On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Oded Arbel wrote:
You seem to imply that with off-the-record, both a third party that has
access to the entire session can prove the identity of at least one side
of it (destroying deniability) and that on a second session one cannot
be assured of the identity of the other p
On Mon, 2007-02-05 at 21:24 +0200, Peter wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Oded Arbel wrote:
>
> > That doesn't work with simple session only encryption, and what I don't
> > understand is how they both offer assurance and deniability, if the next
> > time I'm talking with the same guy I can be assured
On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Oded Arbel wrote:
That doesn't work with simple session only encryption, and what I don't
understand is how they both offer assurance and deniability, if the next
time I'm talking with the same guy I can be assured of his identity but
he can later claim that it wasn't him.
On Mon, 2007-02-05 at 17:55 +0200, Peter wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Alon Altman wrote:
>
> > On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Oded Arbel wrote:
> >>
> >> It seems like they claim both deniability and and assurance (which is
> >> what you get from signing, except w/o the signing part) at the same
> >> time.
