Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Hi Varad,
Thanks for your review!
On Tue, Apr 13, 2021 at 04:28:11PM +0200, Varad Gautam wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 3/9/21 10:10 AM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> > extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> > which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> > verification.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> > ---
> > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> > include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> > struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> > struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> > const unsigned char *v = value;
> > + int i = 0;
> > + enum OID oid;
> >
> > pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> >
> > @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > hdrlen,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> > + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ) ||
> > + v[1] != vlen - 2)
>
> A bad cert might get here with vlen < 2, which would cause indexing into v to
> break.
> Please add a check for vlen >= 2 before this.
>
I will add the check, thanks for your suggestion!
> > + return -EBADMSG;
> > + i += 2;
> > +
> > + while (i < vlen) {
> > + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> > +* ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> > + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i + 10) >
> > vlen)
>
> Same here, for i == (vlen - 1), v[i + 1] would fetch outside of v. Or, does
> the
> ASN.1 layout protect against this?
>
I will move the "(i + 10) > vlen" to the front of "v[i + 1] != 8". It can avoid
that the last octet blob is less than 10 bytes.
Thanks!
Joey Lee
> > + return -EBADMSG;
> > +
> > + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> > + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> > + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> > + }
> > + i += 10;
> > + }
> > + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > index 47accec68cb0..1ccaebe2a28b 100644
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct public_key {
> > bool key_is_private;
> > const char *id_type;
> > const char *pkey_algo;
> > + unsigned int eku : 9; /* Extended Key Usage (9-bit) */
> > };
> >
> > extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> > diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> > index 4462ed2c18cd..e20e8eb53b21 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> > @@ -113,9 +113,14 @@ enum OID {
> > OID_SM2_with_SM3, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.501 */
> > OID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.504 */
> >
> > + /* Extended key purpose OIDs [RFC 5280] */
> > + OID_codeSigning,/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 */
> > +
> > OID__NR
> > };
> >
> > +#define EKU_codeSigning(1 << 2)
> > +
> > extern enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize);
> > extern int sprint_oid(const void *, size_t, char *, size_t);
> > extern int sprint_OID(enum OID, char *, size_t);
> >
>
> --
> SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
> Maxfeldstr. 5
> 90409 Nürnberg
> Germany
>
> HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
> Geschäftsführer: Felix Imendörffer
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Hi,
On 3/9/21 10:10 AM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> verification.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> const unsigned char *v = value;
> + int i = 0;
> + enum OID oid;
>
> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>
> @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> return 0;
> }
>
> + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ) ||
> + v[1] != vlen - 2)
A bad cert might get here with vlen < 2, which would cause indexing into v to
break.
Please add a check for vlen >= 2 before this.
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + i += 2;
> +
> + while (i < vlen) {
> + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> + * ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i + 10) >
> vlen)
Same here, for i == (vlen - 1), v[i + 1] would fetch outside of v. Or, does the
ASN.1 layout protect against this?
> + return -EBADMSG;
> +
> + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> + }
> + i += 10;
> + }
> + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 47accec68cb0..1ccaebe2a28b 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct public_key {
> bool key_is_private;
> const char *id_type;
> const char *pkey_algo;
> + unsigned int eku : 9; /* Extended Key Usage (9-bit) */
> };
>
> extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> index 4462ed2c18cd..e20e8eb53b21 100644
> --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> @@ -113,9 +113,14 @@ enum OID {
> OID_SM2_with_SM3, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.501 */
> OID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.504 */
>
> + /* Extended key purpose OIDs [RFC 5280] */
> + OID_codeSigning,/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 */
> +
> OID__NR
> };
>
> +#define EKU_codeSigning (1 << 2)
> +
> extern enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize);
> extern int sprint_oid(const void *, size_t, char *, size_t);
> extern int sprint_OID(enum OID, char *, size_t);
>
--
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
Maxfeldstr. 5
90409 Nürnberg
Germany
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Felix Imendörffer
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > With eBPF around, does this make any sense? bpf/ebpf may be partially disabled if you boot in secure boot mode - not sure whether that affects this. David
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 11:23:06PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 04:32:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 12:23:53PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> > > Hi Jarkko,
> > >
> > > On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 01:40:48AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:05:14PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > > > > This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> > > > > extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> > > > > which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> > > > > verification.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> > > > > ---
> > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> > > > >
> > > > > include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> > > > > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> > > > > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > > index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> > > > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > > @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > > > hdrlen,
> > > > > struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> > > > > struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> > > > > const unsigned char *v = value;
> > > > > + int i = 0;
> > > > > + enum OID oid;
> > > > >
> > > > > pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> > > > >
> > > > > @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > > > hdrlen,
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> > > > > + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT |
> > > > > ASN1_SEQ) ||
> > > > > + v[1] != vlen - 2)
> > > > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > > > + i += 2;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + while (i < vlen) {
> > > > > + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> > > > > + * ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> > > > > + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i +
> > > > > 10) > vlen)
> > > > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> > > > > + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> > > > > + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > + i += 10;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
> > > >
> > > > With eBPF around, does this make any sense?
> > > >
> > >
> > > I think that the dynamic debug log is still easier for checking the EKU
> > > setting.
