Currently there are trace events for the various RAS
errors with the exception of ARM processor type errors.
Add a new trace event for such errors so that the user
will know when they occur. These trace events are
consistent with the ARM processor error section type
defined in UEFI 2.6 spec
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Add a basic sandbox tool to create a process isolated from some part of
> the system. This sandbox create a read-only environment. It is only
> allowed to write to a character device such as a TTY:
>
> # :> X
> # echo
Currently there are trace events for the various RAS
errors with the exception of ARM processor type errors.
Add a new trace event for such errors so that the user
will know when they occur. These trace events are
consistent with the ARM processor error section type
defined in UEFI 2.6 spec
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Add a basic sandbox tool to create a process isolated from some part of
> the system. This sandbox create a read-only environment. It is only
> allowed to write to a character device such as a TTY:
>
> # :> X
> # echo $?
> 0
> #
Currently external aborts are unsupported by the guest abort
handling. Add handling for SEAs so that the host kernel reports
SEAs which occur in the guest kernel.
When an SEA occurs in the guest kernel, the guest exits and is
routed to kvm_handle_guest_abort(). Prior to this patch, a print
Currently external aborts are unsupported by the guest abort
handling. Add handling for SEAs so that the host kernel reports
SEAs which occur in the guest kernel.
When an SEA occurs in the guest kernel, the guest exits and is
routed to kvm_handle_guest_abort(). Prior to this patch, a print
UEFI spec allows for non-standard section in Common Platform Error
Record. This is defined in section N.2.3 of UEFI version 2.5.
Currently if the CPER section's type (UUID) does not match with
any section type that the kernel knows how to parse, trace event
is not generated for such section. And
UEFI spec allows for non-standard section in Common Platform Error
Record. This is defined in section N.2.3 of UEFI version 2.5.
Currently if the CPER section's type (UUID) does not match with
any section type that the kernel knows how to parse, trace event
is not generated for such section. And
SEA exceptions are often caused by an uncorrected hardware
error, and are handled when data abort and instruction abort
exception classes have specific values for their Fault Status
Code.
When SEA occurs, before killing the process, report the error
in the kernel logs.
Update fault_info[] with
SEA exceptions are often caused by an uncorrected hardware
error, and are handled when data abort and instruction abort
exception classes have specific values for their Fault Status
Code.
When SEA occurs, before killing the process, report the error
in the kernel logs.
Update fault_info[] with
When a memory error, CPU error, PCIe error, or other type of hardware error
that's covered by RAS occurs, firmware should populate the shared GHES memory
location with the proper GHES structures to notify the OS of the error.
For example, platforms that implement firmware first handling may
When a memory error, CPU error, PCIe error, or other type of hardware error
that's covered by RAS occurs, firmware should populate the shared GHES memory
location with the proper GHES structures to notify the OS of the error.
For example, platforms that implement firmware first handling may
A RAS (Reliability, Availability, Serviceability) controller
may be a separate processor running in parallel with OS
execution, and may generate error records for consumption by
the OS. If the RAS controller produces multiple error records,
then they may be overwritten before the OS has consumed
A RAS (Reliability, Availability, Serviceability) controller
may be a separate processor running in parallel with OS
execution, and may generate error records for consumption by
the OS. If the RAS controller produces multiple error records,
then they may be overwritten before the OS has consumed
On 18/04/17 04:24 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> Try and write a stacked map_sg function like you describe and you will
> see how horrible it quickly becomes.
Yes, unfortunately, I have to agree with this statement completely.
> Since dma mapping is a performance path we must be careful not to
>
On 18/04/17 04:24 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> Try and write a stacked map_sg function like you describe and you will
> see how horrible it quickly becomes.
Yes, unfortunately, I have to agree with this statement completely.
> Since dma mapping is a performance path we must be careful not to
>
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 04:50 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
Unlike the pci bus address
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 04:50 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
On 18/04/17 04:50 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>>> support since shipping archs do this today,
On 18/04/17 04:50 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>>> support since shipping archs do this today, I think it is ok to
On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:15 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
>
> On 29/03/2017 12:35, Djalal Harouni wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
>>> @@ -25,6 +30,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
>>> struct seccomp {
>>> int mode;
>>>
On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:15 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
>
> On 29/03/2017 12:35, Djalal Harouni wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
>>> @@ -25,6 +30,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
>>> struct seccomp {
>>> int mode;
>>> struct seccomp_filter *filter;
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The seccomp(2) syscall can be used by a task to apply a Landlock rule to
> itself. As a seccomp filter, a Landlock rule is enforced for the current
> task and all its future children. A rule is immutable and a task can
>
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The seccomp(2) syscall can be used by a task to apply a Landlock rule to
> itself. As a seccomp filter, a Landlock rule is enforced for the current
> task and all its future children. A rule is immutable and a task can
> only add new
Hi Kees,
Thanks for your reviewing!
