Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 7 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 8288edc..31b44b8 100644
of kernel_read(), to integrity_kernel_read().
Changes in v3:
* Patch descriptions improved (Mimi)
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/iint.c | 78
Provide the function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyring.
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/digsig.c| 37
On 29 October 2014 23:22, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Oct 29, 2014 1:20 PM, "Mimi Zohar" wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 2014-10-29 at 11:51 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 11:36 AM, Dan Carpenter
>> > wrote:
>> > > On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 09:23:45AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski
On 29 October 2014 23:22, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
On Oct 29, 2014 1:20 PM, Mimi Zohar zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com wrote:
On Wed, 2014-10-29 at 11:51 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 11:36 AM, Dan Carpenter
dan.carpen...@oracle.com wrote:
On Wed, Oct
Sorry, this was the wrong version of the patch.
Please ignore this patch and use what is in the reply to this patch:
[PATCH v3 1/1] evm: check xattr value length and type in
evm_inode_setxattr()
- Dmitry
On 28/10/14 13:31, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no va
a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP
[ 1106.400020] CR2:
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 9 ++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 del
a_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[ 261.564109] RSP
[ 261.564109] CR2:
[ 261.58] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++
security/integrity/integr
File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security
patch fixes the oops and must go to
the stable and the second patch limits setting of file hash to fix
and log modes and may go to the next kernel version via normal process.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (3):
ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()
ima: limit file hash
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index b392fe6..1384e4b 100644
--- a/security/integri
patch fixes the oops and must go to
the stable and the second patch limits setting of file hash to fix
and log modes and may go to the next kernel version via normal process.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (3):
ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()
ima: limit file hash
[ 1106.400020] RIP [812af7b8] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP 88002917fd50
[ 1106.400020] CR2:
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
Cc: sta
[ 261.58] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++
security/integrity/integrity.h| 1 +
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git
File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions
] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 9 ++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
Sorry, this was the wrong version of the patch.
Please ignore this patch and use what is in the reply to this patch:
[PATCH v3 1/1] evm: check xattr value length and type in
evm_inode_setxattr()
- Dmitry
On 28/10/14 13:31, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value
On 24/10/14 18:00, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 24/10/14 17:18, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> On Fri, 2014-10-24 at 10:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>> ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
>>> check the length so that following command can be
On 24/10/14 17:18, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-10-24 at 10:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
>> check the length so that following command can be used to produce
>> kernel oops: setfattr -n securit
Hi,
At first I did not notice Mimi's email with suggestion to allow
setting hash only in fix mode. Here is a next set with checking
validity of xattr type and allowing setting hash only in permissive
modes such as fix and log.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (2):
ima: check xattr value length
ed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index b392fe6..1384e4b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/int
trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 13 +++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 9226854..e302cbf
68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8
[ 261.564109] RIP [812af272] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[ 261.564109] RSP 880042be3d50
[ 261.564109] CR2:
[ 261.58] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
] RIP [812af7b8] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP 88002917fd50
[ 1106.400020] CR2:
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/evm
Hi,
At first I did not notice Mimi's email with suggestion to allow
setting hash only in fix mode. Here is a next set with checking
validity of xattr type and allowing setting hash only in permissive
modes such as fix and log.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (2):
ima: check xattr value length
On 24/10/14 17:18, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Fri, 2014-10-24 at 10:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes
On 24/10/14 18:00, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
On 24/10/14 17:18, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Fri, 2014-10-24 at 10:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr
On 23 October 2014 18:40, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Thu 23-10-14 16:47:17, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
>> check the length so that following command can be used to produce
>> kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima
Hi,
Here is couple of patches to fix bugs reported by Jan Kara
to prevent kernel oopses when setxattr() is called without
xattr values.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (2):
ima: check xattr value length in ima_inode_setxattr()
evm: check xattr value length in evm_inode_setxattr()
security
02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP [] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP
[ 1106.400020] CR2:
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_
03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8
[ 261.564109] RIP [] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[ 261.564109] RSP
[ 261.564109] CR2:
[ 261.58] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integri
/0x5a
[ 261.564109] RSP 880042be3d50
[ 261.564109] CR2:
[ 261.58] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions
/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP 88002917fd50
[ 1106.400020] CR2:
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---
Reported-by: Jan Kara j...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 9 ++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions
Hi,
Here is couple of patches to fix bugs reported by Jan Kara
to prevent kernel oopses when setxattr() is called without
xattr values.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (2):
ima: check xattr value length in ima_inode_setxattr()
evm: check xattr value length in evm_inode_setxattr()
security
On 23 October 2014 18:40, Jan Kara j...@suse.cz wrote:
On Thu 23-10-14 16:47:17, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch
On 16/10/14 15:31, David Howells wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
>> /tmp/ccgSFKJd.o: In function `display_openssl_errors':
>> sign-file.c:(.text+0x4e): undefined reference to `ERR_peek_error'
>> sign-file.c:(.text+0xa1): undefined reference to `ERR_error_string'
>>
On 16/10/14 15:31, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
/tmp/ccgSFKJd.o: In function `display_openssl_errors':
sign-file.c:(.text+0x4e): undefined reference to `ERR_peek_error'
sign-file.c:(.text+0xa1): undefined reference to `ERR_error_string
Hi Mimi,
Thanks for reply. I will fix your comments.