> >
> > Why?
>
> There have some certificates may loaded when system boot. In booting stage,
> using dynamic debug log for checking EKU is easier than eBPF.
>
> I am not good on eBPF. Correct me if I missed anything, please!
I think it's fine have it, thanks.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 04:32:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 12:23:53PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> > Hi Jarkko,
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 01:40:48AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:05:14PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > > > This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> > > > extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> > > > which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> > > > verification.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> > > > ---
> > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> > > > include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> > > > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> > > > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> > > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > > @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > > hdrlen,
> > > > struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> > > > struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> > > > const unsigned char *v = value;
> > > > + int i = 0;
> > > > + enum OID oid;
> > > >
> > > > pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> > > >
> > > > @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > > hdrlen,
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> > > > + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT |
> > > > ASN1_SEQ) ||
> > > > + v[1] != vlen - 2)
> > > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > > + i += 2;
> > > > +
> > > > + while (i < vlen) {
> > > > + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> > > > +* ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> > > > + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i +
> > > > 10) > vlen)
> > > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > > +
> > > > + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> > > > + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> > > > + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> > > > + }
> > > > + i += 10;
> > > > + }
> > > > + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
> > >
> > > With eBPF around, does this make any sense?
> > >
> >
> > I think that the dynamic debug log is still easier for checking the EKU
> > setting.
>
> Why?
There have some certificates may loaded when system boot. In booting stage,
using dynamic debug log for checking EKU is easier than eBPF.
I am not good on eBPF. Correct me if I missed anything, please!
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 12:23:53PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
>
> On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 01:40:48AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:05:14PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > > This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> > > extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> > > which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> > > verification.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> > > ---
> > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> > > include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> > > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> > > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > > @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > hdrlen,
> > > struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> > > struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> > > const unsigned char *v = value;
> > > + int i = 0;
> > > + enum OID oid;
> > >
> > > pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> > >
> > > @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > > hdrlen,
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> > > + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ) ||
> > > + v[1] != vlen - 2)
> > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > + i += 2;
> > > +
> > > + while (i < vlen) {
> > > + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> > > + * ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> > > + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i + 10) >
> > > vlen)
> > > + return -EBADMSG;
> > > +
> > > + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> > > + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> > > + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> > > + }
> > > + i += 10;
> > > + }
> > > + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
> >
> > With eBPF around, does this make any sense?
> >
>
> I think that the dynamic debug log is still easier for checking the EKU
> setting.
Why?
> Thanks
> Joey Lee
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Hi Jarkko,
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 01:40:48AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:05:14PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> > extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> > which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> > verification.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> > ---
> > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> > include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> > @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> > struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> > struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> > const unsigned char *v = value;
> > + int i = 0;
> > + enum OID oid;
> >
> > pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> >
> > @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t
> > hdrlen,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> > + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ) ||
> > + v[1] != vlen - 2)
> > + return -EBADMSG;
> > + i += 2;
> > +
> > + while (i < vlen) {
> > + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> > +* ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> > + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i + 10) >
> > vlen)
> > + return -EBADMSG;
> > +
> > + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> > + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> > + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> > + }
> > + i += 10;
> > + }
> > + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
>
> With eBPF around, does this make any sense?
>
I think that the dynamic debug log is still easier for checking the EKU
setting.
Thanks
Joey Lee
Re: [PATCH 1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:05:14PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
> extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the eku flag
> which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7
> verification.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi"
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index 52c9b455fc7d..65721313b265 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> const unsigned char *v = value;
> + int i = 0;
> + enum OID oid;
>
> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>
> @@ -526,6 +528,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> return 0;
> }
>
> + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) {
> + if (v[0] != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ) ||
> + v[1] != vlen - 2)
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + i += 2;
> +
> + while (i < vlen) {
> + /* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob =
> + * ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */
> + if (v[i] != ASN1_OID || v[i + 1] != 8 || (i + 10) >
> vlen)
> + return -EBADMSG;
> +
> + oid = look_up_OID(v + i + 2, v[i + 1]);
> + if (oid == OID_codeSigning) {
> + ctx->cert->pub->eku |= EKU_codeSigning;
> + }
> + i += 10;
> + }
> + pr_debug("extKeyUsage: %d\n", ctx->cert->pub->eku);
With eBPF around, does this make any sense?
/Jarkko
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 948c5203ca9c..07a1b28460a2 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct public_key {
> bool key_is_private;
> const char *id_type;
> const char *pkey_algo;
> + unsigned int eku : 9; /* Extended Key Usage (9-bit) */
> };
>
> extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> index 4462ed2c18cd..e20e8eb53b21 100644
> --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> @@ -113,9 +113,14 @@ enum OID {
> OID_SM2_with_SM3, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.501 */
> OID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.504 */
>
> + /* Extended key purpose OIDs [RFC 5280] */
> + OID_codeSigning,/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 */
> +
> OID__NR
> };
>
> +#define EKU_codeSigning (1 << 2)
> +
> extern enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize);
> extern int sprint_oid(const void *, size_t, char *, size_t);
> extern int sprint_OID(enum OID, char *, size_t);
> --
> 2.16.4
>
>
