On Oct 7, 2009, at 6:00 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
As far as I recall, Mailman removes DKIM signatures, and re-signs
messages.
Close, but the spirit is right. Mailman does remove DKIM headers, if
configured to do so via a site-wide option. The option is turned off
by default. This comment
Daniel,
> > [hacking the from] is not going to be acceptable to a lot of folks,
> Apart from the assertions of mailing list software developers I'm
> yet to receive a strong assertion from list operators or
> users.
Er, do you think we write open source purely out of charity? We are
all ope
Daniel Black wrote:
On Thursday 08 October 2009 17:07:30 Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Wouldn't it be more straightforward (not to mention that it would work
for many more lists) to have an LDSP RFC, whose first draft simply
takes the ADSP RFC and substitutes "mailing list" for "author"
everywhe
Stephen,
Thanks you for your responses.
On Thursday 08 October 2009 17:07:30 Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
> In that case it is very often a violation of ... RFC 5322). Surely you
already know that!
thanks for the reminder.
> That's a *lot* of history of best practice that you are dismissing,
The
Daniel Black writes:
> > You're saying that with ADSP, that's not adequate unless Mailman
> > first rewrites the "From:" address.
> yes
In that case it is very often a violation of RFC 733 (most familiarly
known as RFC 822, also STD 11, whose most recent incarnation is RFC
5322). Surely you
On Wednesday 07 October 2009 21:00:52 Ian Eiloart wrote:
> As far as I recall, Mailman removes DKIM signatures,
yes
> and re-signs messages.
not that I recall though the MTA is free to sign it on the way out and I
encourage all list owners to do so.
> You're saying that with ADSP, that's not adeq
--On 8 October 2009 00:21:08 +1100 Daniel Black wrote:
That last paragraph makes the job of reputation assignment harder where
mailing lists are concerned - but that's to be expected. The whole point
of DKIM, as far as I'm concerned, is to allow more sophisticated
assessment and assignment
--On 8 October 2009 00:21:08 +1100 Daniel Black wrote:
we know the message came from a mailing list,
this actually is the hard bit. Options for the recipient verifier are:
1. has a List-ID (or other signature) - must be a mailist. This allows
email spoofers just to add List-ID tags or a s
--On 8 October 2009 00:21:08 +1100 Daniel Black wrote:
It seems to me that it's sensible for the list software to test the DKIM
signature before and after any changes it makes to the message.
You can tell from the mailing list settings if it will break without
revalidating it. Same policies
--On 8 October 2009 00:21:08 +1100 Daniel Black wrote:
You're saying that with ADSP, that's not adequate unless Mailman first
rewrites the "From:" address.
yes, as its easiest place in the whole signing verification scenario to
make a change that benefits the most people without adversely
As far as I recall, Mailman removes DKIM signatures, and re-signs messages.
You're saying that with ADSP, that's not adequate unless Mailman first
rewrites the "From:" address. Some lists are configured to do this already,
the question is what to do about those that don't.
Dave Crocker suggest
I proposed some ideas around DKIM compatibility with mail lists and tried to
send here too. Obviously the anti-cross-post feature on mailman-
develop...@python.org is working well (which on some levels I appreciate).
As leading maillist product I'm keep to know your opinion. This has obviously
Folks,
Please excuse the massive cross post and reply to the dkim-dev list if
possible and it is of collective interest to many email list software
implementers.
I've put together a paper on DKIM that I've just put out for review. It is
available here[1] if anyone would like to review it. Feed
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