Corné Plooy via Lightning-dev
writes:
> For instance, the attacking intermediate node might guess that the next
> node in the route is the final node; it can test this by completely
> replacing the onion packet it sends to the next node with a self-written
> onion packet that has the next hop as f
Except we have invoices with no specified amount (payer dictates how much to
pay).
Which is why we need to send the total amount to the payee as part of the onion
final hop, for the case the invoice has no specified amount.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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Good morning CJP,
> > > I think we could stop this type of attack by including some kind of
> > > shared secret in the onion message to the final node:
> > > I think we get this "for free" if we switch to path decorrelation and
> > > points+privkeys instead of hashes+preimages.
> >
> > Path deco
Dear Joao,
there are the people from BHB Networks (in Itally) working on colored coins
for Bitcoin and Lightning. The main contributor seems to be Alekos Filini.
As far as I understand there is quite some progress. You can find more
information in their spec repo at:
https://github.com/rgb-org/spe
Hi list,
Thank you all for the great work. LN is looking amazing!
I was wondering if there is any discussion about exchanging colored-coins or
non-fungible tokens through the LN.
Or even issuance, which I'm not seeing how it would be possible, but recognise
that this space is full of surprises
Which brings us back to the initial proposal that just signals the
awareness of a temporary underpayment with the single "more is coming"-bit.
On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 11:49 PM Rusty Russell wrote:
> ZmnSCPxj writes:
> > But what if 2 of those paths fail?
> > It would be better to merge them into
>> I think we could stop this type of attack by including some kind of
>> shared secret in the onion message to the final node:
> I think we get this "for free" if we switch to path decorrelation and
> points+privkeys instead of hashes+preimages.
>
> Path decorrelation means that each hop is giv
Good morning CJP,
> I think we could stop this type of attack by including some kind of
> shared secret in the onion message to the final node:
I think we get this "for free" if we switch to path decorrelation and
points+privkeys instead of hashes+preimages.
Path decorrelation means that each
Thanks Christian, that makes sense. Unfortunately it's not very clear
from the BOLT, at least not for me.
Now that I think of this type of attack: *in general* the HMAC prevents
this kind of attack, but isn't the attack still possible in certain
specific cases?
For instance, the attacking interm
