On 17 July 2018 at 03:15, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Hi Ard,
>
>
>
> On 07/11/2018 05:00 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>
>> On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>
>>> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
>>> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data
Hi Ard,
On 07/11/2018 05:00 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI
On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active
On 3 July 2018 at 23:46, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 04:16:57PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> I agree with Ard, it may be good idea to extend the UEFI spec to
>> include encryption information. Having this information may be helpful
>> in some cases, e.g if we ever need to
On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 04:16:57PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> I agree with Ard, it may be good idea to extend the UEFI spec to
> include encryption information. Having this information may be helpful
> in some cases, e.g if we ever need to map a specific non IO memory as
> unencrypted. So far
On 7/3/18 10:44 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> (dropping stable@ as this is not how you send patches to stable).
>
> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 05:37:18PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in
On 7/3/2018 8:32 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the
(dropping stable@ as this is not how you send patches to stable).
On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 05:37:18PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> > flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi:
On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active
SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO
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