On 04/18/17 at 01:22pm, Kees Cook wrote:
> > static int
> > parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start, unsigned long long *size)
> > @@ -142,40 +112,33 @@ parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start,
> > unsigned long long *size)
> >
Hi Kees,
Thanks for your reviewing!
On 04/18/17 at 01:22pm, Kees Cook wrote:
> > static int
> > parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start, unsigned long long *size)
> > @@ -142,40 +112,33 @@ parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start,
> > unsigned long long *size)
> >
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:46 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 10:27 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > FWIW, RDMA probably wouldn't want to use a p2mem device either, we
>> > already have APIs that map BAR memory to user space, and would like to
>>
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:46 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 10:27 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > FWIW, RDMA probably wouldn't want to use a p2mem device either, we
>> > already have APIs that map BAR memory to user space, and would like to
>> > keep using them. A
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:42 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:28:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>
>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>> support since shipping archs do this toda
>
> But we can support
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:42 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:28:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>
>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>> support since shipping archs do this toda
>
> But we can support this by modifying those arch's
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>> support since shipping archs do this today, I think it is ok to say
>> p2p is restricted to a
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:48 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
>> support since shipping archs do this today, I think it is ok to say
>> p2p is restricted to a single sgl that gets
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:28:36PM +0200, Pali Rohár wrote:
> On Tuesday 18 April 2017 18:33:25 Darren Hart wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:07:06PM +0200, Rafael Wysocki wrote:
> > > On Monday, April 17, 2017 04:10:51 PM Darren Hart wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 03:03:29PM -0700,
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:28:36PM +0200, Pali Rohár wrote:
> On Tuesday 18 April 2017 18:33:25 Darren Hart wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:07:06PM +0200, Rafael Wysocki wrote:
> > > On Monday, April 17, 2017 04:10:51 PM Darren Hart wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 03:03:29PM -0700,
On 19/04/2017 00:23, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
>> integration with seccomp (next commit).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün
>> Cc: Kees Cook
On 19/04/2017 00:23, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
>> integration with seccomp (next commit).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün
>> Cc: Kees Cook
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski
>> Cc: Will
On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
> support since shipping archs do this today, I think it is ok to say
> p2p is restricted to a single sgl that gets to talk to host memory or
> a single device. That said, what's
On 18/04/17 04:28 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
> support since shipping archs do this today, I think it is ok to say
> p2p is restricted to a single sgl that gets to talk to host memory or
> a single device. That said, what's
Hi Florian,
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:29:55PM -0700, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> Hey Guenter,
>
> On 04/18/2017 01:58 PM, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > Hi Markus,
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:17:02PM -0700, Markus Mayer wrote:
> >> From: Markus Mayer
> >>
> >> This driver
Hi Florian,
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:29:55PM -0700, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> Hey Guenter,
>
> On 04/18/2017 01:58 PM, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > Hi Markus,
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:17:02PM -0700, Markus Mayer wrote:
> >> From: Markus Mayer
> >>
> >> This driver allows access to DRAM
On Fri, 14 Apr 2017 17:07:50 +0300 Andrey Ryabinin
wrote:
> Some direct write fs hooks call invalidate_inode_pages2[_range]()
> conditionally iff mapping->nrpages is not zero. If page cache is empty,
> buffered read following after direct IO write would get stale data
On Fri, 14 Apr 2017 17:07:50 +0300 Andrey Ryabinin
wrote:
> Some direct write fs hooks call invalidate_inode_pages2[_range]()
> conditionally iff mapping->nrpages is not zero. If page cache is empty,
> buffered read following after direct IO write would get stale data from
> the cleancache.
>
On 19/04/2017 00:17, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem
>> event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS.
>>
>> A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g.
On 19/04/2017 00:17, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem
>> event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS.
>>
>> A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g.
>> struct file,
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:28:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
> support since shipping archs do this toda
But we can support this by modifying those arch's unique dma_ops
directly.
Eg as I explained, my
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:28:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Unlike the pci bus address offset case which I think is fundamental to
> support since shipping archs do this toda
But we can support this by modifying those arch's unique dma_ops
directly.
