Hi Zeeman,
> i.e. I send my high-fee RBF-enabled channel funding to you, at the same
time I send a conflicting low-fee RBF-disabled transaction (that pays the
entire channel amount to myself) to all the miners I can find.
Mapping miners mempools will be a cost in spying infrastructure and thus
ma
Good morning Lloyd,
I think this is excellent work overall.
With that said...
> - It is more elegant as there are half the number of possible transactions.
> I
> expect this will follow through to reduced implementation complexity and
> maybe
> make it easier to explain as well.
I
# Abstract
This is a proposal for a new channel symmetric channel construction
that uses the
key idea from a recent paper called "Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels"[1]
and tries to practically apply it to lightning. If you prefer, you can
read the rendered
markdown version here: https://gith
Hi Matt and thanks for your notes.
On Mon, 24 Aug 2020 at 22:22, Matt Corallo wrote:
>
> A few notes.
>
> Given gossip messages will be rejected by many nodes if no such on-chain
> transaction exists, I don't think you can
> "re-broadcast" gossip messages at that time, instead I believe you simp
