Good Morning.
Yes it is stated that relationship anonymity gets violated.
This probably implies that all the intermediate hops know the entire route,
and thus who the ultimate sender and receiver are, thus utterly bad for
privacy. Hopefully my reading is wrong, or this is fixable, but if neither,
i
Some of the feedback I received from the check-in for the dual-funding
proposal this past Monday was along the lines that we look at simplifying
for breaking it into smaller, more manageable chunks.
The biggest piece of the dual-funding protocol update is definitely the
move from a single peer con
Right, but there are approaches that are not as susceptible - an
obvious, albeit somewhat naive, approach would be to define a fixed and
proportional max fee, and pick a random (with some privacy properties eg
biasing towards old or good-reputation nodes, routing across nodes
hosted on different IS
Good morning Matt,
Thread-hijack...
> route-hijacks (aka someone providing routing for a lower fee
> and users happily taking it)
I observe that this is something of a catch-22.
If users *notice* lower fees and go to lower-fee channels, then route-hijacking
is possible and surveillors can pay
Note the distinction - there is almost nothing done today to prevent
spam and route-hijacks (aka someone providing routing for a lower fee
and users happily taking it) in the routing DB today. The issue of
anti-DoS is somewhat different - we do have reasonable protection from
someone OOM'ing every
Good morning Subhra,
> So introducing proof of knowledge of fund locked instead of revealing the
> amount of fund locked by counterparties will introduce added complexity while
> routing but how effective is this going to be against handling attacks like
> hijacking of routes and channel exhaus
Why require a funding locked? Just require proof-of-UTXO - its only for
anti-DoS, again there is no reason to require a standard lightning
channel on-chain for this.
In general proving 2-of-2 multisig UTXO ownership doesn't do much to
prevent route hijacking to begin with, so it shouldn't be much
Good morning Subhra,
The paper does not describe how Lightning works today, so I was confused.
It seems to claim to have a constant *lock time*, but still a decrementing
*amount*, across the entire payment attempt.
In any case: any offchain updateable cryptocurrency system can host any
contract
So introducing proof of knowledge of fund locked instead of revealing the
amount of fund locked by counterparties will introduce added complexity
while routing but how effective is this going to be against handling
attacks like hijacking of routes and channel exhaustion ?
On Mon, Jan 27, 2020, 20:
Note that there's no real reason lightning nodes *have* to have
confidence in that - if a node routes your payment to the next hop, how
they do it doesn't really matter. Allowing things like non-lightning
"channels" (eg just a contractual agreement to settle up later between
two mutually-trusting p
Hey thanks for clearing the confusion. Well then may be we can look out for
such a provision in off chain payment systems for Monero.
On Mon, Jan 27, 2020, 13:20 Ugam Kamat wrote:
> Hey Subhra – In order to have faith that the channel announced by the
> nodes is actually locked on the Bitcoin ma
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