> On 29 Mar 2018, at 00:07, Luck, Tony wrote:
>
>> The default limit of only 65536 VMAs will also quickly come into play
>> if consecutive anon mmaps don't get merged. Of course this can be
>> raised, but it has significant resource and performance (fork) costs.
>
> Could
> The default limit of only 65536 VMAs will also quickly come into play
> if consecutive anon mmaps don't get merged. Of course this can be
> raised, but it has significant resource and performance (fork) costs.
Could the random mmap address chooser look for how many existing
VMAs have space
On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 09:55:08AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> > All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
> > creation. After that mmap build very predictable layout of address
> > space. It
On Fri 2018-03-30 12:07:58, Ilya Smith wrote:
> Hi
>
> > On 30 Mar 2018, at 10:55, Pavel Machek wrote:
> >
> > Hi!
> >
> >> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> >> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
> >> creation.
Hi
> On 30 Mar 2018, at 10:55, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> Hi!
>
>> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
>> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
>> creation. After that mmap build very predictable layout of address
>> space.
Hi!
> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
> creation. After that mmap build very predictable layout of address
> space. It allows to bypass ASLR in many cases. This patch make
> randomization of
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 02:49, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 03:53:53PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> I agree: pushing this off to libc leaves a lot of things unprotected.
>> I think this should live in the kernel. The question I have is about
>> making it
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a
>> performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take
> On 27 Mar 2018, at 17:38, Michal Hocko wrote:
>
> On Tue 27-03-18 16:51:08, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>
>>> On 27 Mar 2018, at 10:24, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon 26-03-18 22:45:31, Ilya Smith wrote:
> On 26 Mar 2018, at 11:46, Michal Hocko
On 03/23/2018 02:06 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 02:00:24PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 05:48:06AM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
Current implementation doesn't randomize address
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:49:04PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 03:53:53PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > I agree: pushing this off to libc leaves a lot of things unprotected.
> > I think this should live in the kernel. The question I have is about
> > making it
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 6:51 AM, Ilya Smith wrote:
>
>> On 27 Mar 2018, at 10:24, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>
>> On Mon 26-03-18 22:45:31, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>>
On 26 Mar 2018, at 11:46, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Fri 23-03-18
On Mon 26-03-18 22:45:31, Ilya Smith wrote:
>
> > On 26 Mar 2018, at 11:46, Michal Hocko wrote:
> >
> > On Fri 23-03-18 20:55:49, Ilya Smith wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 23 Mar 2018, at 15:48, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 12:29:52PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 03:16:21PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > Huh, I thought libc was aware of this. Also, I'd expect a libc-based
> > > implementation to restrict itself to, eg, only loading libraries in
> > > the bottom 1GB
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 02:00:24PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 05:48:06AM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
> > > Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> > > All the entropy ends with
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 05:48:06AM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
> > Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> > All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
> > creation. After that mmap
> On 23 Mar 2018, at 15:48, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
>> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
>> creation. After
Hello, Andrew
Thanks for reading this patch.
> On 22 Mar 2018, at 23:57, Andrew Morton wrote:
>
> On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 19:36:36 +0300 Ilya Smith wrote:
>
>> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
>> All the entropy
On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by mmap.
> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the process
> creation. After that mmap build very predictable layout of address
> space. It allows to bypass ASLR
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