Eg as I explained, my
On 04/19/2017 12:36 AM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 20:25 +0200, Marek Vasut wrote:
>> On 04/18/2017 04:21 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>>> As per request from Marek Vasut, change the following:
>>
>> Does that really have to be in the commit message ? ^_^'
>>
>>>- Replace
On 04/19/2017 12:36 AM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 20:25 +0200, Marek Vasut wrote:
>> On 04/18/2017 04:21 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>>> As per request from Marek Vasut, change the following:
>>
>> Does that really have to be in the commit message ? ^_^'
>>
>>>- Replace
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 20:25 +0200, Marek Vasut wrote:
> On 04/18/2017 04:21 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> > As per request from Marek Vasut, change the following:
>
> Does that really have to be in the commit message ? ^_^'
>
> >- Replace indentation between type and name of local variable
On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 20:25 +0200, Marek Vasut wrote:
> On 04/18/2017 04:21 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> > As per request from Marek Vasut, change the following:
>
> Does that really have to be in the commit message ? ^_^'
>
> >- Replace indentation between type and name of local variable
Hey Guenter,
On 04/18/2017 01:58 PM, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> Hi Markus,
>
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:17:02PM -0700, Markus Mayer wrote:
>> From: Markus Mayer
>>
>> This driver allows access to DRAM properties, such as the refresh rate,
>> via the Broadcom STB DDR PHY Front
Hey Guenter,
On 04/18/2017 01:58 PM, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> Hi Markus,
>
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:17:02PM -0700, Markus Mayer wrote:
>> From: Markus Mayer
>>
>> This driver allows access to DRAM properties, such as the refresh rate,
>> via the Broadcom STB DDR PHY Front End (DPFE). The
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:15 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 03:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
>> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> I
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 3:15 PM, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
> On 18/04/17 03:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
>> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> I think this opens an even bigger can of worms..
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:31:58PM -0600, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
> 1) It means that sg_has_p2p has to walk the entire sg and check every
> page. Then map_sg_p2p/map_sg has to walk it again and repeat the check
> then do some operation per page. If anyone is concerned about the
> dma_map
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:31:58PM -0600, Logan Gunthorpe wrote:
> 1) It means that sg_has_p2p has to walk the entire sg and check every
> page. Then map_sg_p2p/map_sg has to walk it again and repeat the check
> then do some operation per page. If anyone is concerned about the
> dma_map
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
> integration with seccomp (next commit).
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün
> Cc: Kees Cook
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
> integration with seccomp (next commit).
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün
> Cc: Kees Cook
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski
> Cc: Will Drewry
> ---
> include/linux/seccomp.h | 4
Hi Eddie,
Am Dienstag, 18. April 2017, 20:15:27 CEST schrieb Eddie Cai:
> firefly reload is very similar with firefly board, so reuse firefly dtsi
>
> Signed-off-by: Eddie Cai
> ---
> arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly-reload-core.dtsi | 310 --
>
Hi Eddie,
Am Dienstag, 18. April 2017, 20:15:27 CEST schrieb Eddie Cai:
> firefly reload is very similar with firefly board, so reuse firefly dtsi
>
> Signed-off-by: Eddie Cai
> ---
> arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly-reload-core.dtsi | 310 --
>
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem
> event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS.
>
> A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g.
> struct file, struct path...). Multiple LSM
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem
> event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS.
>
> A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g.
> struct file, struct path...). Multiple LSM hooks can trigger
On 18/04/17 03:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
I think this opens an even bigger can of worms..
>>>
>>> No, I don't think it does. You'd
On 18/04/17 03:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
I think this opens an even bigger can of worms..
>>>
>>> No, I don't think it does. You'd only shim when the target page is
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:26:03PM +, Ghannam, Yazen wrote:
> We definitely don't need to look at MiscV.
>
> But the value in MCA_ADDR isn't necessarily a system physical address. It can
> be,
> or it can be a normalized address in the case of UMCs, or it can a set/way
> for caches.
> So it
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:26:03PM +, Ghannam, Yazen wrote:
> We definitely don't need to look at MiscV.
>
> But the value in MCA_ADDR isn't necessarily a system physical address. It can
> be,
> or it can be a normalized address in the case of UMCs, or it can a set/way
> for caches.
> So it
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Add a new type of eBPF program used by Landlock rules.
>
> This new BPF program type will be registered with the Landlock LSM
> initialization.
>
> Add an initial Landlock Kconfig.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * rename file
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Add a new type of eBPF program used by Landlock rules.
>
> This new BPF program type will be registered with the Landlock LSM
> initialization.
>
> Add an initial Landlock Kconfig.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * rename file hooks.c to init.c
> *
On 2017-04-18 13:44, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 12:59:50PM +0200, Peter Rosin wrote:
>> On 2017-04-18 10:51, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 06:43:07PM +0200, Peter Rosin wrote:
+config MUX_GPIO
+ tristate "GPIO-controlled Multiplexer"
On 2017-04-18 13:44, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 12:59:50PM +0200, Peter Rosin wrote:
>> On 2017-04-18 10:51, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 06:43:07PM +0200, Peter Rosin wrote:
+config MUX_GPIO
+ tristate "GPIO-controlled Multiplexer"
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The goal of the program subtype is to be able to have different static
> fine-grained verifications for a unique program type.