I am on LinuxCon EU at the moment.
Fixing as have a time :)
- Dmitry
On 13 October 2014 19:32, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-10-10 at 17:09 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Currently secure IMA/EVM initialization has to be
Hi Mimi,
Thanks for reply. I will fix your comments.
I am on LinuxCon EU at the moment.
Fixing as have a time :)
- Dmitry
On 13 October 2014 19:32, Mimi Zohar zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com wrote:
On Fri, 2014-10-10 at 17:09 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
Currently secure IMA/EVM initialization has
-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
include/linux/integrity.h | 6 ++
init/main.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/iint.c | 11 +++
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 83222ce..c2d6082 100644
--- a/include
enabled.
-Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (6):
integrity: provide integrity_read_file()
integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: require signature based appraisal
VFS
Hello Andrew,
I have just posted updated patchset.
Please check patch description where I discuss your questions and
related changes.
Thanks,
Dmitry
On 30/07/14 00:37, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> On Wed, 2014-07-16 at 23:26 +030
Provide function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyrings.
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/digsig.c| 37 -
security
integrity_kernel_read() duplicates the file read operations code
in vfs_read(). This patch refactors vfs_read() code creating a
helper function __vfs_read(). It is used by both vfs_read() and
integrity_kernel_read().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
fs/read_write.c | 24
initialization
script can initialize EVM key, update the IMA policy and change further
requirement of everything to be signed.
Changes in v2:
* policy change of this patch separated from the key loading patch
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 7 +++
security
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig| 15 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 17 +
security/integrity/integrity.h| 8
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity
as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/iint.c | 78 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 35 ++---
security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig| 15 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 17 +
security/integrity/integrity.h| 8
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima
as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/iint.c | 78 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 35 ++---
security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 32 deletions
initialization
script can initialize EVM key, update the IMA policy and change further
requirement of everything to be signed.
Changes in v2:
* policy change of this patch separated from the key loading patch
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 7
integrity_kernel_read() duplicates the file read operations code
in vfs_read(). This patch refactors vfs_read() code creating a
helper function __vfs_read(). It is used by both vfs_read() and
integrity_kernel_read().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
fs/read_write.c
Provide function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyrings.
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/digsig.c| 37
Hello Andrew,
I have just posted updated patchset.
Please check patch description where I discuss your questions and
related changes.
Thanks,
Dmitry
On 30/07/14 00:37, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Mimi Zohar zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com wrote:
On Wed, 2014-07-16 at 23
enabled.
-Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (6):
integrity: provide integrity_read_file()
integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: require signature based appraisal
VFS
-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
include/linux/integrity.h | 6 ++
init/main.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/iint.c | 11 +++
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 83222ce..c2d6082
On 7 October 2014 20:17, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 08:11:42PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> If file_set_fowner op is now type of "void", how you can actually
>> return the value?
>> I think compiler must give error. How could you compil
On 4 September 2014 15:38, Jeff Layton wrote:
> security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
> __f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
> callers.
>
> Cc: linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton
On 4 September 2014 15:38, Jeff Layton jlay...@primarydata.com wrote:
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
On 7 October 2014 20:17, Christoph Hellwig h...@infradead.org wrote:
On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 08:11:42PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
If file_set_fowner op is now type of void, how you can actually
return the value?
I think compiler must give error. How could you compile it?
Returning void
On 06/10/14 15:44, James Morris wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Oct 2014, David Howells wrote:
>
>> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>
>>> BTW. But actually why signer is needed to find the key?
>>> Every key has unique fingerprint.
>> The SKID is by no means guaranteed uniqu
Hi David,
I just applied these 3 patches, but got build problems..
sign-file.c cannot be build.
Log attached...
Any ideas?
Thanks
- Dmitry
On 03/10/14 17:30, David Howells wrote:
> Hi Rusty,
>
> In the current module signing code, we try to use the subject and subjKeyId
> fields from X.509
Hi David,
I just applied these 3 patches, but got build problems..
sign-file.c cannot be build.
Log attached...
Any ideas?
Thanks
- Dmitry
On 03/10/14 17:30, David Howells wrote:
Hi Rusty,
In the current module signing code, we try to use the subject and subjKeyId
fields from X.509
On 06/10/14 15:44, James Morris wrote:
On Fri, 3 Oct 2014, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
BTW. But actually why signer is needed to find the key?
Every key has unique fingerprint.
The SKID is by no means guaranteed unique, is not mandatory and has
On 03/10/14 16:40, David Howells wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
>> BTW. But actually why signer is needed to find the key?
>> Every key has unique fingerprint.
