* Jan Kiszka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Maybe, maybe not. I followed the comment in the original code, saying
> that we need word-wise access for I/O memory poking. Can I assume
> across a all archs that __copy_to/from_user will not perform byte
> accesses if count is 2, 4, or 8? I would be
* Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> all other places already use probe_kernel_{read|write}. (Now, there
> are a few stray TASK_SIZE checks still, i'll double check them and
> convert them to access_ok() checks.)
all the TASK_SIZE checks relate to the soft breakpoint write accesses.
and
* Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > +static int kgdb_get_mem(char *addr, unsigned char *buf, int count)
> > {
> > + if ((unsigned long)addr < TASK_SIZE)
> > + return -EFAULT;
> >
> > + return probe_kernel_read(buf, addr, count);
> > }
>
> Ok, so this is a pretty fun
Linus Torvalds wrote:
On Sun, 10 Feb 2008, Jan Kiszka wrote:
+static int kgdb_get_mem(char *addr, unsigned char *buf, int count)
{
+ if ((unsigned long)addr < TASK_SIZE)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return probe_kernel_read(buf, addr, count);
}
Ok, so this is a pretty function
* Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > +static int kgdb_get_mem(char *addr, unsigned char *buf, int count)
> > {
> > + if ((unsigned long)addr < TASK_SIZE)
> > + return -EFAULT;
> >
> > + return probe_kernel_read(buf, addr, count);
>
> Ok, so this is a pretty function a
On Sun, 10 Feb 2008, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>
> +static int kgdb_get_mem(char *addr, unsigned char *buf, int count)
> {
> + if ((unsigned long)addr < TASK_SIZE)
> + return -EFAULT;
>
> + return probe_kernel_read(buf, addr, count);
> }
Ok, so this is a pretty function after all
* Jan Kiszka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [This still runs fine here, but sharp eyes are always welcome!]
>
> Cleanup of the way kgdb
> - accesses unsafe memory via probe_kernel_*
> - converts to/from hex representation
> - passes errors due to such accesses around
>
> At this chance I also
>
> so lets please all keep that goal in mind. This is not about "will we
> have KGDB support or not", this is about "WHERE will we have KGDB
> support", and i strongly support the notion that it should be in the
> core kernel, where we can keep it clean, tidy and architecturally agile.
I thin
On Feb 10, 2008 9:39 AM, Jan Kiszka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Ray Lee wrote:
> > unsigned int void u64_to_hex(u64 val, unsigned char *buf)
> > {
> > int i;
> > for (i=15; i>=0; i--) {
> > buf[i] = hexchars[ val & 0x0f ];
> > val >>= 4;
> >
[This still runs fine here, but sharp eyes are always welcome!]
Cleanup of the way kgdb
- accesses unsafe memory via probe_kernel_*
- converts to/from hex representation
- passes errors due to such accesses around
At this chance I also fix kgdb_ebin2mem, which was broken /wrt escape
sequence
Ray Lee wrote:
> On Feb 10, 2008 8:36 AM, Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
>> + } else if ((count == 8) && (((long)mem & 7) == 0)) {
>> + u64 tmp_ll;
>> + if (probe_kernel_address(mem, tmp_ll))
>> + return ERR_PTR
On Feb 10, 2008 8:36 AM, Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> + } else if ((count == 8) && (((long)mem & 7) == 0)) {
> + u64 tmp_ll;
> + if (probe_kernel_address(mem, tmp_ll))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> +
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