PM
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
A copyright owner (owner of a wholly original work) has a number of
affirmative exclusive rights:
17 U.S.C.A. § 106
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 17
Scott Peterson wrote:
The rights provided under US copyright law are negative
rights (the right to exclude others), not positive rights
(the right to do something yourself).
I don't think so, Scott. At least that's not how the copyright act reads:
...The owner of copyright under this
Peterson, Scott K (HP Legal) scripsit:
By writing something down, you become a copyright owner. That ownership
right does not give you any special privilege or right to copy,
distribute, etc. that work. If others have rights that are infringed by
such acts, they are free to assert those
Peter Fairbrother scripsit:
Yes. In a derivative work, the second author has the right to make copies of
his contribution to the derivative work, but he has no right at all to make
copies of the whole derivative work.
[analogous points snipped]
You sound like you are describing a collective
John Cowan wrote:
Peter Fairbrother scripsit:
Yes. In a derivative work, the second author has the right to make copies of
his contribution to the derivative work, but he has no right at all to make
copies of the whole derivative work.
[analogous points snipped]
You sound like you are
Peter Fairbrother scripsit:
No, a derivative work. Eg, the first author writes a book, the second
author makes a film of the book. The film is a derivative work. The
film director needs two seperate permissions from the book author:
one permission to make a derivative work, and another
Daniel and Russell,
I've been following this discussion with a great deal of interest, and because
I'm fairly inexperienced in the topic at hand, I hope that one or both of you
will clarify something for me...
On Wednesday 28 January 2004 03:44 am, daniel wallace wrote:
It does not. The GPL
1) There is an exclusive right of an original author to
prepare (authorize) a derivative work. This is granted
under section 106(2) of the Copyright Act.
2) Two distinct exclusive copyrights exist in an
authorized derivative work. The preexisting author's
copyright in the material which will form
daniel wallace scripsit:
When you impose a condition on another person's exclusive legal
rights you are asking that person to wave a legal right. After all,
the right is exclusive and no one may impose a condition without
that person's concious agreement to waive that right.
Very good. But
Perhaps these comments from the annointed version of
the Copright Act will clarify things:
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
HOUSE REPORT NO. 94-1476
Section 103 complements section 102: A
PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
daniel wallace scripsit:
When you impose a condition on another person's exclusive legal
rights you are asking that person to wave a legal right. After all,
the right is exclusive and no one may impose a condition without
that person's
daniel wallace scripsit:
The most important
point here is one that is commonly misunderstood today: copyright in
a ''new version'' covers only the material added by the later author,
and has no effect one way or the other on the copyright or public
domain status of the preexisting material.
Ken Brown scripsit:
I think Daniel makes an interesting point. But let me ask since you
emailed me your conversations. Who is the original owner of Linux?
Well (to be Clintonesque), that depends on what you mean by Linux. I'll
assume you mean the kernel. It also depends on whether a court
Ryan Ismert scripsit:
It seems to me that what Russell is suggesting (or what one could suggest,
even if Russell is not) is that the condition being imposed is not in fact a
condition on an exclusive right -- the distribution of a derivative work--,
as Daniel holds, but rather a condition
Cc: 'daniel wallace'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Copyright Act preempts the GPL
Ken Brown scripsit:
I think Daniel makes an interesting point. But let me ask since you
emailed me your conversations. Who is the original owner of Linux?
Well (to be Clintonesque), that depends on what
Ken Brown wrote:
Well, if everything else is a derivative...then how can anyone claim to
be the original owner? I mean how many original owners can you have?
There can only be one, whether the license says you can transfer it to
10,000 people...right?
Why can't there be more than one? Why can't
Wow, I have seldom seen hair sliced so thinly!
Caveat. I am not a US lawyer. I am not a lawyer at all. This is not
legal advice.
From: daniel wallace [EMAIL PROTECTED]
How then, do you permit a derivative work to be distributed?
This is usually done at the time the preexisting author
On Wed, 28 Jan 2004, Ken Brown wrote:
Well, if everything else is a derivative...then how can anyone claim to
be the original owner? I mean how many original owners can you have?
There can only be one, whether the license says you can transfer it to
10,000 people...right?
You have to
Section 103 (b) of the Copyright Act says:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material.
daniel wallace scripsit:
Section 103 (b) of the Copyright Act says:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive
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