> The SKID is by no means guaranteed unique, is not mandatory and has no defined
> algorithm for generating i
On 03/10/14 15:53, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 03/10/14 15:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
>>> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>>
>>>> Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
>>>> signi
On 03/10/14 15:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
>> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>
>>> Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
>>> signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
>>>
>>>
On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
>> Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
>> signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
>>
>> This patch fixes this problem without change module signature
&g
On 03/10/14 15:13, David Howells wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
>> [ 132.820302] CR2: ffea
> Looks like I leaked an error number somewhere.
>
> David
>
Yes... I found..
Check patches I posted.
Also here
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin
On 03/10/14 15:12, David Howells wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
>> Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
>> also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
>>
>> Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Su
sysfs entry as in original design
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 23 ---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 23 ++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b
If rule is a comment, there is no need to allocate entry.
Move checking for comment before allocating entry.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima
Hi,
Here is few policy loading interface improvements.
Refer to the patches descriptions for details.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (4):
ima: report policy load status
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: use atomic bit
Empty policy lines cause parsing failures which is, especially
for new users, hard to spot. This patch prevents it.
It is now possible to 'cat policy > /ima/policy'.
Changes in v2:
* strip leading blanks and tabs in rules to prevent parsing failures
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
secur
Audit messages are rate limited and often policy update info
is not visible. Report policy loading status also using pr_info.
Changes in v2:
* reporting moved to ima_release_policy to notice parsing errors
* reporting both completed and failed status
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security
Hi David,
I slightly update what I posted and added one fix and one suggestion on
the top.
Here is those patches on the top of Jame's tree...
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git/log/?h=keys-fixes
- Dmitry
On 03/10/14 12:09, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> I repor
Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
This patch fixes this problem without change module signature
data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
kernel/module_signing.c | 16 +---
1 file changed, 5
I reported yesterday problems with new KEYS.
Module signature verification is broken, integrity subsystem verification is
broken, kernel oopses.
Here is few fixes.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (4):
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
KEYS: provide pure subject key identifier (fingerprint
] [] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
[ 132.820302] [] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
[ 132.820302] [] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff
Latest KEYS code return error if hexadecimal string length id odd.
Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
---
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
b/security/integrity
Earlier KEYs code used pure subject key identifies for
searching keys. Latest merged code removed that and broke
compatibility with integrity subsytem signatures and original
format of module signatures.
This patch returns back fingerprint and partial matching.
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Earlier KEYs code used pure subject key identifies for
searching keys. Latest merged code removed that and broke
compatibility with integrity subsytem signatures and original
format of module signatures.
This patch returns back fingerprint and partial matching.
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Latest KEYS code return error if hexadecimal string length id odd.
Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
b/security
+0x6a/0x7a
[ 132.820302] [812b0390] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
[ 132.820302] [81161db2] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
[ 132.820302] [812ada30] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat
I reported yesterday problems with new KEYS.
Module signature verification is broken, integrity subsystem verification is
broken, kernel oopses.
Here is few fixes.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (4):
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
KEYS: provide pure subject key identifier (fingerprint
Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
This patch fixes this problem without change module signature
data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
kernel/module_signing.c | 16 +---
1
Hi David,
I slightly update what I posted and added one fix and one suggestion on
the top.
Here is those patches on the top of Jame's tree...
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git/log/?h=keys-fixes
- Dmitry
On 03/10/14 12:09, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
I reported
Audit messages are rate limited and often policy update info
is not visible. Report policy loading status also using pr_info.
Changes in v2:
* reporting moved to ima_release_policy to notice parsing errors
* reporting both completed and failed status
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat
Hi,
Here is few policy loading interface improvements.
Refer to the patches descriptions for details.
- Dmitry
Dmitry Kasatkin (4):
ima: report policy load status
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: use atomic bit
Empty policy lines cause parsing failures which is, especially
for new users, hard to spot. This patch prevents it.
It is now possible to 'cat policy securityfs/ima/policy'.
Changes in v2:
* strip leading blanks and tabs in rules to prevent parsing failures
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
If rule is a comment, there is no need to allocate entry.
Move checking for comment before allocating entry.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security
sysfs entry as in original design
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 23 ---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 23 ++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security
On 03/10/14 15:12, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
Identifier
On 03/10/14 15:13, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
[ 132.820302] CR2: ffea
Looks like I leaked an error number somewhere.
David
Yes... I found..
Check patches I posted.
Also here
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux
On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
This patch fixes this problem without change module signature
data.
This isn't
On 03/10/14 15:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id.
This patch fixes this problem without change
On 03/10/14 15:53, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
On 03/10/14 15:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
On 03/10/14 15:46, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
Latest KEYS code change the way keys identified and module
signing keys are not searchable anymore with original id
On 03/10/14 16:40, David Howells wrote:
Dmitry Kasatkin d.kasat...@samsung.com wrote:
BTW. But actually why signer is needed to find the key?
Every key has unique fingerprint.
The SKID is by no means guaranteed unique, is not mandatory and has no defined
algorithm for generating it.
SKID
On 2 October 2014 19:04, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
>> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
>>
>> [9.812332] Re
On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
>
> [9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Gla
Hi David,
I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
[9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl
101 - 200 of 735 matches
Mail list logo