>
> The struct bpf_verifier_ops gets a new optional function:
> is_valid_subtype(). This new
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The goal of the program subtype is to be able to have different static
> fine-grained verifications for a unique program type.
>
> The struct bpf_verifier_ops gets a new optional function:
> is_valid_subtype(). This new verifier is called
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:25:19PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:19:42PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:52:41AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > > Josh Poimboeuf writes:
> > > >
> > > > The error is working as designed. gcc <
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 01:25:19PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 03:19:42PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:52:41AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > > Josh Poimboeuf writes:
> > > >
> > > > The error is working as designed. gcc < 4.6.0 doesn't have
I am trying to figure out a storage latency issue I am seeing with oVirt
and iSCSI storage, and I am looking for a little help (or to be told
"you're doing it wrong" as usual).
I have an oVirt virtualization cluster running with 7 CentOS 7 servers,
a dedicated storage LAN (separate switches), and
I am trying to figure out a storage latency issue I am seeing with oVirt
and iSCSI storage, and I am looking for a little help (or to be told
"you're doing it wrong" as usual).
I have an oVirt virtualization cluster running with 7 CentOS 7 servers,
a dedicated storage LAN (separate switches), and
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > I think this opens an even bigger can of worms..
>>
>> No, I don't think it does. You'd only shim when the target page is
>> backed by a
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Jason Gunthorpe
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:11:33PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > I think this opens an even bigger can of worms..
>>
>> No, I don't think it does. You'd only shim when the target page is
>> backed by a device, not host memory, and you
On Tue, 18 Apr 2017, Minchan Kim wrote:
> > The purpose of the code that commit 623762517e23 ("revert 'mm: vmscan: do
> > not swap anon pages just because free+file is low'") reintroduces is to
> > prefer swapping anonymous memory rather than trashing the file lru.
> >
> > If all anonymous
On Tue, 18 Apr 2017, Minchan Kim wrote:
> > The purpose of the code that commit 623762517e23 ("revert 'mm: vmscan: do
> > not swap anon pages just because free+file is low'") reintroduces is to
> > prefer swapping anonymous memory rather than trashing the file lru.
> >
> > If all anonymous
On 18/04/17 03:03 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> What about something more incremental like this instead:
> - dma_ops will set map_sg_p2p == map_sg when they are updated to
> support p2p, otherwise DMA on P2P pages will fail for those ops.
> - When all ops support p2p we remove the if and
On 18/04/17 03:03 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> What about something more incremental like this instead:
> - dma_ops will set map_sg_p2p == map_sg when they are updated to
> support p2p, otherwise DMA on P2P pages will fail for those ops.
> - When all ops support p2p we remove the if and
Hi All,
As this has been a tradition for the last few years, we (I, Morten and
Kevin) are proposing a Power Management and Energy-Awareness
microconferece for the LPC this year, but of course it can only be
successful if there is enough material to cover.
If the recent OSPM-summit is any
Hi All,
As this has been a tradition for the last few years, we (I, Morten and
Kevin) are proposing a Power Management and Energy-Awareness
microconferece for the LPC this year, but of course it can only be
successful if there is enough material to cover.
If the recent OSPM-summit is any
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky
---
arch/x86/Kconfig
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the
Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the
> -Original Message-
> From: linux-edac-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-edac-
> ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Borislav Petkov
> Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 2:39 PM
> To: Ghannam, Yazen
> Cc: Tony Luck ; linux-edac
> -Original Message-
> From: linux-edac-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-edac-
> ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Borislav Petkov
> Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 2:39 PM
> To: Ghannam, Yazen
> Cc: Tony Luck ; linux-edac e...@vger.kernel.org>; lkml
> Subject: [RFC PATCH] x86/mce:
Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches
the address of an EFI table.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 33 +
include/linux/efi.h|7 +++
2 files changed, 40
Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches
the address of an EFI table.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 33 +
include/linux/efi.h|7 +++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
diff --git
Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory. Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.
Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory. Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.
The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted
state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(),
early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys(). Change all accesses
to use early_memremap()/early_memunmap(). This allows for proper setting
of the
The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted
state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(),
early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys(). Change all accesses
to use early_memremap()/early_memunmap(). This allows for proper setting
of the
Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline
area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to
not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption
mask
Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline
area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to
not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption
mask
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